Michael Ian Binetti

The plaintiff developer entered into agreements of purchase and sale with the defendant for commercial properties, which included a mutual lease condition for a leaseback arrangement.

As the condition deadline approached, the defendant assured the plaintiff it would continue negotiating the leases but secretly sought board approval to sell the properties to a third party.

The defendant then terminated the agreements.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of good faith and honest performance, and was liable for negligent misrepresentation.

Applying promissory estoppel, the court held the defendant could not rely on its strict contractual rights to terminate.

The plaintiff was awarded $15.5 million in damages for lost profits.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the defendants' counterclaim was granted in part, the parties made submissions on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs based on the plaintiff's oppressive conduct and a prior award of punitive damages.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, finding it would result in double compensation, and instead awarded partial indemnity costs subject to a significant discount for time spent on unsuccessful allegations.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs to a defendant to the counterclaim who successfully defended against unproven allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff, the former President of a family-run painting corporation, brought an action for oppression and wrongful dismissal after being terminated and removed as a director.

The defendants counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the plaintiff misappropriated corporate funds, redirected rebates, and performed cash jobs for personal benefit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding his termination was justified for cause due to his dishonest conduct.

The court granted the counterclaim in part, ordering the plaintiff to pay $470,000 for redirected rebates and cash jobs, refund unauthorized transfers, disgorge profits, and pay $75,000 in punitive damages for reprehensible self-dealing.

The plaintiff brought a motion during trial for leave to withdraw an admission of fact contained in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

The admission was based on a handwritten note produced by the defendant.

Midway through the trial, the defendant produced new documentary evidence, including emails, that contradicted the handwritten note and the admission.

Applying the tripartite test under Rule 51.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that the new evidence raised a triable issue, provided a reasonable explanation for the withdrawal, and would not result in non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The motion was granted.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The plaintiffs in 17 auto parts price-fixing class actions brought motions for approval of distribution protocols, an order compelling automakers to produce customer information, and approval of honoraria for representative plaintiffs.

The court approved the Omnibus and CVJB Distribution Protocols, finding them fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also ordered the automakers to produce the requested customer information pursuant to section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and approved modest honoraria for the representative plaintiffs given their long-term commitment to the litigation.

The plaintiffs brought motions for the approval of 12 settlement agreements totaling $22.6 million in various class actions alleging price-fixing in the global automotive parts industry.

The court found that the proposed settlements fell within the 'zone of reasonableness,' as they were generally 8 to 10 percent of the comparable U.S. indirect purchaser settlements.

The court also approved class counsel's request for a 25 percent contingency fee, totaling approximately $5.4 million, plus disbursements, finding the fee presumptively valid and reasonable.

The appellants, who own taxicab licences in Toronto, sought to certify a class proceeding against the City of Toronto for economic losses allegedly caused by the City's failure to enforce its by-laws against Uber and other private transportation companies.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding it plain and obvious that the City did not owe the appellants a private law duty of care.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the City's regulatory role and its interactions with the appellants did not create a relationship of proximity, and that policy reasons regarding indeterminate liability negated any prima facie duty of care.

The plaintiff brought a motion in writing for an order compelling the defendants to produce a further and better affidavit of documents.

After the defendants filed their responding record and factum, the plaintiff filed multiple supplementary motion records containing new expert requests, which the defendants had no opportunity to review before leaving the country.

The court adjourned the motion sine die, directing the plaintiff to file a single, consolidated motion record and factum in compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure before the motion could proceed.

The plaintiffs, taxicab plate owners, brought a proposed $1.7 billion class action against the City of Toronto, alleging negligence in the enforcement of its taxicab bylaws against Uber and in the enactment of a new bylaw permitting private transportation companies.

The plaintiffs moved for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the City's enactment of the bylaw was a legislative function immune from private damage suits, and its enforcement of the bylaws was a public duty that did not create a private law duty of care to the taxicab plate owners for pure economic losses.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and the City of Toronto revoking permits for a sign on its property adjacent to Highway 401.

The MTO revoked its permit after determining the sign was a third-party billboard, which is prohibited within 400 metres of a controlled-access highway, rather than a permitted first-party location sign.

Toronto subsequently revoked its municipal permit because a valid MTO permit is a prerequisite.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the MTO's characterization of the sign as a third-party advertisement was reasonable, as the advertised law firm did not genuinely conduct business at the premises.

The court also found the applicant was not denied procedural fairness.

The applicant contractor sought an interim injunction staying the City of Toronto Chief Purchasing Official's decision to temporarily suspend it from bidding on city contracts.

The suspension was based on performance issues that occurred before the new Supplier Code of Conduct took effect.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding the applicant established a strong prima facie case that the Chief Purchasing Official lacked authority to suspend for conduct predating the Code, and that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if unable to bid on imminent solicitations.

Following a divided outcome on an application regarding taxi licensing by-laws, the intervenor, Taxiworkers Association of Ontario, sought costs against the applicant.

The court denied costs for the intervention and injunction motions because the intervenor was not a necessary party and participated on its own initiative.

However, the court awarded the intervenor $2,500 in costs for the main application, recognizing that its evidence was critical to the court's determination of the notice issue.

The appellant commenced an action in 1989 alleging the respondents dumped coal tar that migrated onto its property between 1924 and 1958.

In 2014, the motion judge dismissed the 25-year-old action for delay under Rule 24.01, finding the delay after 2003 was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the appellant failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice given the unavailability of key witnesses and documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's application of the test for dismissal for delay or his costs awards.

The applicant challenged municipal resolutions and by-law amendments implementing a new one-tier taxi licensing regime, alleging lack of notice, breach of the City's procedural by-law, and bad faith.

The court held that City Council was acting legislatively, not administratively, so no common law duty of procedural fairness applied.

The court further held that Council could consider the referred recommendations and that adequate notice had been given for the general TTL reforms, but not for the newly introduced mandatory 2024 deadline requiring all licences to convert.

That notice failure was a substantive breach going to the root of validity, so only the mandatory conversion deadline was quashed; the remainder of the regime was upheld and the bad faith claim failed.

The plaintiff commenced an action in 1989 alleging the defendants dumped coal tar waste that migrated onto its property.

After 25 years of litigation, the defendants moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that while the initial 14 years of delay were excusable due to collaborative settlement efforts, the plaintiff's failure to advance the litigation after 2003 was inordinate and inexcusable.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, as it had not preserved the evidence of key witnesses who had since passed away.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

A contractor sought to enforce lien and related claims against a land vendor after a hotel purchaser defaulted on payment for servicing work on the parcel to be sold.

The court held the vendor was not an owner within sections 1.1 or 18 of the Construction Lien Act for the impugned work, finding no request, privity, consent, or joint/common ownership status that would ground liability.

Claims in unjust enrichment and quantum meruit were rejected because the deprivation flowed from the purchaser’s contractual breach and no corresponding enrichment by the vendor was established.

The court found the contractor’s proven damages remained those already reflected in judgments against the purchaser.

The action was dismissed with costs, but the contractor was found entitled to a lien against the purchaser’s $25,000 deposit held by the vendor.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a partially successful application for judicial review regarding the municipal reimbursement of legal expenses for city councillors.

The Divisional Court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs of $15,000 payable by the city, noting the lack of complexity and partial success.

The court declined to award costs against the individual councillors, and ordered the applicant to pay $5,000 in costs to one councillor who successfully opposed the relief sought against him personally.

The applicant, a Toronto city councillor, brought an application for judicial review to quash municipal by-laws authorizing the reimbursement of legal expenses for three other councillors.

The expenses related to compliance audits of election campaign finances and defamation actions.

The Divisional Court held that the by-law reimbursing expenses for the compliance audits was ultra vires, as the expenses were not incurred in the councillors' capacity as members of council.

However, the court upheld the by-law reimbursing expenses for a defamation action brought by a sitting councillor, finding it was reasonably connected to her duties.

The application was granted in part.