Andrew Mcallister Little

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel production of a defence vocational assessment report following an examination of the injured plaintiff conducted by a vocational rehabilitation expert retained by the defendant municipality.

The defendant refused production, arguing the assessor was not a "health practitioner" within the meaning of s.105 of the Courts of Justice Act and therefore Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure did not require disclosure.

The court held that examinations conducted on consent are analogous to court‑ordered examinations under Rule 33.08 and therefore trigger the mandatory disclosure obligation in Rule 33.06.

The court further held that a party cannot avoid production simply by asserting that the assessor is not a statutory health practitioner or by electing not to rely on the report at trial.

The defendant was ordered to produce the report forthwith in the interests of fairness and full disclosure.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to add a corporate defendant alleged to own the property where an ATV accident occurred.

The proposed amendment was sought after the expiry of the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court considered whether the discoverability rule under s. 5 of the Act postponed the running of the limitation period because the plaintiffs did not know, and could not reasonably have known through due diligence, that the accident occurred on land owned by the proposed defendant.

The court found the plaintiffs had undertaken significant investigative steps after the accident and reasonably believed another party owned the land until survey evidence disclosed otherwise.

The court concluded that a letter from defence counsel denying ownership constituted the triggering event requiring renewed diligence and that the plaintiffs acted within two years of that event.

Leave was therefore granted to add the proposed defendant, without prejudice to it to plead a limitation defence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge failed to address whether the accused was given a final opportunity to provide a breath sample, misapprehended evidence regarding the accused’s attempts to blow into the approved screening device, and misapplied the credibility analysis from R. v. W.(D.).

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge made clear credibility findings, reasonably rejected the accused’s evidence, and properly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

Applying the deferential standard owed to findings of fact and credibility, the court found no reversible error in the trial decision.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg contrary to the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had found breaches of the appellant’s Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 arising from an unlawful roadside screening demand but admitted the breath test evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in the application of the Grant framework by minimizing the seriousness of the police conduct, failing to properly assess the impact of the Charter breaches, and failing to adequately balance the factors governing exclusion of evidence.

The court concluded that the unlawful demand and resulting detention significantly infringed Charter‑protected interests and that the trial judge’s analysis contained legal errors affecting the result.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that breath samples were invalid because the breath technician failed to wait 17 minutes after an invalid sample and that the trial judge improperly relied on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code when the Crown had also called the technician to testify viva voce.

The appeal court held that the trial judge did not err in accepting the technician’s evidence that a waiting period was unnecessary where the invalid sample resulted from inadequate blowing rather than residual mouth alcohol.

The court further held that the Crown was not barred from relying on the certificate and presumption of accuracy merely because the technician also testified.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary raising doubt about the reliability of the readings, the presumption applied.

The conviction for driving over 80 mg was therefore upheld.

The municipal defendant sought leave to appeal a motion judge’s refusal to grant summary judgment dismissing a negligence claim as statute‑barred under s. 44(8)(b) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The underlying action arose from a motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiff’s vehicle struck a pole located on a median.

The moving party argued the undisputed facts permitted determination of the statutory bar on summary judgment.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s decision and that the proposed appeal raised issues of importance concerning interpretation of the statutory immunity provision and the proper use of summary judgment.

Leave to appeal was granted.

An insurer moved under Rule 51.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to withdraw admissions in its statement of defence that the plaintiff was entitled to statutory accident benefits.

After discovery evidence suggested there may have been no collision between the insured vehicle and a school bus, the insurer sought to deny that a motor vehicle accident occurred and to dispute coverage under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

Applying the three-part test for withdrawal of admissions, the court found that the proposed amendment raised a triable issue, that the insurer provided a reasonable explanation for the change in position based on new discovery evidence, and that any alleged prejudice to the plaintiff was speculative.

The court also rejected an argument that the insurer was estopped from denying entitlement due to past benefit payments.

Leave to amend the statement of defence was granted.