S.J. Woodley

Following a successful application in which the applicant was awarded $200,000 from the estate of his deceased brother and/or from the respondent widow personally on the basis of conversion of trust assets, the court fixed costs of the entire proceeding on a full indemnity basis.

The respondent, who acted as estate trustee and sole beneficiary of her late husband's estate, consistently defied court orders, refused to provide accountings, launched multiple unsuccessful interlocutory proceedings, remained self-represented despite orders requiring her to retain counsel, and failed to pay $21,000 in previously-ordered costs.

The court found her conduct constituted an egregious disregard for the court and the rule of law, warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $195,543.68 inclusive of all prior costs awards, jointly and severally payable by the respondent in her personal and representative capacities within 60 days.

The court further declared that the real property subject to a Certificate of Pending Litigation was available to satisfy both the $200,000 judgment and the costs award.

The accused was charged with one count of sexual assault following an encounter on his boat.

The accused admitted to the sexual activity but maintained it was consensual.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found the accused's evidence to be straightforward and reliable, while noting factual gaps and inconsistencies in the complainant's narrative.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of an affidavit filed by the plaintiffs in support of an upcoming summary judgment motion regarding an insurance coverage dispute.

The defendants argued the subjective extrinsic evidence was irrelevant and would needlessly complicate the summary judgment hearing.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that under the expanded powers of Rule 20, issues of admissibility and relevancy are best left to the judge hearing the summary judgment motion to avoid bifurcating the process and wasting judicial resources.

The applicants sought an order declaring that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify them in an underlying trip and fall action.

The incident occurred during a gap period between written service contracts with a landscaping contractor insured by the respondent.

The applicants argued an implied contract existed during the gap period.

The court dismissed the application, finding it fatally flawed because the landscaping contractor was not named as a respondent and could not have a ruling made against its interests without an opportunity to be heard.

During a medical negligence trial, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the evidence of the defendant doctor's emergency medicine expert.

The plaintiffs alleged the expert was biased because his spouse, also a physician, had privileges at the defendant hospital.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess framework and found no disqualifying bias, noting the expert's opinion was formed before his spouse obtained privileges and he had no relationship with the defendants.

The motion to strike the expert evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against an emergency room physician, two nurses, and a hospital following the sudden death of a 40-year-old woman from an acute aortic dissection.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached the standard of care by failing to diagnose the condition, failing to order a CT angiogram, and failing to refer the patient to a specialist in a timely manner.

The plaintiffs also alleged that the medical records were falsified and that the defendants' care was compromised by anti-Black racism and sexism.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the physician and nurses met the applicable standards of care.

The court held that the patient presented with symptoms consistent with more common conditions like acute coronary syndrome, and that the physician's investigative approach was appropriate.

The court also found no evidence of record falsification or discriminatory conduct.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including human trafficking, assault, theft of a motor vehicle, and firearms offences.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of a single complainant, a sex trade worker with a severe cocaine addiction.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be riddled with internal and external inconsistencies, largely due to her admitted drug intoxication and trauma.

Text messages between the complainant and the accused contradicted her claims of fear and control.

Consequently, the court found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and reliability, resulting in an acquittal on all counts.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2013 final order, seeking disclosure and changes to access.

At the hearing, she orally requested retroactive and ongoing adjustments to child support and contribution to section 7 expenses for their special needs child.

The respondent father, who lives in the US and exercises access in Canada, argued that a retroactive increase would cause undue hardship due to his significant travel costs.

The court denied retroactive child support due to hardship but varied ongoing support prospectively based on the father's current income.

The court also ordered the father to contribute to specific past section 7 expenses and to add the child to his employment health benefits for future expenses.

During a medical malpractice jury trial, the plaintiffs sought to qualify a paediatrician and neonatologist to give expert evidence on the standard of care applicable to the defendant family physician.

The defendants objected, arguing the expert was not a family physician and his evidence would be duplicative and prejudicial.

The court applied the two-stage test for expert evidence and held that the expert was qualified to testify on the minimum standard of care applicable to all physicians regarding well-baby checkups and head circumference measurements.

The court found the evidence was not overly complex or confusing and its benefit outweighed any potential prejudice.

The City of Kawartha Lakes appealed a Master's order compelling its solicitor to answer questions and produce documents on cross-examination regarding an affidavit she swore.

The Master found that the City had waived solicitor-client and settlement privilege by voluntarily disclosing detailed narratives of its conduct, legal advice, and settlement negotiations in the affidavit.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Master's findings that the information was relevant and that the privileges had been waived.

The court also confirmed that section 239 of the Municipal Act does not create a new 'closed session' privilege.

The accused pleaded guilty to simple possession of hydromorphone.

He was originally prescribed the drug for chronic pain from workplace injuries and a car accident, which led to an addiction.

The Crown sought a six-month conditional sentence, while the accused sought a suspended sentence.

The court considered the accused's lack of a prior criminal record, his steady employment, and his significant rehabilitative efforts, including 18 years of treatment for opiate dependency and recent success in tapering his methadone dose.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 24 months of probation, finding a custodial sentence unwarranted.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff was barred from recovering non-pecuniary and health care damages under the Insurance Act.

The jury had awarded $10,000 in general damages and $37,133.13 in medical expenses.

The trial judge applied the three-pronged test from Meyer v. Bright and found the plaintiff, a former school principal, suffered permanent serious impairment due to chronic pain syndrome and soft tissue injuries.

The court held the plaintiff met the statutory threshold, dismissing the defendants' motion and allowing the plaintiff to recover the damages awarded by the jury.

The defendant was successful on a summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff's claim for damages and sought partial indemnity costs of $77,750.85.

The plaintiff argued the quantum was excessive and suggested $35,000.00.

The court reviewed the time dockets, hourly rates, and the complexity of the matter, finding the defendant's claimed rates reasonable.

The court fixed costs payable to the defendant at $70,313.19 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff, a registered nurse who underwent massive weight loss, sued her plastic surgeon, his professional corporation, a hospital, and a nurse after the nurse asked an allegedly inappropriate question during surgery while the plaintiff was awake.

The surgeon and his corporation moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them.

The court applied the Hryniak test and reviewed the plaintiff's own expert report, which established that the surgeon met the standard of care for preoperative, technical, and postoperative care.

The court found that the surgeon also met the subjective standard of care for intraoperative management and patient advocacy, as he did not perceive the question as derogatory or know the plaintiff felt insulted at the time.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted the motion and dismissed the action against the surgeon and his corporation.

The Crown sought an order under section 715.1(1) of the Criminal Code to introduce a videotaped statement of a child complainant in a sexual assault trial.

The defendant opposed, arguing the statement was not made within a reasonable time and should be excluded under the court's residual discretion.

The court found the delay in reporting was reasonable given the child's age, the accused's position of authority, and the child's belief she would be arrested if she told the secret.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the statement and granted the order, subject to the complainant adopting the statement at trial.

The applicant sought to enforce an alleged settlement by accepting an offer contained in the respondent’s settlement conference brief more than two years after it was initially rejected.

The court held that offers contained in settlement conference briefs are not Rule 18 offers under the Family Law Rules but are governed by the law of contract, informed by the Family Law Rules, the Courts of Justice Act, and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although such offers may become binding contracts upon acceptance, they may also be implicitly withdrawn by subsequent written offers that are less favourable to the opposing party.

The court found that later settlement proposals reducing the applicant’s share constituted implicit withdrawal of the earlier offer.

Accordingly, the purported acceptance did not create a binding agreement enforceable by the court.