M. Newhouse

During a jury trial for procuring and related offences, the Crown sought leave to introduce portions of the complainant's prior consistent statements during re-examination to rehabilitate her credibility after cross-examination.

The court applied the test from R. v. Murray and denied the request, finding that the complainant had not claimed her prior statements were lies, but rather offered explanations for inconsistencies.

The court held that admitting the statements would violate the general rule against prior consistent statements and cause prejudice to the accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The incident occurred after the appellant, the complainant, and her partner returned to a residence after drinking.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony as illogical and accepted the complainant's evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) principles, assessing credibility, and refusing an adjournment for a Seaboyer application.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and there were no errors of law.

The accused was charged with sexually abusing his step-daughter over a six-year period beginning when she was eight years old.

The abuse included sexual touching, forced anal intercourse, and other sexual acts.

The accused initially could not plead guilty due to alcohol-induced blackouts preventing him from recalling the offences, but he accepted the victim's evidence as truthful and credible.

The court found him guilty of sexual touching of a child under sixteen.

At sentencing, the court imposed a six-year custodial sentence, balancing significant aggravating factors including the breach of trust, the victim's young age, the prolonged nature of the abuse, and the serious harm suffered by the victim, against mitigating factors including the accused's difficult childhood, his remorse, his steps toward rehabilitation, and his decision to accept responsibility without requiring the victim to testify at trial.

The accused was charged with assault on a peace officer, escape from lawful custody, and failing to comply with recognizance.

The court considered a Charter application to exclude fingerprint evidence obtained during a traffic stop that evolved into an investigative detention.

The accused argued violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the initial detention and pat-down search were justified, the officer's attempt to handcuff the accused without reasonable grounds constituted an arbitrary detention in violation of section 9.

However, the fingerprint evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor and technical, the impact on the accused's liberty interest was minimal, and the evidence was vital to the truth-finding process.

The accused was charged with fail to stop, impaired operation, and excess alcohol following a motor vehicle collision in a parking lot on September 16, 2011.

The Crown proved the fail to stop charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on eyewitness evidence and vehicle identification.

However, the impaired operation charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence of impairment, with the court finding the observations of impairment were inconsistent and could be explained by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The excess alcohol charge was also dismissed as a consequence of excluding the breath sample evidence due to a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that police failed to ensure the accused, who had significant language limitations, understood his right to counsel and had a meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel.

The accused was charged with two counts of attempted murder of Raheem Mitchell and Nishan Singh, as well as charges related to pointing, discharging, and using a firearm without lawful excuse, and possessing a handgun without a licence.

A shooting incident occurred on August 25, 2013, at Swansea Mews in Toronto.

The Crown sought committal for trial on all charges.

The defence challenged both the identity of the shooter and whether there was sufficient evidence of intent to kill.

The court found that circumstantial evidence, including video footage, clothing matching, gunshot residue, and witness testimony, established that the accused was the shooter.

The court also found sufficient evidence of intent to kill based on the number of shots fired, the proximity of the victims, the trajectory of the bullets, and the accused's deliberate actions.

The Crown's request for additional counts of attempted murder against other members of the group was rejected as there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill them.

The accused brought a motion on the second day of trial to dismiss charges of impaired driving and driving with over 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood.

The accused argued that the Crown was barred by statute from proceeding without the consent of the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.

The accused was charged in February 2011, released on a Promise to Appear with a March 2011 court date, but no Information was before the court at that appearance.

The accused heard nothing until receiving a Summons in February 2012, over one year later.

The court found that jurisdiction was lost when no Information was before the court at the first appearance, and that the Crown failed to regain jurisdiction within the three-month statutory period.

Accordingly, the charges were deemed dismissed for want of prosecution, and the Crown could not proceed without the required consent, which was never obtained.

The motion was granted and the charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault against a complainant who alleged that the taxi driver touched her genitals without consent during a cab ride on December 1, 2012.

The complainant was intoxicated and became ill during the ride.

The defendant denied the allegations and testified that he did not touch the complainant at any time.

The court found that while the complainant's evidence was credible, her state of intoxication created a reliability gap in her testimony.

The security camera footage did not corroborate the allegations of continuous touching.

The defendant's evidence, while not fully believed, raised a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was convicted of production of cannabis, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm with ammunition, and related drug and weapons offences following a search warrant execution at a residential property where a sophisticated hydroponic marijuana grow operation was discovered.

The sentencing judgment addresses three key legal issues: whether the mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a loaded firearm remains in effect following the Smickle decision declaring it unconstitutional; whether the combination of drug production and firearms constitutes an aggravating factor; and whether sentences should be imposed concurrently or consecutively.

The court imposed a global sentence of 43 months imprisonment, treating the offences as concurrent given their interconnected nature within a single criminal enterprise.

The applicant was charged with five drug-related offences, six firearm-related offences, one charge of proceeds obtained by crime, and four charges of possession of stolen property arising from a marijuana production operation.

The applicant brought a Charter section 8 application challenging the search warrant executed at his residence on September 19, 2011.

The applicant sought to exclude all evidence seized during the search.

The court conducted a voir dire to examine the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

After careful review and redaction of irrelevant, misleading, and prejudicial information from the ITO, the court found that sufficient reasonable and probable grounds existed to justify the issuance of the warrant based on the totality of circumstances, including distinctive electricity consumption patterns and police observations.

The application was dismissed.