Derek Victor Abreu

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss a medical negligence claim, arguing it was brought outside the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff contended that the claim was not discovered until an expert medical opinion was obtained.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the material facts supporting a plausible inference of liability as early as mid-February 2013, and no later than October 2013, well before the claim was issued in August 2017.

The expert opinion merely addressed the merits, not the discoverability.

The motion was granted, and the claims were dismissed.

An appeal by Royal Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (RSA) from a trial judge's decision that RSA was responsible to provide insurance coverage to the estate of Steven Devecseri, who was killed in a motorcycle accident in 2006.

Devecseri had alcohol in his system at the time of the accident, which breached both his M2 driver's licence restrictions and his insurance policy terms.

RSA did not learn of the alcohol consumption until 2009 during discovery proceedings, at which point it took an off-coverage position.

The trial judge found that RSA waived its right to deny coverage by failing to obtain the coroner's report in 2006 and by defending the claim without taking a reservation of rights.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that RSA did not waive coverage and was not estopped from denying coverage because it lacked actual knowledge of the policy breach until 2009.

The appellant sued for damages relating to property flooding and brought a motion to extend the time to set the matter down for trial beyond its fifth anniversary.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay under Rule 48.14(7)(a), finding the appellant had not reasonably explained the delay.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an overly stringent test, misapprehended evidence, and failed to consider the pending summary judgment motion and consent of other defendants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly articulated and applied the legal test and his decision was amply grounded in the record.

The applicant, Wawanesa, withdrew its application for a declaration of coverage and duty to defend, leading to a costs dispute.

The respondent, Dominion, sought costs for work incurred.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, found that costs should follow the event, as Wawanesa abandoned its application.

Despite Dominion's excessive costs claim, the court fixed costs at $10,000 plus HST and disbursements, deeming it a fair and reasonable amount for the unsuccessful applicant to pay.

The appellants commenced a motor vehicle accident action in December 2010 following a collision in December 2008.

The action was administratively dismissed as abandoned in August 2011 pursuant to rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants moved to set aside the dismissal in February 2014, more than two years after the dismissal order.

A master granted the motion to set aside, but the Superior Court judge allowed the respondents' appeal and reinstated the dismissal.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the master erred in considering the repeal of rule 48.15 as part of the contextual analysis, erred in assigning fault to the respondents for not filing a defence, erred in finding that the appellants always intended to prosecute the action without evidence to support this finding, and critically erred in failing to consider the finality principle in assessing prejudice to the respondents.

The third party insurer, CAA, brought a motion for summary judgment to determine if the defendant driver, Jeffrey Sorto Torres, was in possession of his father's (Victor Sorto Rivera) vehicle with or without consent at the time of a motor vehicle accident.

The determination would affect Victor's vicarious liability under the Highway Traffic Act and Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company's uninsured motorist coverage.

The court found that Victor had given implied consent for Jeffrey to possess the vehicle, primarily due to Jeffrey being left in charge of the household and his autistic brother, and the accessibility of car keys.

Consequently, CAA's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against Victor Rivera was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that had set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2011 due to the plaintiffs' counsel's delay, and the motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought for 2.5 years.

The Superior Court found that the Master erred in law by misinterpreting the statutory context of Rule 48.15 repeal, incorrectly assigning blame to the defendants for not filing a defence, and failing to adequately consider the finality principle and the growing presumption of prejudice over time.

The court re-evaluated the Reid factors, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, did not demonstrate inadvertence, and did not move promptly.

Furthermore, actual prejudice to the defendants and intervenor was established.

The appeal was allowed, and the administrative dismissal was reinstated.

The municipal defendant sought leave to appeal a motion judge’s refusal to grant summary judgment dismissing a negligence claim as statute‑barred under s. 44(8)(b) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The underlying action arose from a motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiff’s vehicle struck a pole located on a median.

The moving party argued the undisputed facts permitted determination of the statutory bar on summary judgment.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s decision and that the proposed appeal raised issues of importance concerning interpretation of the statutory immunity provision and the proper use of summary judgment.

Leave to appeal was granted.