Dana Louise Eichler

Following a motion to strike where success was equally divided, the parties submitted written arguments on costs.

The moving parties had successfully struck personal claims against the individual defendants but failed to strike the oppression remedy claim.

The responding party had to amend its pleadings to save the oppression claim.

The court found neither party was substantially successful and fixed costs at $40,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable in the cause.

Following a motion to strike where personal claims against the individual defendants were struck but the oppression remedy claim survived, the court held a case management conference to settle the terms of the order.

The court issued a file direction settling the order and providing procedural directions for the delivery of a fresh as amended statement of claim, subsequent pleadings, and discovery.

The plaintiff sued a corporation and its directors for damages arising from defective shut-off valves.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the personal claims against the directors, including negligence, inducing breach of contract, piercing the corporate veil, and an oppression remedy.

The court struck the negligence and inducing breach of contract claims, applying the rule in Said v. Butt, and struck the claim to pierce the corporate veil.

However, the court declined to strike the oppression remedy claim, finding that the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient material facts to support a reasonable expectation that the corporation's affairs would be conducted to protect its interests as a creditor.

The appellant, a third party, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the effect of a Pierringer Agreement on third- and fourth-party claims.

The agreement, entered into by the plaintiffs and a settling defendant, limited the plaintiffs' claims against remaining defendants to several liability.

The appellant argued this precluded the remaining defendant from pursuing its third-party claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Pierringer Agreement and the subsequent order, while limiting the plaintiffs' recovery against the remaining defendant to its several liability, did not affect the remaining defendant's ability to seek contribution from third parties.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion to determine the effect of a Pierringer Agreement and a prior court order on the remaining claims against the non-settling defendant and subsequent third and fourth parties.

The court clarified that the prior order restricted the plaintiffs' claim against the remaining defendant to several liability, but did not affect the remaining defendant's ability to pursue contribution from third parties.

The motion was resolved with all parties ultimately agreeing on this interpretation, and costs were deferred to the pre-trial or trial judge.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granted in favour of the respondent on a motion concerning the interpretation of paragraph 20 of a Licence Agreement between Gro-Bark and Eacom.

The motion judge granted summary judgment by simply adopting the respondent's factum without engaging in the required contractual interpretative exercise or articulating the basis for his findings.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the evidence and explain his reasoning, and therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the decision.

The plaintiff condominium corporation sued the adjacent property owner for damages to its easement rights due to the defendant's failure to maintain a shared retaining wall, pleading negligence and nuisance.

The defendant, third parties (Development Engineering (London) Limited, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada), and fourth party (Atkinson, Davies Inc.) brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court found no common law, statutory, contractual, or equitable duty for the servient tenement (defendant) to repair the wall, especially since the defendant was not responsible for its initial collapse.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claims were dismissed.

The court also found that the defendant, third parties, and fourth party were not concurrent tortfeasors, thus precluding claims for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action arising from explosions at a propane facility in Toronto that allegedly caused personal injury, property damage, and evacuation of nearby residents.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

It held that the pleadings against certain landlord defendants failed to disclose a viable cause of action because the allegations relying on agency, single‑group enterprise, and alter‑ego theories lacked material facts capable of piercing the corporate veil.

Those pleadings were struck with leave to amend and the certification motion against those defendants was adjourned.

The proceeding was otherwise certified as a class action against the remaining defendants, with common issues approved and representative plaintiffs appointed.