Stuart Martin Ghan

The appellant sued his insurance broker in negligence for failing to offer optional income replacement benefits.

The trial judge found the broker breached its duty of care but dismissed the action because the appellant failed to prove causation, specifically that he would have purchased the coverage if offered.

On appeal, the appellant argued that in cases of insurance broker negligence, the insured does not need to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the normal rules of negligence apply and causation remains a question of fact.

Finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions, the appeal was dismissed.

In a class proceeding arising from a major propane facility explosion, the plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim and certify claims against additional defendants associated with the ownership and leasing of the facility property.

The court considered whether the proposed amended pleading satisfied the s. 5(1)(a) requirement of the Class Proceedings Act by disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

Claims in strict liability and nuisance against the property-owning defendants were struck because the pleadings failed to meet the legal prerequisites and improperly characterized the alleged nuisance.

Negligence claims under the Occupiers’ Liability Act were also dismissed because the alleged damages occurred off the premises and the statute only applies to persons entering the premises.

However, the court held that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded a viable common law negligence claim based on the defendants’ alleged rights of control and failure to intervene in unsafe operations.

Certification against the remaining defendants proceeded solely on the basis of the common law negligence cause of action.

In a certified class proceeding arising from explosions at a propane facility, class counsel moved for an order restraining an insurer and its counsel from communicating directly with class members during the court‑approved opt‑out period.

The insurer’s counsel had sent letters stating the insurer would opt insured class members out of the class action and pursue their claims through a subrogated action.

The court held the communications were misleading, interfered with the solicitor‑client relationship between class counsel and class members, and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court reaffirmed that insureds retain control of litigation until fully indemnified for both insured and uninsured losses.

An order was made prohibiting the insurer and its counsel from communicating with affected class members without court approval or consent of class counsel during the opt‑out period.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action arising from explosions at a propane facility in Toronto that allegedly caused personal injury, property damage, and evacuation of nearby residents.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

It held that the pleadings against certain landlord defendants failed to disclose a viable cause of action because the allegations relying on agency, single‑group enterprise, and alter‑ego theories lacked material facts capable of piercing the corporate veil.

Those pleadings were struck with leave to amend and the certification motion against those defendants was adjourned.

The proceeding was otherwise certified as a class action against the remaining defendants, with common issues approved and representative plaintiffs appointed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action under Rules 20 and 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

At trial, the appellant had amended his pleading to abandon all claims except for the pecuniary value of the alleged loss of an interdependent relationship (his marriage) following an accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the pleading under Rule 21, finding that the amended pleading contained virtually no material facts regarding the injuries, how they caused the marriage breakdown, or the associated economic loss.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision regarding liability under a lease and the dismissal of its counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no liability for matters predating the 1999 lease and that there was no evidence of the cost to remove partitions erected during the lease term.

The court also found that the trial judge erred by dismissing the counterclaim without analysis, and ordered a new trial on the counterclaim.

The main action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability under a commercial lease and the dismissal of its counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no liability for matters predating the 1999 lease under the assignment of lease.

The court also found no evidence of the cost to remove partitions erected by the appellant.

The main action was dismissed.

The court also allowed the appeal regarding the counterclaim, ordering a new trial because the trial judge provided no analysis on liability or damages.

An addendum was later released confirming the result despite counsel's correction regarding evidence of partition removal costs.

The landlord appealed a Small Claims Court judgment that dismissed its claim for unpaid rent and awarded the tenants $10,000 in damages for the landlord's unreasonable refusal to consent to an assignment of the lease.

The landlord argued the trial judge exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court by effectively granting a set-off of $10,000 against the rent claim plus a $10,000 judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that the landlord's breach terminated the right to rent after May and separately gave rise to a cause of action for damages.

The appellant appealed a Master's order denying leave to add a witness as a defendant and denying an amendment to the statement of claim.

The appellant had previously settled litigation with the respondents but later sought to set aside the settlement, alleging that the respondents had coerced witnesses into swearing false affidavits.

The appellant also sought to add a witness as a defendant for alleged conspiracy and perjury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the witness was protected by absolute witness privilege.

The court also upheld the Master's decision denying the amendment to set aside the settlement, noting that the appellant had not relied on the allegedly false evidence when deciding to settle and that litigants must take responsibility for assessing prospective untrue evidence.