Brendan Donald Bowles

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated December 17, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $5,000 inclusive.

The appellant appealed a motion decision finding its claim for lien had expired for failing to set the action down for trial within two years as required by s. 37 of the Construction Act.

The appellant argued its lien was saved because another lien claimant on the same project had set its action down in time, asserting they were part of the same 'improvement'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an 'improvement' is tied to the specific lands described in the claim for lien.

Because the appellant and the other claimant registered liens against different lands, the appellant could not enforce its lien in the other claimant's action.

The appellant contractor appealed a motion judge's order discharging and vacating its construction lien.

The motion judge had found that the lien expired prior to perfection because the contract was terminated or abandoned more than 150 days before the certificate of action was registered.

On appeal, the contractor argued the motion judge erred in finding termination or abandonment and improperly used enhanced fact-finding powers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings of termination and abandonment, and concluding that the motion judge correctly applied the evidentiary burden without resorting to enhanced fact-finding powers.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of P. Boucher J. dated June 24, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs outlines were filed, no costs were awarded.

The defendant, Marydel Homes, moved to discharge a construction lien registered by the plaintiff, Trillium Masonry, or alternatively to reduce the posted security.

The lien amount included both the cost of work performed on the specific lot and an outstanding balance of over $190,000 from a prior contract, which the parties had contractually agreed to incorporate into the contract price for the new lot.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the Construction Act does not prohibit parties from contractually agreeing to a price for lienable services that includes prior outstanding debts.

The court concluded that because the price was agreed upon in writing, it served as the valid basis for the lien, leaving any factual disputes regarding the agreement for trial.

The court considered whether the plaintiff’s construction lien, not set down for trial within two years as required by the Construction Lien Act, could be enforced in another lien action relating to a different portion of the same wind energy project.

The court held that because the plaintiff’s lien and the other lien (Corbiere) were registered against different lands, they did not relate to the same “premises” under the Act.

As a result, the plaintiff’s lien expired and was ordered discharged.

The appellants sought to appeal a decision declining to award costs against a law firm under s. 86(1)(b)(i) of the Construction Act.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was required under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act because the appeal was solely regarding discretionary costs, and the costs order did not constitute a 'judgment' under s. 71 of the Construction Act.

Finding that the test for leave was not met, the court denied leave and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order reducing the amount of security the respondent was required to pay into court to vacate a construction lien.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in law by providing deficient reasons that prevented meaningful appellate review.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the motion judge's five-paragraph endorsement lacked sufficient explanation for reducing the security and failed to address the conflicting evidence regarding the contract price.

The appeal was allowed, the order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for redetermination by a different judge.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed his motion opposing the confirmation of a Construction Lien Report.

The Divisional Court found that the appellant was essentially repeating the same submissions made to the lower court.

The appeal was dismissed for the reasons given by the Superior Court judge, and costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The defendants brought motions under section 86(1)(b)(i) of the old Construction Act seeking costs against the plaintiff's former law firm, arguing the firm participated in preserving and perfecting a baseless construction lien.

The court held that liability under this section requires subjective actual knowledge, recklessness, or willful blindness regarding the baselessness of the lien, rather than mere negligence.

Finding no evidence that the law firm possessed such knowledge or acted with willful blindness at the time of preservation and perfection, the court dismissed the motions.

The plaintiff sued its former lawyer's estate and professional corporation for negligence and breach of contract after the lawyer allowed a construction lien to expire by failing to set the action down for trial within two years.

The defendants conceded the breach of the standard of care but disputed causation and damages, arguing the plaintiff failed to mitigate by not enforcing a related judgment and that the property lacked sufficient equity.

The court found the plaintiff did not act unreasonably in relying on the lawyer's advice that the lien was valid.

Assessing the complex evidence on the contaminated property's retrospective value, the court determined there was equity in the property and fixed damages at $472,000.

The plaintiff brought a motion to discharge the defendant's construction lien, arguing it was discharged when the defendant inadvertently "registered" an application to delete it.

The defendant argued the lien was not discharged because the "registration" was incomplete as it was never certified by the Land Registrar and was subsequently withdrawn.

The court, applying statutory interpretation principles to the Land Titles Act and Land Registration Reform Act, held that "registration" is a staged process requiring both receipt and certification by the Land Registrar.

Since the application to delete the lien was received but not certified and was withdrawn, it was never fully registered, and thus the original lien was not discharged.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed.

The defendants 1995636 Ontario Inc. and Lisa Bailey brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to the plaintiff's alleged failure to timely disclose multiple settlement agreements with another defendant, 2495048 Ontario Inc. In the alternative, they sought severance of claims against them, arguing their involvement was discrete.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the undisclosed agreements did not "entirely alter the landscape of the litigation" or change the adversarial position of the parties into a cooperative one.

The court also dismissed the motion for severance, determining that the test for joinder was met due to common questions of fact and law and interconnectedness between the claims across multiple properties, promoting efficiency and avoiding inconsistent judgments.

The appellants, lien claimants in a condominium development bankruptcy, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the quantum of their priority under section 78(2) of the Construction Act.

They argued for a 20% priority due to two building mortgages, while the receiver contended it was a single 10% holdback deficiency.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the statutory interpretation issue important.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, affirming that the priority is limited to the single 10% holdback deficiency, regardless of the number of building mortgages.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to correct a misnomer in the title of proceedings and to direct the Land Registrar to certify a certificate of action registered on title.

The court dispensed with service on the landlord due to unsuccessful attempts and the lack of prejudice.

The court granted the motion, holding that it had the authority to amend the certificate of action nunc pro tunc and to direct the Land Registrar to certify the correct registration.

The applicants sought to remove the sole arbitrator in a complex construction arbitration, alleging his extensive questioning of witnesses created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the application under the Arbitration Act, 1991, and that the application was not out of time.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding that the arbitrator's interventions were a legitimate exercise of his truth-seeking function and subject matter expertise, and did not demonstrate bias or pre-judgment.

Three lien claimants brought a motion in a receivership proceeding to determine the proper interpretation of s. 78(2) of the Construction Act regarding priority over building mortgages.

The claimants argued they were entitled to priority for the holdback deficiency against each building mortgage individually, effectively multiplying their priority amount.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the lien claimants' priority is limited to the extent of the single deficiency in the owner's holdback over all building mortgages combined, as multiplying the priority would be contrary to the statutory scheme and unfairly prejudice subsequent encumbrancers.

Following a 19-day construction lien trial, a procedural dispute arose regarding closing submissions.

The defendant filed a surrebuttal that raised a new defence under the Limitations Act, 2002, and implicitly alleged professional negligence against the plaintiff's counsel.

The plaintiff requested a right of reply.

The court granted the plaintiff a limited right of reply, finding that trial fairness dictated the plaintiff must have an opportunity to respond to a newly raised, unpleaded limitations defence.

The defendants, a lawyer and his firm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence action as statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants negligently failed to perfect a construction lien, resulting in the loss of its secured position.

The plaintiff argued it did not discover the claim until the conclusion of the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings when it became clear no funds would be recovered.

The court held that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known it had suffered a loss and that a civil action was legally appropriate by October 2014, when it was advised the lien had expired.

The bankruptcy proceeding was not an alternative dispute resolution process that delayed the limitation period.

The action, commenced in 2019, was statute-barred and dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to confirm a master's report that granted summary judgment in a construction lien action.

The Divisional Court held that a master acting as a referee under the Construction Lien Act has the jurisdiction to use the enhanced powers of a judge on a summary judgment motion.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the master deprived the self-represented respondent of procedural fairness by treating his motion to discharge the lien under section 47 as a motion for summary judgment without notice.

The matter was remitted back to a master for disposition.