Jacob Benson Kaufman

In an estates dispute over jointly held property alleged to be held on resulting trust for the deceased's estate, the moving party sought summary judgment dismissing the trust claim as statute-barred and extending that ruling to a related passing of accounts application.

The court held that summary judgment is not available in an application, applying the Court of Appeal's direction that Rule 20 is restricted to actions.

The court further declined to convert the matter into a partial hearing of substantive issues, finding that piecemeal adjudication would be disproportionate given the overlap between the trust claim, the estate trustee's accounting obligations, and potential breach of duty issues.

The limitation issue was left for determination at a joint hearing of both applications, and costs were deferred.

This motion addressed three issues: the addition of parties to a trust dispute, the appropriate method of service for parties residing in Israel under the Hague Service Convention, and costs.

The court ordered the addition of the issue of Gershon Kaplan and Adina Gordon as party defendants, including the Children's Lawyer for minor/unascertained beneficiaries, finding their presence necessary for effective adjudication.

Regarding service abroad, the court held that Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention authorizes service of an originating process by postal channels, rejecting the argument that "send" does not include "serve" and clarifying that prior case law suggesting otherwise (e.g., Wilson v. Servier Canada Inc.) is no longer good law.

The court directed service on the added parties in Israel by a method authorized by Article 10, including registered mail.

No costs were awarded due to the plaintiff's non-opposition on the first issue and the novelty of the second issue.

The plaintiff brought an urgent ex parte motion seeking a preservation order over cryptocurrency, a worldwide Mareva injunction, and an Anton Piller order against the defendants for an outstanding balance of $300,000 USD from a cryptocurrency exchange.

The court granted the preservation order and the Anton Piller order with modifications to protect solicitor-client privilege, but dismissed the Mareva injunction, finding no sufficient risk of asset dissipation to avoid judgment.

The applicant beneficiary sought to remove her aunt as the estate trustee, alleging mismanagement, hostility, and the wrongful transfer of the deceased's vehicle to herself.

The court declined to remove the estate trustee, finding that her mistakes did not endanger the trust property and that removal is a remedy of last resort.

Instead, the court imposed terms on the trustee's future administration of the estate's real property.

However, the court found that the estate trustee failed to prove the deceased made a valid inter vivos gift of the vehicle, ordering its return to the estate.

The respondent Estate Trustee brought a motion to clarify a prior Preservation Order to permit her to withdraw Estate funds to pay her legal and accounting fees incurred in defending an application to remove her as Estate Trustee.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Preservation Order explicitly restricted payments to legitimate taxes and liabilities, which did not include the trustee's personal legal fees in a dispute over her removal.

The court also extended the timeline for the passing of accounts.

This appeal concerned the sale of Lash Point, a family cottage property owned by a non-profit corporation (LPAC).

Family members were divided between "Remainers" (who wanted to keep the property) and "Departers" (who wanted to sell their interests).

A lower court initially ordered a staged buy-out, but due to delays, a motion judge later approved an en bloc sale of the entire property to third parties, reversing the original plan.

The appellants (Remainers and LPAC) appealed, arguing the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to vary the original order and erred in approving the sale without satisfying the principles for sale approval in receivership contexts (Soundair principles).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's jurisdiction to vary the order but found that the sale approval was flawed as it did not meet the Soundair principles, particularly regarding efforts to obtain the best price and the integrity of the sales process.

The appeal was allowed, the sale order set aside, and the Receiver was directed to develop a proper sales process for the entire property.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his cross-motion regarding the administration of his late father's estate.

He sought an extension of time to file an election under s. 6(1) of the Family Law Act on behalf of his incapable mother, arguing his father may have made a subsequent will disinheriting her.

The application judge found no evidence of a subsequent will and that an election was not in the mother's best interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's factual findings or costs award.

The court-appointed Receiver brought a motion for directions regarding an offer to purchase a large Muskoka property en bloc.

The original buy-out order directed the Receiver to sever the property to allow departing members of the corporation to be paid their share while remaining members kept a retained parcel.

After four years of delays and significant expenses, the severance process was incomplete.

The court found it had jurisdiction to vary the original order due to materially changed circumstances.

The court directed the Receiver to halt the severance process and accept the en bloc purchase agreement, which had the support of the vast majority of stakeholders and represented fair market value.

The plaintiff, acting through her litigation guardian, brought a motion for an order approving the sale of a property and preserving the net sale proceeds in trust pending further court order.

The defendants opposed the preservation of funds, seeking immediate payout.

The court found that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the plaintiff's capacity at the time of previous property transfers and the validity of a trust declaration.

Given the defendants' breach of an undertaking and the risk of dissipation of funds, the court granted the preservation order under Rules 45.01 and 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ordering the sale proceeds to be held in trust.

The applicant and respondent, siblings and joint attorneys for property for their incapable mother, disputed the administration of their late father's estate.

The applicant sought to appoint CIBC Trust as Estate Trustee to administer the estate under a 1974 Will, which left the residue to their mother.

The respondent opposed, arguing their father had made a later will disinheriting their mother, and sought an order compelling an election under the Family Law Act to protect her interests.

The court found no evidence of a later will despite extensive searches, dismissed the respondent's motion, appointed CIBC Trust as Estate Trustee, and declared the 1974 Will valid.

Costs were awarded on a full indemnity basis, capped at $125,000, payable by the respondent, the estate, and the mother.

The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company, as guardian of property for Asha Kumra, sought advice and direction from the court regarding whether Minutes of Settlement, entered into by Asha's sons Sanjiv and Rajiv Kumra, were binding on the guardian and precluded it from pursuing claims related to property transfers made by Asha prior to a one-year limitation period specified in the Minutes.

The court found that the Minutes were not binding on Scotiatrust or Asha Kumra, as neither was a party to the agreement, nor was Asha legally represented during its negotiation.

Consequently, Scotiatrust retains the discretion to pursue claims in Asha Kumra's best interests, irrespective of the limitation period in the Minutes.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from an unsuccessful and untimely motion brought by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing a litigation guardian for her mother, Ida Rubin.

The court found Ms. Werner's proposed motion to be an obstructionist tactic, lacking merit, and brought in breach of a scheduling order.

Due to Ms. Werner's reprehensible litigation conduct, the court awarded full indemnity costs against her to the applicant and litigation guardian.

Additionally, costs were awarded to other parties (Morris Rubin and The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company) from the estate, with these amounts to be allocated solely to Ms. Werner's share.

Joseph Pernica, litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, sought a case conference regarding his status amidst upcoming motions.

The endorsement addresses a purported motion by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing Pernica as litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, arguing Pernica exceeded his mandate by obtaining Ida Rubin's banking records and challenging Ida Rubin's capacity.

The court declined to schedule Ms. Werner's motion, finding she lacked standing under Rules 59.06 and 7.06(1)(b).

The court affirmed Pernica's role as litigation guardian and provided specific directions for any future motion by Ida Rubin herself to remove the litigation guardian, emphasizing the need for transparency, personal affidavit, and attendance in open court for cross-examination due to the risk of abuse in ex parte proceedings.

The court also declined to stay the case, emphasizing the need for information sharing for mediation and a mechanism for fund distribution.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claim, arguing it only discovered its loss from a breach of duty to warn when an internal investigation report was disclosed in 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew the goods were stolen and that it had paid storage fees for missing goods by October 2006.

The court noted that knowing the full extent of damages is not required to trigger the limitation period under section 5 of the Limitations Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

In a professional negligence action involving estate law advice, the plaintiff brought a refusals motion seeking answers to several undertakings and refusals arising from the examination for discovery of a senior lawyer at a defendant law firm.

The court held that questions seeking the lawyer’s legal opinion on the law were improper, as the applicable standard of care would be determined through expert evidence rather than the witness’s own interpretation.

However, certain questions concerning the witness’s personal interpretation of contractual language and matters central to the claim were ordered answered.

On the defendants’ cross‑motion, the court ordered production of all draft expert reports prepared by the plaintiff’s damages expert, preferring authority requiring disclosure of draft reports.

As success was divided, no order for costs was made.