Matthew A. Rendely

The respondent brought a motion to stay an application for dependent's support under the Succession Law Reform Act, arguing that the Ontario Superior Court lacks jurisdiction.

The applicants sought support from the estate of a deceased individual who was domiciled in Costa Rica at the time of death.

The court found that the deceased had established Costa Rica as his permanent domicile and that the presumptive connecting factors (existence of personal property and insurance trusts in Ontario) were insufficient to establish a real and substantial connection between the dispute and Ontario.

The application was permanently stayed for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs from the applicant following a consolidated application concerning beneficial ownership of a property, arguing he was the more successful party.

The applicant contended that both parties equally succeeded and lost, as neither established sole ownership and both were awarded an equal interest in the property, with no payments owed between them.

The court found that success was equally divided, as both parties failed in their symmetrical claims for sole ownership and related payments.

Consequently, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs of the consolidated application, and also declined to award costs for the costs submissions.

The applicant mother and her deceased daughter purchased a property as joint tenants in 1994.

The daughter lived in the property with her husband (the respondent) and children until her death in 2019.

Following the daughter's death, the mother claimed sole beneficial ownership by right of survivorship and sought occupation rent.

The respondent husband claimed the estate was the sole beneficial owner or, alternatively, a 50% owner as a tenant in common under s. 26(1) of the Family Law Act.

The court found that both the mother and daughter contributed to the purchase and neither established a resulting or constructive trust.

Because the property was a matrimonial home, the joint tenancy was deemed severed immediately before the daughter's death under s. 26(1) of the Family Law Act.

The property is held by the mother and the estate as tenants in common, each with a 50% interest.

Claims for unjust enrichment and occupation rent were dismissed.

The appellants, trustees of the Estate of Vincent Di Santo and the Vincent Di Santo 2003 Family Trust, appealed an order that permanently removed them and appointed CIBC Trust Corporation as replacement.

The original order also granted further interim funding to the respondent, Ottavio Di Santo.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's decision that permanent removal was sought and necessary.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the trustees' mindset had become intractable, they were in a position of conflict, acted unilaterally, or could not objectively exercise their discretion, thus meeting the high threshold of "clear necessity" for trustee removal.

The Court of Appeal heard three motions related to an ongoing appeal concerning the removal and replacement of estate and family trust trustees.

The Appellants (original trustees) sought a stay of the order removing them and appointing CIBC Trust Corporation.

The Respondent (Ottavio Di Santo) sought to lift a stay on a costs order and to quash or stay the Appellants' appeal.

The court granted the Appellants' stay motion, finding a serious issue, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience in their favour.

The Respondent's motions to lift the costs stay and to quash/stay the appeal were dismissed.

Costs were ordered payable from the Estate.

The appellant, Robert Lockhart, appealed a lower court order that declared Powers of Attorney (POAP and POAPC) he arranged for his mother, June Lockhart, void ab initio, and awarded costs to his sister, Barbara Lockhart.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that Robert had reasonable grounds to believe June was incapable of granting the POAPC, thus negating the presumption of capacity under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The costs order was also upheld.

This motion involved a dispute between a sister (applicant) and brother (respondent) over their mother's personal care and property.

The applicant challenged the validity of two Powers of Attorney (for Personal Care and Property) signed by their 89-year-old mother, June Lockhart, in 2018, which appointed the respondent brother as sole attorney.

The court found both 2018 Powers of Attorney void ab initio due to the mother's lack of capacity and the respondent's failure to prove capacity, as well as his actions in preventing a full capacity assessment and withholding the documents.

The court authorized both the applicant and respondent to make personal care and treatment decisions for their mother jointly under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, dismissing the respondent's motion to validate the POA and exclude the applicant.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

Christina Atkinson sought to enforce a settlement agreement with her former lawyers, Whaley Estate Litigation, regarding a fee dispute, pursuant to Rule 49.09 or common law.

Whaley Estate Litigation brought a cross-motion to dismiss the proceedings or transfer the matter to Small Claims Court.

The court found that both parties had elected to proceed with the fee dispute litigation before an assessment officer after settlement efforts failed, thereby repudiating the settlement agreement.

Consequently, neither party could enforce the settlement.

Both Ms. Atkinson's application and Whaley Estate Litigation's cross-motion were dismissed without costs.

This endorsement addresses an oral motion brought by applicants in four consolidated parentage applications involving assisted reproductive technologies (ART).

The motion sought to dispense with the Superior Court of Justice Practice Direction's requirements for formal notice and media notification regarding discretionary publication bans and sealing orders under s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court considered the Dagenais/Mentuck test and the best interests of the child, finding that sealing orders are necessary to prevent serious risk to the proper administration of justice and to protect the privacy and dignity of the children, intended parents, surrogates, and their families.

The court concluded that the salutary effects of dispensing with notice and sealing the files outweigh any deleterious effects on public expression.