Laura B. Stewart

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss a medical negligence claim, arguing it was brought outside the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff contended that the claim was not discovered until an expert medical opinion was obtained.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the material facts supporting a plausible inference of liability as early as mid-February 2013, and no later than October 2013, well before the claim was issued in August 2017.

The expert opinion merely addressed the merits, not the discoverability.

The motion was granted, and the claims were dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the November 30, 2020 order of Davies J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as neither party filed a bill of costs.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action appealed a Master's decision upholding a defendant doctor's refusal to answer certain hypothetical questions during his examination for discovery.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly ruled that the doctor was not required to answer hypothetical questions based on factual premises he disputed, nor questions that indirectly asked him to opine on the standard of care or decisions of other medical professionals involved in the infant plaintiff's care.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant argued that the tribunal failed to determine his capacity to consent to treatment at the time of the mandatory review and that, if he had regained capacity, the substitute decision maker’s prior consent would be invalid.

The court held that the tribunal was required to consider capacity as part of the statutory review criteria and found that it had done so.

The tribunal reasonably concluded that the appellant lacked the ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment, based primarily on medical evidence regarding persistent delusional beliefs and lack of insight into illness.

The tribunal’s reasoning was adequate and entitled to deference as a specialized body.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant settled its claim with the hospital and sought to amend its statement of claim to proceed against the remaining defendants for their several liabilities, as contemplated by the settlement.

The motion judge refused to allow the amendment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed amendments fully disclosed the terms of the settlement and restricted the claim against the remaining defendants to what was permitted by the settlement.

The appellants' mother was killed by her son, a psychiatric patient who eloped from the hospital.

The appellants sued the treating psychiatrist, who successfully moved to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the six-month limitation period in s. 78 of the Mental Health Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of s. 78, finding no violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that while claims regarding the patient's care and treatment were statute-barred, it was not plain and obvious that the psychiatrist's alleged common law duty to warn the mother was governed by s. 78.

The action was permitted to proceed solely on the duty to warn claim.