Sarah McLeod

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The appellant challenged a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication treatment.

The appellant and amicus curiae argued that the appellant was denied statutory rights advice and that the evidence did not support the incapacity finding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant received proper rights advice as required by statute, that no additional rights advice obligation arose when the appellant later expressed intent to apply to the Board, and that the Board's finding of incapacity was supported by evidence and involved no palpable and overriding error.

This decision concerns an appeal by L.H. from a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) decision confirming her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The court reviews the legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and the requirement for the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision.

The court finds that, where the evidence clearly demonstrates the appellant cannot recognize the possibility of being affected by a mental condition, the CCB is not required to inquire into her actual appreciation of the treatment decision’s parameters.

The appeal is dismissed, and an anonymization order is granted.

The appellant, SI, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding Dr. Jeanetta Viljoen’s finding that SI was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic drugs.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly identified and applied the statutory test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act.

The court held that corroborative evidence, as required by the Evidence Act, was present, including the notes and observations of Dr. Banks and other medical history.

The court confirmed that a second clinical opinion is not required for corroboration and that the Board’s findings were supported by the evidence.

The Ontario Securities Commission applied to appoint a receiver over the property of the respondents, who allegedly engaged in a fraudulent foreign exchange trading scheme.

The respondents had collected over USD $310 million in registration fees from customers who believed they were trading in a live market, when in fact they were trading in a simulated environment controlled by the respondents.

The court found a prima facie case of fraud and determined that appointing a receiver was appropriate for the due administration of Ontario securities law to manage and preserve approximately USD $90 million in frozen assets.

The plaintiffs, prospective franchisees, entered into agreements with the defendant franchisor to open two frozen yogurt stores and paid a $75,000 development fee.

After failing to secure suitable store locations within the agreed and extended timeframes, the franchisor terminated the agreements and retained the fee.

The plaintiffs sued for rescission under the Arthur Wishart Act, alleging deficient disclosure regarding lease costs and location availability, as well as common law misrepresentation and frustration of contract.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the disclosure provided was sufficient to allow an informed investment decision, no misrepresentations were made, and the failure to find a location was a foreseeable event explicitly contemplated by the contracts.

A franchisee, sued by a bank, issued a third-party claim against the franchisor seeking rescission of the franchise agreement for non-disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The franchisor argued that the third-party claim did not constitute proper notice of rescission.

The motion judge agreed, ruling that a pleading could not serve as the required notice.

The lawyer who drafted the third-party claim appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a pleading, specifically a third-party claim, could constitute sufficient written notice of rescission under s. 6 of the Arthur Wishart Act.

The court emphasized a generous interpretation of the remedial legislation, prioritizing substance over form, and clarified that the purpose of the notice is to advise the franchisor of rescission, not to act as a precondition to litigation.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to stay the action pending the outcome of a hospital board hearing, both parties sought costs.

The defendants sought $18,358.12, while the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs based on prior offers to settle.

The court found the defendants' bill of costs to be excessive given the relative simplicity of the issues and fixed costs at $7,500 payable to the defendants.

This motion, brought under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, sought a determination of a question of law: whether a claim in a pleading (specifically, a Third Party Claim) constitutes proper notice under section 6(3) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure) 2000.

The franchisee (Shearer) and franchisor (The Works) argued that the pleading was not proper notice, while the franchisee's former lawyer (Msi), who was being sued for negligence for failing to provide proper notice, argued that it was.

The court found that a Rule 21 motion was appropriate and, following binding authority and legal principle, concluded that a Third Party Claim cannot constitute a proper notice of rescission under subsection 6(3) of the Wishart Act, as a pleading and a statutory notice serve distinct purposes and have different temporal and functional implications.

The plaintiffs, Iris Technologies Inc. and ICE Wireless Inc., commenced an action against TELUS Communications Company for breach of contract and unlawful interference with economic relations.

TELUS brought a motion to temporarily stay the action, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction or was not the appropriate forum, as the core dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).

The court granted a temporary stay, finding that the factual and legal underpinnings of the civil action and the CRTC proceedings were the same, and the predicate misconduct concerned matters within the CRTC's specialized expertise.

The defendant/moving party, TDL Group Corp., brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's/responding party's Amended Statement of Claim.

The plaintiff, 6646107 Canada Inc., alleged breach of the original Franchise Agreement, breach of a subsequent oral "Renewal Agreement," and negligent/intentional misrepresentation regarding the non-renewal of its Tim Hortons franchise.

The court granted the motion in part, striking claims related to the breach of the original Franchise Agreement due to explicit non-renewal clauses and the absence of a free-standing duty of good faith.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike claims concerning the oral Renewal Agreement and negligent/intentional misrepresentation, finding these issues involved mixed fact and law and were not plain and obvious to fail.

The plaintiff, Carillion Construction Inc., brought a motion to compel answers to a refused question during the "executive discovery" of the City of Toronto's representative.

The question sought disclosure of all relevant facts known by a key City employee, Jelena Rekalic, or relayed by her to others or counsel.

The City argued that such communications were protected by solicitor-client and litigation privilege.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the broad request for "every fact" conveyed by Ms. Rekalic would improperly trench upon privilege and effectively constitute a second discovery without leave, which is not permitted under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

This case conference addressed the scheduling of Carillion Construction Inc.'s motion for further productions against the City of Toronto and NORR Limited in a complex multi-party construction litigation concerning Toronto's Union Station project.

Carillion sought various production orders and a discovery completion deadline prior to a scheduled mediation.

The City and NORR argued for delaying the motion until after mediation, citing the volume of existing documents and the laborious process of retrieving new ones.

The court determined that Carillion's motion should proceed prior to mediation, finding no cogent reason to delay the argument, but indicated that the actual production of documents, if ordered, could potentially be deferred until after the mediation.

The court urged counsel to schedule the motion.

The plaintiff, Larry Patterson, was successful in his motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal against IBM Canada Limited.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs.

The defendant had made an offer to settle which the plaintiff failed to beat, but the offer was made only four days before the hearing, falling short of the seven-day requirement under Rule 49.10.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 49.13, acknowledging the defendant's offer despite its late delivery and the minimal difference from the judgment amount.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $16,209.16, less a $2,500 credit to the defendant (comprising a $1,500 credit for the offer to settle and $1,000 for the plaintiff's hearing costs), plus $500 for assessing costs, for a total of $14,209.16.

The damages award was also revised by agreement to $57,427.46 due to a calculation error.

In a wrongful dismissal summary judgment motion, the court determined the reasonable notice period and assessed damages.

The plaintiff, a 67-year-old IT Specialist with 22 years of service, was terminated without cause.

The court fixed reasonable notice at 18 months, including a contingency discount for future earnings.

The plaintiff was awarded employer contributions to his defined contribution pension plan but denied claims for an incentive bonus and supplementary health benefits due to lack of evidence and program subjectivity.

The court also discussed the preferred 'discounted approach' over 'trust and accounting' for future mitigation.