Meredith Hayward

The plaintiff developer entered into agreements of purchase and sale with the defendant for commercial properties, which included a mutual lease condition for a leaseback arrangement.

As the condition deadline approached, the defendant assured the plaintiff it would continue negotiating the leases but secretly sought board approval to sell the properties to a third party.

The defendant then terminated the agreements.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of good faith and honest performance, and was liable for negligent misrepresentation.

Applying promissory estoppel, the court held the defendant could not rely on its strict contractual rights to terminate.

The plaintiff was awarded $15.5 million in damages for lost profits.

The defendants in two related oppression actions brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to re-attend examinations for discovery to answer refused questions and to produce a solicitor's file.

The defendants also sought leave to examine a non-party.

The refused questions related to the plaintiffs' consultations with lawyers, which the defendants argued were relevant to their limitation period defence and discoverability.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested information and files were protected by solicitor-client privilege, which had not been waived, and were not relevant to the discoverability issue since the consultations occurred within the two-year limitation period.

The request to examine the non-party was also dismissed as the communications were privileged.

The applicants, beneficiaries of the Fitzhenry (1994) Family Trust, sought a declaration that the respondent trustee, Linda Stevens, had already received appropriate compensation and was not entitled to additional fees.

Ms. Stevens sought over $300,000 in additional compensation.

The court found that Ms. Stevens and co-trustees breached the trust deed by failing to obtain beneficiary consent for fees and by delegating duties without proper oversight.

Applying the "five factors" for trustee compensation, the court determined that Ms. Stevens had been adequately compensated for her services, especially given the extensive delegation of management duties to other professionals and her failure to adhere to trust terms.

The court dismissed Ms. Stevens' claim for additional compensation and ordered her to pay the applicants' costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion during trial for leave to withdraw an admission of fact contained in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

The admission was based on a handwritten note produced by the defendant.

Midway through the trial, the defendant produced new documentary evidence, including emails, that contradicted the handwritten note and the admission.

Applying the tripartite test under Rule 51.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that the new evidence raised a triable issue, provided a reasonable explanation for the withdrawal, and would not result in non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The motion was granted.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The appellants, who own taxicab licences in Toronto, sought to certify a class proceeding against the City of Toronto for economic losses allegedly caused by the City's failure to enforce its by-laws against Uber and other private transportation companies.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding it plain and obvious that the City did not owe the appellants a private law duty of care.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the City's regulatory role and its interactions with the appellants did not create a relationship of proximity, and that policy reasons regarding indeterminate liability negated any prima facie duty of care.

The plaintiffs in a class action sought court approval for a settlement agreement with certain defendants, class counsel fees and disbursements, and honorariums for the representative plaintiffs.

The settlement amount was $37 million.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair and reasonable given the litigation risks, including dissolved corporate entities and limitations issues.

The court also approved the 30% contingency fee for class counsel and $50,000 honorariums for each representative plaintiff, recognizing their exceptional involvement and exposure to costs.

The plaintiff sued his investment advisors, actuaries, and lawyers for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging they misled him into commuting his teacher's pension to establish an Individual Pension Plan (IPP) that risked revocation by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The actuaries and lawyers brought motions for summary judgment arguing the claims were statute-barred and the plaintiff suffered no damages, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

After the plaintiff discontinued the action against all defendants except the lawyers, the court dismissed both the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and the damages branch of the lawyers' motion, finding genuine issues for trial that were not appropriate for summary determination.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking injunctive relief and an Anton Piller order against former employees and a competing corporation.

Evidence indicated that one former employee downloaded thousands of confidential corporate files prior to leaving employment and that the defendants were using the information to compete for the plaintiff’s principal customer.

Applying the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure as articulated in RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the plaintiff’s business, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The court held that the defendants’ conduct arguably breached contractual confidentiality obligations, restrictive covenants, and duties of confidence.

Injunctive relief restraining the defendants’ conduct was granted.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim for defamation and mental distress against his former employer, and his third-party claim against an insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment, noting the age of the case.

The Court found no error in the dismissal of the counterclaim, as the employer's actions were justified by its investigation into the appellant's business practices.

The third-party claim was properly dismissed because the appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of the 'claims made and reported' insurance policy.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant created a calendar and sold advertising space to pharmaceutical companies.

The respondent, a trade association, directed its members not to advertise in the calendar, claiming it violated their Code of Marketing Practices.

This direction destroyed the appellant's business.

The appellant sued for intentional interference with economic relations.

The trial judge found the respondent's initial letter was tortious but cured by a subsequent legitimate ruling.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the respondent had no authority under its Code to prohibit members from advertising in third-party products.

The Court held the unauthorized ruling constituted unlawful means, satisfying the elements of the tort of intentional interference with economic relations, and directed a reference on damages.