P. Andras Schreck

The accused appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, arguing arbitrary detention and racial profiling.

The Crown appealed the sentence, challenging the trial judge's finding that s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, which limits pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 when bail is denied primarily due to a previous conviction, violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding no arbitrary detention or racial profiling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that s. 719(3.1) violates the principle of proportionality in sentencing under s. 7 of the Charter by subjecting identically placed offenders to different periods of incarceration based on bail outcomes, and is not saved by s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

Five criminal appeals arising from a major gang investigation challenged informer-privilege procedures, wiretap authorizations, general warrants, covert searches, no-knock take-down warrants, a warrantless vehicle search, jury instructions, and expert opinion evidence.

The court held that an ex parte, in camera first-stage informer privilege hearing was proper, that Criminal Code ss. 186(1.1) and 487.01 were constitutionally valid, and that the wiretap authorizations and general warrants were lawfully issued and executed.

Although one warrantless vehicle search was conducted in an unreasonable manner and one aspect of the conspiracy jury charge was erroneous, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2) and the charge error caused no substantial wrong.

All convictions were upheld and all appeals were dismissed.

The respondent was convicted of 16 weapons and drug offences and sentenced to a global term of 42 months.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and seeking a seven-year term, and that the trial judge erred by making the drug and weapons sentences concurrent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the relevant sentencing principles, the effect of invalidated mandatory minimums, and the aggravating factor of combining guns and drugs.

The sentence was entitled to deference and was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal barroom altercation.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding self-defence under sections 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to assess the lawfulness of the victim's assault from the accused's perspective rather than the victim's, and by failing to leave section 35 with the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

The Crown's principal position at trial was that the appellant was wilfully blind to the child pornography his house guest had placed on his computer.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's original charge and re-charge to the jury on wilful blindness were too broad and confusing, failing to properly articulate the level of suspicion required to engage the doctrine.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant was convicted of production of cannabis, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm with ammunition, and related drug and weapons offences following a search warrant execution at a residential property where a sophisticated hydroponic marijuana grow operation was discovered.

The sentencing judgment addresses three key legal issues: whether the mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a loaded firearm remains in effect following the Smickle decision declaring it unconstitutional; whether the combination of drug production and firearms constitutes an aggravating factor; and whether sentences should be imposed concurrently or consecutively.

The court imposed a global sentence of 43 months imprisonment, treating the offences as concurrent given their interconnected nature within a single criminal enterprise.

This appeal addressed whether trial judges may fix rates of remuneration for amici curiae and order provincial payment in criminal proceedings where amici were appointed to preserve orderly process.

The majority held that while superior and statutory courts may appoint amici in exceptional circumstances, inherent or implied jurisdiction does not extend to fixing compensation rates absent constitutional or statutory authority.

The Court emphasized separation of powers and held public-funding allocation decisions belong to the legislative and executive branches.

Dissenting judges would have recognized fee-setting as necessarily incidental to the appointment power to protect judicial process integrity.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his certiorari application seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for second degree murder.

He argued the evidence could support committal only for manslaughter and that the inferences drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge amounted to speculation.

The Court of Appeal held that, at the preliminary inquiry stage, the inference most favourable to the Crown must be drawn and that difficult inferences may still be reasonable.

It found the inferences supporting committal under ss. 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were reasonably available given the appellant's conduct, the conduct of his accomplices, and the planning and execution of the robbery.

The applicant was charged with five drug-related offences, six firearm-related offences, one charge of proceeds obtained by crime, and four charges of possession of stolen property arising from a marijuana production operation.

The applicant brought a Charter section 8 application challenging the search warrant executed at his residence on September 19, 2011.

The applicant sought to exclude all evidence seized during the search.

The court conducted a voir dire to examine the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

After careful review and redaction of irrelevant, misleading, and prejudicial information from the ITO, the court found that sufficient reasonable and probable grounds existed to justify the issuance of the warrant based on the totality of circumstances, including distinctive electricity consumption patterns and police observations.

The application was dismissed.

On a Crown appeal in a criminal matter, the Court addressed whether prior compelled civil discovery testimony could be used to cross-examine an accused at trial without violating s. 13 of the Charter.

A majority held that only prior testimony that is itself incriminating engages the constitutional protection, and that non-incriminating prior statements used solely for impeachment do not trigger s. 13.

The majority restored the conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and set aside the order for a new trial.

A dissenting minority would have barred the cross-examination, finding that compelled prior testimony assisting the prosecution in any way should remain protected.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug and weapons charges, which followed the trial judge's exclusion of evidence seized from the accused's residence.

The police had obtained search warrants for the accused's restaurant and residence based primarily on information from a confidential informant.

The Court of Appeal found that while the warrant for the restaurant was validly issued, the information supporting the residence warrant was insufficient, as it lacked details about the informant's source of knowledge regarding drugs in the home.

The Court concluded that the search of the residence violated section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2), noting that the police conduct in drafting the Information to Obtain was careless and misleading, rendering the breach serious.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug and weapons charges after the trial judge excluded evidence seized from his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police obtained search warrants for the accused's restaurant and residence based on a confidential informant's tip.

The Court of Appeal found the information to obtain (ITO) for the restaurant was sufficient, but the ITO for the residence lacked detail and failed to indicate the informant's source of knowledge.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the search of the residence violated s. 8 of the Charter and that the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2), noting the misleading and careless drafting of the ITO.

The appellant appealed his conviction for child pornography offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained from a search of his computer under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police had obtained his subscriber information from his Internet service provider without a warrant, which the trial judge found breached s. 8.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, relying on its companion decision in R. v. Ward to hold that obtaining the subscriber information did not violate s. 8, and alternatively, that the trial judge made no error in her s. 24(2) analysis admitting the evidence.

The appellant, a 17-year-old youth, was involved in a gang shootout on a crowded street that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander.

He was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as an adult.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding his identification as a shooter and causation of the victim's death, and challenged the Crown's decision to require a jury trial under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable based on the evidence, the mutual decision to engage in a gunfight established causation, and the Crown's decision to require a jury trial did not amount to an abuse of process.

The appellants appealed convictions arising from a vicious, pre-meditated group assault intended to intimidate a victim from testifying at an upcoming murder trial, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding an unsavoury key witness and misdirected the jury on confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the caution, framed consistently with standard jury instructions and reinforced by repeated references to the witness's frailties, was more than adequate in the context of the case as a whole.

It further held that the cited confirmatory evidence was capable of bolstering material aspects of the witness's account and was not misleading.

On sentence, the court found an error in the trial judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors, but concluded that denunciation and deterrence properly predominated and that the four-year global sentence remained fit.

The appellant appealed his first degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of two loaded handguns seized from him that were unconnected to the murder, and by instructing the jury that this evidence could confirm the testimony of a Vetrovec witness (a jailhouse informant).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the firearms evidence was relevant to the appellant's knowledge of the murder weapons and properly admitted with a limiting instruction.

The Court also held the evidence was capable of confirming the informant's testimony, as it was independent and increased confidence in the witness's reliability.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and that his rights under ss. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter were violated.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the circumstances, including the fact that the appellant matched the description of a male who pointed a handgun, constituted reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The Charter arguments were not pressed and were found to have no merit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder for an execution-style shooting related to a drug debt.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding unsavoury witnesses (Vetrovec warning) and the defence of abandonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's continuum approach to the Vetrovec warnings, his instructions on confirmatory evidence, or his charge on abandonment.

The youth appellant, who was unrepresented and mentally ill, pleaded guilty to break and enter with intent.

The Youth Court judge accepted the plea without a proper inquiry and subsequently found the appellant not criminally responsible (NCR) based on expert evidence that failed to address the legal test for criminal responsibility.

The Court of Appeal found fatal procedural errors, including the failure to ensure a valid plea, lack of evidence for the NCR verdict, and denial of trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, the NCR verdict set aside, and based on the appellant's fresh acknowledgement of guilt, a conviction was entered with a sentence of one day's imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter by the Court of Appeal, which substituted the conviction for second-degree murder following an appeal.

The appellant acted as a middleman in an insurance fraud scheme, recruiting arsonists to burn down a commercial building, which resulted in the death of one of the arsonists.

The Court of Appeal imposed a base sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, finding the appellant's role and the inherent danger of the arson warranted a substantial penitentiary term.

After applying credit for pre-sentence and post-conviction custody, the appellant was sentenced to 4 years and 11 months.