Chi-Kun Shi

The plaintiff school brought an action for defamation against two former students and their paralegal based on an email the paralegal sent to York University inquiring about the school's relationship with the university.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing the email was protected by absolute privilege.

The court granted the motion, finding that the email was a reasonable pre-litigation communication made in the course of investigating the clients' claims and was therefore protected by absolute privilege.

The parties appeared for a case conference to determine the procedure for a mini-trial directed by a previous endorsement.

The court ordered specific guidelines for the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including out-of-court examination with translation for an elderly witness, viva voce testimony from a transaction lawyer, and the proper production of a family doctor's expert report.

A two-day hearing was scheduled.

The applicant sought to invalidate or correct a $1.2 million gift of a home made to her parish priest in trust for his religious order, alleging mistake and, by amendment, undue influence.

Despite the parties' joint request for a decision on the voluminous affidavit evidence, the court found significant contradictions and gaps, particularly regarding the applicant's capacity, instructions to her lawyer, and the solicitation of the gift.

The court determined the record was inadequate for a fair determination and ordered a short motion to schedule a hearing with viva voce testimony to resolve the factual disputes.

The court considered costs submissions following a motion.

The responding parties did not dispute the number of hours or rates claimed by counsel for the successful parties, except for the preparation time for the motion.

The court found that four hours of preparation was reasonable and awarded costs of $6,510.09 inclusive for the motion, plus $250.00 plus HST for preparing the costs submissions.

Although the responding parties argued that payment within 30 days would cause financial hardship, the court allowed additional time for payment.

Costs were ordered payable within 90 days.