Anne Thompson

Contractors sought indemnity under a builder’s risk insurance policy for costs incurred repairing corroded aluminum window frames during construction of a Toronto building.

The corrosion resulted from exposure to de‑icing chemicals and trapped liquid caused by construction practices.

Insurers relied on policy exclusions for corrosion and faulty workmanship.

The court held the corrosion exclusion did not apply because the corrosion was caused by a peril not otherwise excluded, namely faulty workmanship, which the policy treated as covered resultant damage subject only to deduction of the cost that would have been incurred to rectify the workmanship before the loss occurred.

Coverage therefore applied, but the precise deduction for proper workmanship could not be determined on the record and required further process.

The moving defendants brought a Rule 22 motion seeking determination of whether Ontario or Alberta law governed the plaintiff’s contractual and tort claims arising from a fire allegedly caused by a defective fryer and oven system supplied to an Alberta poultry processing plant.

The parties agreed that if Alberta law governed the tort claims, the claims would be statute‑barred under Alberta’s ultimate limitation period.

Applying the lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson v. Jensen, the court held that Alberta law governed the tort claims because the damage occurred in Alberta, and therefore those claims were dismissed as statute‑barred.

However, applying the “closest and most real connection” test for contractual choice of law, the court found the contract was most closely connected to Ontario, where the system was designed and supplied.

Ontario law therefore governed the contractual claims.

In a class proceeding arising from a major propane facility explosion, the plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim and certify claims against additional defendants associated with the ownership and leasing of the facility property.

The court considered whether the proposed amended pleading satisfied the s. 5(1)(a) requirement of the Class Proceedings Act by disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

Claims in strict liability and nuisance against the property-owning defendants were struck because the pleadings failed to meet the legal prerequisites and improperly characterized the alleged nuisance.

Negligence claims under the Occupiers’ Liability Act were also dismissed because the alleged damages occurred off the premises and the statute only applies to persons entering the premises.

However, the court held that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded a viable common law negligence claim based on the defendants’ alleged rights of control and failure to intervene in unsafe operations.

Certification against the remaining defendants proceeded solely on the basis of the common law negligence cause of action.

In a certified class proceeding arising from explosions at a propane facility, class counsel moved for an order restraining an insurer and its counsel from communicating directly with class members during the court‑approved opt‑out period.

The insurer’s counsel had sent letters stating the insurer would opt insured class members out of the class action and pursue their claims through a subrogated action.

The court held the communications were misleading, interfered with the solicitor‑client relationship between class counsel and class members, and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court reaffirmed that insureds retain control of litigation until fully indemnified for both insured and uninsured losses.

An order was made prohibiting the insurer and its counsel from communicating with affected class members without court approval or consent of class counsel during the opt‑out period.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action arising from explosions at a propane facility in Toronto that allegedly caused personal injury, property damage, and evacuation of nearby residents.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

It held that the pleadings against certain landlord defendants failed to disclose a viable cause of action because the allegations relying on agency, single‑group enterprise, and alter‑ego theories lacked material facts capable of piercing the corporate veil.

Those pleadings were struck with leave to amend and the certification motion against those defendants was adjourned.

The proceeding was otherwise certified as a class action against the remaining defendants, with common issues approved and representative plaintiffs appointed.