Emma Carver

The appellant tenant appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay over $1.1 million in alleged profits earned from a commercial sublease to the respondent landlord.

The motion judge had interpreted the lease to preclude the tenant from deducting the rent it paid for unusable open-air space on the sublet floor, and found the claim was governed by the 6-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's interpretation ignored the factual matrix and resulted in a commercial absurdity.

The tenant was entitled to deduct the full rent paid for the floor, meaning it incurred a $2.6 million loss, not a profit.

The Court also held that the obligation to remit profit was not 'rent', and therefore the 2-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

The Toronto Star and journalist Morgan Bocknek appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to quash a subpoena for journalistic notes related to an interview with a sexual assault complainant.

The subpoena was sought by the accused, Bruce Timothy Cavey, under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for potential prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision not to grant certiorari, finding that the trial judge was the appropriate forum to address issues of journalistic privilege and relevance within the s. 278 application process.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

This is an appeal concerning confidentiality orders in a civil action involving a minor plaintiff (P1), two minor defendants (D1, D2), and a school (XYZ School) with its employees.

The original motion judge had issued broad sealing and publication ban orders to protect the identities of the minor parties, extending to the school and its employees.

The appellants (P1 and Toronto Star) argued these orders were overbroad.

The Court of Appeal, applying the reformulated Sherman Estate test, found that while protecting the minors' identities was an important public interest, anonymizing the school and its employees was not necessary.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the broad sealing order and limiting the anonymity and publication bans to only the minor parties and their litigation guardians, along with specific identifying information, while allowing the school's identity to be public.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

This is a motion to quash appeals of a non-publication and sealing order.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order was final for the media (Toronto Star) as it finally determined their constitutional rights under s. 2(b) of the Charter, allowing their appeal to proceed as of right.

For the plaintiffs, the order was interlocutory, but the court exercised its discretion under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to hear their appeal concurrently due to the interrelation of the issues.

The motion to quash the appeals was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a sealing order and publication ban regarding her family law file following the highly public suicide of the respondent father, who died in a car explosion outside the courthouse.

Several media outlets intervened to oppose a broad ban.

The court applied the Dagenais-Mentuck-Sierra Club test, balancing the open court principle against the risk of harm to the children.

The court denied a complete sealing order but granted a tailored publication ban protecting the identities and personal information of the children, the mother, and extended family, and ordered the file to be initialized.

The appellant father and respondent mother both brought motions to introduce fresh evidence in an appeal from an arbitrator's decision declining to order their children be vaccinated.

The court applied a relaxed Palmer test, given the case involved the best interests of children.

The court admitted the father's fresh expert evidence regarding vaccine safety and the mother's genetic variation, as well as evidence challenging the credibility of one of the mother's experts.

The court also admitted the mother's fresh evidence from the children's family doctor regarding their current health and the psychological impact of the litigation.

A temporary publication ban on the children's health information was made permanent.

The moving parties, trustees of a family trust, sought to consolidate or temporarily stay an application for a passing of accounts and declarations of breach of fiduciary duty, pending the outcome of a complex related action concerning the ownership of family businesses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the two proceedings did not share common questions of fact or law, and that delaying the application would prejudice the beneficiaries' right to a timely accounting and preservation of trust assets.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion for a publication ban and sealing order in an appeal concerning child vaccination.

The mother, who brought the original motion, sought costs, arguing the father's publicizing of the case necessitated the motion and increased her expenses.

The father argued for no costs or costs payable to him, asserting he protected the children's identity and consented to much of the relief.

The court found that while the mother achieved some confidentiality protections, she did not obtain all the relief sought (e.g., sealing the file).

The court concluded that the motion would have been necessary regardless of the father's actions due to the open court principle and the need to notify media.

Therefore, the father's behaviour did not cause or increase the mother's costs, and no costs were ordered for the motion.

The appellant, FCT Insurance Company Ltd., appealed a trial judgment that found FCT responsible for losses sustained by the respondent, John Breen, arising from structural defects in a cottage property for which he had obtained title insurance.

The trial judge found that the defects rendered the title unmarketable and fell within the coverage of the title insurance policy, relying on the principles established in MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance Company of Canada.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying MacDonald to the facts of this case.

The court distinguished this case on two fundamental grounds: first, Mr. Breen was on notice at the time of purchase of potential problems with the building permit process; and second, even if a final inspection had been conducted, it would not have revealed the hidden construction defects.

The court concluded that the situation involved unmarketability of the land rather than the title, and that title insurance is designed to protect against defects that would be revealed by off-title searches, not hidden defects.

The appeal was allowed and the claim dismissed.

The children's mother (L.K.) brought a motion for a publication ban, file initialization, and sealing of the court file in an appeal concerning the vaccination status of the parties' children.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, finding a serious risk of harm and stigmatization to the children if their identities were revealed.

A tailored publication ban was ordered, prohibiting the publication of identifying information for the children (names, dates of birth, addresses, schools, genders, images, voices, and most health information, except their unvaccinated status) and the parties (names, voices, images).

The court also ordered that the title of proceedings and public documents use initials only, and that future publications not link to non-compliant prior reports.

The request to seal the court file and retroactively amend existing publications was dismissed due to lack of evidentiary basis and practical unenforceability, respectively.

The respondent mother brought a motion for a publication ban in a family law appeal concerning the vaccination of the parties' children.

The mother sought an interim publication ban and sealing order pending the hearing of the motion.

The court found that the mother had not provided proper notice to the media under the Practice Direction because she used initials instead of the parties' names.

The court granted an interim publication ban to preserve the mother's ability to argue for the children's privacy interests at the full hearing, and directed her to provide proper notice to the media using the parties' names.

O.P., suffering from end-stage glioblastoma, applied for a declaration that his planned physician-assisted death was permitted by law under the criteria established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5.

The applicant argued that court authorization was not legally required but sought a declaratory order for practical reasons due to healthcare providers' concerns about civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability, and issues with the Coroners Act.

The court rejected the premise that physician-assisted death was permissible without court order pending federal legislation, asserting that judicial authorization remained a constitutional remedy under s. 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to ensure the rule of law and safeguard vulnerable persons.

The court ultimately granted an authorization order for physician-assisted death, finding that O.P. met all the Carter criteria, and provided ancillary relief regarding the Coroners Act and Family Law Act.

The applicant, an almost 90-year-old man suffering from multiple severe, non-terminal medical conditions causing intolerable pain and suffering, sought judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death under the *Carter* constitutional exemption.

The court considered whether a medical condition must be terminal to qualify for such an exemption.

The Attorneys General took no position, while the respondent physicians supported the application.

The court granted the application, clarifying that a terminal illness is not a necessary precondition for a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted death, and that the death would not require coroner notification.

The applicant, an 80-year-old suffering from metastasized renal cancer and a broken pelvis, applied for judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death pursuant to the Carter constitutional exemption.

She was in intolerable pain with no hope of recovery and a prognosis of approximately three months to live.

The court found that she was competent, acting voluntarily, and met all the Carter criteria.

The application was granted, including a declaration that the assisting physicians were exempt from Criminal Code provisions and were not required to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The defendants, Workplace Health & Cost Solutions (WHCS) and The Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB), brought motions to strike the plaintiff, Dr. Brenda Steinnagel's, statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action or for being scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious.

The plaintiff alleged wrongful dismissal, economic torts, conspiracy, and fraudulent conduct, claiming the defendants orchestrated her termination for refusing to alter medical opinions to deny claimant benefits.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the statement of claim, read generously, sufficiently pleaded the causes of action, including unlawful interference with economic relations, inducing breach of contract, and unlawful act conspiracy.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the action could not succeed and that allegations of fraudulent conduct were relevant to the context of dismissal and potential punitive damages.

CD, suffering from stage 4 metastatic breast cancer, applied for judicial authorization of a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General).

She also sought a declaration that the physicians involved would not need to notify the coroner.

The court found that CD met all criteria for physician-assisted death, including grievous, terminal, and irremediable suffering, and that she was a competent adult freely consenting.

The application was granted, and a declaration was issued that coroner notification was unnecessary.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man with advanced-stage aggressive lymphoma, brought a preliminary motion for confidentiality orders in his application for physician-assisted death under the Carter framework.

He sought orders allowing him, his family, and his physicians to proceed anonymously, a publication ban on identifying information, and a sealing order for the application record, proposing to file a redacted version for the public.

The media respondents opposed the anonymity of the physicians and requested a 'counsel's eyes only' review of the unredacted record.

The court granted the motion, finding that the applicant's proposal struck the appropriate balance between the open court principle and the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the applicant, as well as the public interest in not deterring physicians from participating in such applications.