Peter A. Downard

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff's defamation claim was statute barred under section 6 of the Libel and Slander Act (LSA).

The plaintiff published an article alleging the plaintiff hired a hacker to destroy a video of Mayor Rob Ford.

The plaintiff commenced the action more than three months after learning of the publication.

The defendants argued that the preconditions in sections 7 and 8 of the LSA were satisfied, making the three-month limitation period applicable.

The court found that the article was published in Ontario and that the publisher's information was substantially compliant with statutory requirements.

The motion was granted and the claim was dismissed as statute barred.

The court dismissed motions by the defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the basis of absolute privilege.

The case concerns whether statements made in an affidavit in another proceeding, about a non-party, are protected by absolute privilege.

The court held that absolute privilege is subject to exceptions and applies only to statements made “with reference to the inquiry.” Without the full context of the affidavit and related documents, the court could not determine that the claim was bound to fail.

The court also addressed the application of absolute privilege to counsel and found no basis to treat counsel differently in this context.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The court issued a costs endorsement following an anti-SLAPP motion.

Defendant Isabel Vincent, who successfully had the action dismissed against her, was awarded full indemnity costs of $90,000 from the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff, Theresa Kielburger, who successfully resisted the anti-SLAPP motion brought by the other Defendants (Canadaland Inc. et al.), was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $110,000 from Canadaland Inc. The court exercised its discretion under sections 137.1(7) and (8) of the Courts of Justice Act, noting Canadaland's brazen defense and callous disregard for the Plaintiff.

The appellant, Guarav Tewari, appealed the striking out of his statement of claim against the respondent lawyer and law firm, who had represented his former employer.

The motion judge had struck the claim, finding it disclosed no reasonable cause of action due to absolute privilege for litigation conduct and the absence of a solicitor-client relationship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, deeming it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court noted the appellant's history of relitigating similar claims against opposing counsel, which had been repeatedly found untenable.

The applicants, Jacqueline Anne Horvat (Treasurer of the Law Society of Ontario) and the Law Society of Ontario, sought to transfer a libel action initiated by the respondent, Samuel David Goldstein, from Small Claims Court to the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent's claim alleged libel by the Treasurer in a public statement.

The court granted the transfer, finding the case involved complex legal issues, required pre-trial discovery, and raised matters of general public importance concerning the LSO's governance and the conduct of its Benchers.

To mitigate the respondent's concerns about increased costs and potential anti-SLAPP motions, the court imposed conditions: no anti-SLAPP motion could be brought, the applicants' costs would be limited to Small Claims Court levels if successful, but the respondent's costs would not be so limited if he were successful.

The court also offered to remain seized for case management.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion by the defendants to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's unfounded and vitriolic allegations of fraud and dishonesty against them, which continued even in his costs submissions.

The plaintiff, self-represented, also raised impecuniosity.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $17,500, finding the allegations against the lawyers' professional integrity warranted such an award, despite the plaintiff's impecuniosity claim and some potential duplication of defence counsel hours.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against the lawyers who represented his former employer in a prior wrongful dismissal action, alleging they conspired to manipulate facts and breached a fiduciary duty to him.

The defendant lawyers brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff and their conduct in representing their clients was protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

A case management conference was held to address procedural issues in several consolidated actions.

The court scheduled a motion to clarify a previous order dismissing the plaintiff's motion for default judgment against one of the defendants.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to examine non-parties and obtain documents prior to a Rule 21 motion to strike, noting that no evidence is admissible on such a motion.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $116,706.47 following a successful motion and the dismissal of the defendant's cross-motion.

The plaintiff argued the defendant engaged in suspicious and abusive conduct, including commencing a separate action in Korea and insisting on unnecessary foreign law experts.

The court agreed that the defendant's aggressive and strategic conduct unnecessarily complicated the dispute.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $80,000 against the primary defendant and $3,000 against the secondary defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to consolidate two actions or amend its statement of claim.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to stay the second action based on an arbitration clause in their sales agreement.

The court found that the defendant was estopped from relying on the arbitration clause because it had previously commenced a court action in Korea alleging breach of contract, rendering the arbitration clause inoperative.

The cross-motion to stay was dismissed, and the plaintiff's motion to amend and consolidate the actions was granted to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The appellants (Roustan/RINC) appealed a trial decision that found Grant Thornton LLP (GT) breached a contract but awarded no damages for share losses, dismissing their action.

GT cross-appealed on costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's causation analysis or refusal to award various damages (lost opportunity, share loss, special, nominal), and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's costs award as not an error in principle or plainly wrong.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents general damages of $75,000 and punitive damages of $75,000 for defamation.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a City manager, made defamatory statements about the respondents' business during a meeting with a supplier representative, acted maliciously in response to complaints the respondent had made about him, and abused his position as a public officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of defamation, malice, and abuse of position, but set aside the punitive damages award, finding that the trial judge failed to analyze whether the compensatory damages were adequate to achieve the objectives of retribution, deterrence, and condemnation.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The plaintiff successfully defeated the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion and sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court considered whether to depart from the statutory presumption in section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides that a successful responding party is generally not entitled to costs.

Finding that the defendants' motion was not frivolous, ill-conceived, or brought at an unjustifiably late stage in the proceeding, the court declined to exercise its discretion to award costs.

No order as to costs was made.

The plaintiff, a retired music teacher, brought a defamation action against the school board and its superintendent regarding letters sent to parents about hidden cameras discovered in music rooms.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that while the letters related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that the claim had substantial merit, there were grounds to believe no valid defence existed, and the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

This costs endorsement followed a prior decision where the plaintiffs' action for breach of contract was dismissed due to a lack of proven damages, despite a finding of breach.

The court determined that the defendant, Grant Thornton LLP (GT), was the more successful party, notwithstanding some mixed success, as the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and defamation were dismissed outright, and no remedy flowed from any of the plaintiffs' findings.

The defendant's offer to settle did not meet the requirements of Rule 49.10(2)(b), thus no costs consequences flowed from its non-acceptance.

Applying the "fair and reasonable" principle for fixing costs and considering Rule 57.01 factors, including the moderate complexity and the $10 million claim, the court awarded GT partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $175,000.00.

Following the release of trial reasons finding the defendant breached its contract but awarding no damages, the plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to amend the reasons.

The plaintiffs sought nominal damages, special damages, damages for the purchase of new shares, and damages for loss of chance.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that nominal damages were inappropriate where general damages were unproven, special damages lacked causal link, and the other claims were either already disposed of or not raised at trial.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment, which was resolved on consent.

The only remaining issue was costs.

The defendants' in-house counsel sought costs against the plaintiff's lawyer personally, alleging he fabricated evidence of a misfiled Notice of Intent to Defend to trap the defendants.

The court found these allegations of professional misconduct to be completely groundless and reprehensible.

As a result, the court dismissed the defendants' costs claim and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff and its lawyer $30,592 in substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant, Marc Cohodes, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action commenced by the plaintiff, Mark Thompson.

The alleged libel imputed fraud against Thompson during his prior employment as a junior lawyer.

The court found that the expression related to a matter of public interest.

However, the plaintiff established grounds to believe his claim had substantial merit, that the defendant had no valid defence (justification or fair comment), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The Defendants sought leave to appeal a series of interim decisions by Snowie J., which included granting injunctions against defamation and harassment, a publication ban, and substantial costs awards, in two separate actions brought by S.R. and V.B. against the Defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal on all issues, finding conflicting legal principles regarding defamation injunctions, uncertainty in the evolving torts of harassment and intrusion upon seclusion, and procedural irregularities and open court principle concerns regarding the publication ban.

The costs award was also subject to appeal as it flowed from the underlying decisions.

The applicants, members of the Ontario Medical Association (OMA), brought a motion for interlocutory orders in a governance dispute concerning a proposed Physician Services Agreement (PSA).

They sought a new notice of general meeting, a revised proxy form, a comprehensive membership list including phone numbers, and the appointment of a neutral chair.

The court dismissed requests for a new notice of meeting, the expanded membership list, and a neutral chair, finding no strong case for intervention on those points.

However, the court granted the request to void the OMA's circulated proxy form, deeming it unhelpful, unclear, unbalanced, and unfair, and directed the OMA to prepare a revised form.

The court exercised its jurisdiction under sections 297 and 332 of the Corporations Act to ensure the fair conduct of the members' meeting and the integrity of the proxy system.