Jessica Whitney Firestone

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision declaring that the limitation period for putative class members remained suspended under s. 28(1) of the Class Proceedings Act following the denial of class certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 28(1) provides an exhaustive list of circumstances that resume a limitation period, and denial of certification is not among them.

Consequently, the limitation period remains suspended indefinitely following a denial of certification, a result the court noted must be addressed by the Legislature.

The plaintiff, Carillion Construction Inc., brought a motion to compel answers to a refused question during the "executive discovery" of the City of Toronto's representative.

The question sought disclosure of all relevant facts known by a key City employee, Jelena Rekalic, or relayed by her to others or counsel.

The City argued that such communications were protected by solicitor-client and litigation privilege.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the broad request for "every fact" conveyed by Ms. Rekalic would improperly trench upon privilege and effectively constitute a second discovery without leave, which is not permitted under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from an unsuccessful and untimely motion brought by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing a litigation guardian for her mother, Ida Rubin.

The court found Ms. Werner's proposed motion to be an obstructionist tactic, lacking merit, and brought in breach of a scheduling order.

Due to Ms. Werner's reprehensible litigation conduct, the court awarded full indemnity costs against her to the applicant and litigation guardian.

Additionally, costs were awarded to other parties (Morris Rubin and The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company) from the estate, with these amounts to be allocated solely to Ms. Werner's share.

Joseph Pernica, litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, sought a case conference regarding his status amidst upcoming motions.

The endorsement addresses a purported motion by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing Pernica as litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, arguing Pernica exceeded his mandate by obtaining Ida Rubin's banking records and challenging Ida Rubin's capacity.

The court declined to schedule Ms. Werner's motion, finding she lacked standing under Rules 59.06 and 7.06(1)(b).

The court affirmed Pernica's role as litigation guardian and provided specific directions for any future motion by Ida Rubin herself to remove the litigation guardian, emphasizing the need for transparency, personal affidavit, and attendance in open court for cross-examination due to the risk of abuse in ex parte proceedings.

The court also declined to stay the case, emphasizing the need for information sharing for mediation and a mechanism for fund distribution.

The plaintiff moved to certify a proposed class action arising from allegedly unreliable Motherisk hair-strand drug and alcohol testing used in child protection, family, and criminal proceedings.

The court held that while the pleading disclosed a cause of action and there was evidence of a broad group of potentially affected persons, the proposed proceeding failed on common issues, preferable procedure, and representative plaintiff criteria.

The court found the alleged systemic negligence did not materially advance the class members' real claims because compensable harm depended on highly individualized proof that a particular test result was false and adversely influenced a particular proceeding.

The litigation plan for individual hearings was found unworkable and procedurally unfair.

Certification was refused.

The Court considered whether an intervening assault by a bar bouncer could sever legal causation after the appellants had already violently assaulted the victim, who later died.

It held that legal causation remains governed by whether the accused's dangerous unlawful acts were a significant contributing cause of death, and that foreseeability and independence are analytical tools, not standalone legal tests.

On the trial judge's factual findings, it was open to conclude the bouncer's conduct was a reasonably foreseeable response in an escalating bar fight and not sufficiently independent to break the causal chain.

The Court therefore upheld the result that the appellants could legally be found to have caused death and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder following a second jury trial.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and eyewitness identification.

The trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could infer guilt from a disbelieved alibi without independent evidence of fabrication.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso to uphold the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the erroneous alibi instruction was a serious error that provided a direct route to guilt, and the curative proviso could not be applied because it could not be said that any other reasonable jury would inevitably convict.