A. De Marco

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing the death of her 11-month-old son, who died from acute fentanyl intoxication after being exposed to the drug in their shared bed.

The court accepted a joint submission from the Crown and defence, sentencing the accused to two years in jail, less pre-trial custody, followed by two years of probation.

The court emphasized the primacy of denunciation and deterrence for offences involving child abuse, while also considering the accused's guilty plea, traumatic background, and rehabilitative efforts.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography between April 29, 2012 and January 14, 2014.

Police discovered tens of thousands of images on seven seized devices.

The defendant had a significant collection spanning a broad range of depravity, including images of very young children and violent sexual acts.

The Crown sought 12 months imprisonment plus maximum probation.

The defence sought the mandatory minimum of 90 days with intermittent service.

The court imposed 90 days intermittent imprisonment followed by three years probation with extensive conditions, finding the defendant's unique neuropsychological circumstances—including severe traumatic brain injury from childhood, borderline intellectual functioning, and profound social isolation—warranted departure from the typical sentencing range despite aggravating factors in the offence itself.

The accused was charged with fail to stop, impaired operation, and excess alcohol following a motor vehicle collision in a parking lot on September 16, 2011.

The Crown proved the fail to stop charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on eyewitness evidence and vehicle identification.

However, the impaired operation charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence of impairment, with the court finding the observations of impairment were inconsistent and could be explained by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The excess alcohol charge was also dismissed as a consequence of excluding the breath sample evidence due to a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that police failed to ensure the accused, who had significant language limitations, understood his right to counsel and had a meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel.

The accused brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first degree murder following the close of the Crown’s case.

The defence argued there was no evidence capable of establishing planning and deliberation, conceding only that evidence could support second degree murder.

Applying the directed verdict test from United States of America v. Sheppard and R. v. Arcuri, the court considered whether there was any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could infer planning and deliberation.

The court held that circumstantial evidence including motive arising from a prior altercation and threat, potential retrieval of a knife shortly before the attack, absence of a contemporaneous struggle, and the nature of the fatal wound could support such an inference.

The motion was therefore dismissed and the first degree murder charge was left for the jury.