Murray Stieber

The moving defendants brought a motion on consent of all parties to transfer the action from St. Thomas to Toronto.

The action arose from a syndicated mortgage investment for a property in St. Thomas.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that none of the parties were located in Toronto and the only connection to Toronto was the location of counsel's offices.

The court held that the convenience of counsel is not a sufficient basis to transfer an action under Rule 13.1.02.

The applicants, CRD Construction Ltd. and Rob Leshuk, sought a declaration that their insurers, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada and Economical Mutual Insurance Company, had a duty to defend them against a counterclaim and to reimburse their legal fees.

The court found that Economical had waived its right to deny the duty to defend due to a reservation of rights letter and its acceptance.

However, the court found that the applicants' breaches of the duty of cooperation constituted non-compliance, making relief from forfeiture unavailable against Aviva, and that the applicants failed to prove their conduct was reasonable for relief from forfeiture against either insurer regarding the duty of cooperation.

Economical was ordered to defend and reimburse the applicants, while the application against Aviva was dismissed.

This endorsement from a case conference outlines a revised schedule for a class action proceeding.

The previous schedule for a certification motion was disrupted, necessitating a motion to amend the Statement of Claim.

The court approved a new timeline, setting dates for the service of motion records, cross-examinations, factum exchanges, and hearings for both the amendment motion (September 10, 2020) and the certification motion (November 26, 2020).

A case management conference was held for five related actions arising from a 2016 motor vehicle accident.

The court noted partial compliance with a previous timetable and ordered further deadlines for answering undertakings, arranging defence medical examinations, and serving expert reports.

The court also directed that the matters be tried together and admonished counsel for sending representatives without knowledge or authority to the case conference.

This endorsement outlines a case management order for five consolidated actions arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court, acting as case management judge, set a timetable for the remaining procedural steps, including the completion of examinations for discovery, answering undertakings, conducting defence medical examinations, and scheduling a mediation.

The order also directed counsel to circulate a draft consent order for trial of the actions together and to advise on the continuation of an action against a specific insurer.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to certify a class action and dismissing claims against three respondents on the basis that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The appellants conceded that the motion judge made no error in law but challenged his application of the principles relating to the duty of care to the facts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding his reasons correct and concluding that the appellants had pleaded no reasonable cause of action against the respondents.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's assessment of costs.

The moving party obtained a judgment for conversion against a lending corporation that unlawfully seized his equipment.

After the corporation declared bankruptcy, the moving party brought an action against the corporation's insurers under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that the tort of conversion involves interference with possessory rights, which does not constitute 'injury or damage to property' within the meaning of s. 132(1).

The claim was characterized as pure economic loss, which is not recoverable under the provision.

The third party, Mortgage Alliance Company of Canada Inc. (MA), moved for summary judgment to dismiss a third party claim brought by the defendant, Stephen Tzaras.

Stephen Tzaras had fraudulently transferred property and obtained a mortgage, leading to a cross-claim against him for fraud.

Stephen Tzaras then brought a third party claim against MA, alleging that MA's employee aided the fraudster and that MA failed to supervise its employee.

MA argued that Stephen Tzaras's claim was barred by issue estoppel, res judicata, or the defence of ex turpi causa.

The court dismissed MA's motion, finding that issue estoppel and res judicata did not apply as the issues in the cross-claim and third party claim were distinct, and the third parties were not involved in the prior summary judgment motion.

The court also held that ex turpi causa did not prevent a claim for contribution and indemnity from fellow fraudsters, distinguishing it from claims seeking to profit from illegal acts.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for $2.6 million in building replacement costs and $250,000 in business interruption losses after two windstorms damaged their mushroom farm buildings.

The defendant insurer argued that some damage pre-existed the storms and was excluded from coverage, relying on conflicting expert reports.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that the conflicting expert evidence regarding the cause and extent of the damage created a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court also held that the statutory appraisal process was not appropriate for resolving disputes involving policy interpretation and causation.

The plaintiff sued his investment advisors, actuaries, and lawyers for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging they misled him into commuting his teacher's pension to establish an Individual Pension Plan (IPP) that risked revocation by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The actuaries and lawyers brought motions for summary judgment arguing the claims were statute-barred and the plaintiff suffered no damages, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

After the plaintiff discontinued the action against all defendants except the lawyers, the court dismissed both the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and the damages branch of the lawyers' motion, finding genuine issues for trial that were not appropriate for summary determination.

A manufacturing company was charged with two strict liability offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to ensure safe procedures and provide adequate instruction and supervision regarding the movement of a heavy spindle component.

A worker was injured when a 10,000-pound spindle fell on his foot during an attempted rotation.

The court found the Crown proved the actus reus but accepted the due diligence defence, finding the accident was not reasonably foreseeable given the company's safety protocols, training programs, and the worker's deliberate deviation from established procedures using an unapproved method.

Contractors sought indemnity under a builder’s risk insurance policy for costs incurred repairing corroded aluminum window frames during construction of a Toronto building.

The corrosion resulted from exposure to de‑icing chemicals and trapped liquid caused by construction practices.

Insurers relied on policy exclusions for corrosion and faulty workmanship.

The court held the corrosion exclusion did not apply because the corrosion was caused by a peril not otherwise excluded, namely faulty workmanship, which the policy treated as covered resultant damage subject only to deduction of the cost that would have been incurred to rectify the workmanship before the loss occurred.

Coverage therefore applied, but the precise deduction for proper workmanship could not be determined on the record and required further process.

Two related actions challenged a municipality’s expropriation of commercial land that formed part of a 1,000‑acre assembly for a vehicle manufacturing plant.

The plaintiffs argued that the municipality unlawfully expropriated the property and conferred an illegal “bonus” on a private manufacturer by transferring the land at the expropriation price rather than its alleged fair market value, contrary to s. 106 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the municipality had lawful authority to expropriate the land for valid public purposes related to economic development.

Applying the contextual approach to s. 106 adopted in Friends of Lansdowne Inc. v. Ottawa (City), the court concluded that the transaction did not confer an “obviously undue advantage” on the private enterprise.

Accordingly, the expropriation and subsequent transfer did not breach the statutory prohibition on municipal bonuses.