Suhail Akhtar

Crown appeal from an acquittal following a judge-alone trial on charges of accessing and possessing child pornography discovered on a computer owned by the respondent but used by his partner.

The trial judge found the respondent suspicious that his partner may have downloaded prohibited material but concluded he lacked actual knowledge and acquitted him on the basis of “innocent possession.” The Court of Appeal held the trial judge misapplied both the doctrine of wilful blindness and the innocent possession doctrine.

However, the court concluded the factual findings did not establish the knowledge or control required for possession under the Criminal Code.

The acquittal was therefore upheld.

The accused brought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a preliminary inquiry judge revoked a prior release order under s. 523(2)(b).

The revocation was based on a modest increase in the strength of the Crown’s identification evidence and two new convictions that had been outstanding at the time of the original bail hearing.

The court held that s. 523(2)(b) does not authorize a de novo bail hearing and requires proof of a substantial or material change in circumstances.

The identified developments did not constitute a sufficient change to justify revoking bail.

The revocation order was vacated and the accused was ordered released on stricter bail with additional sureties and conditions.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a $4 million mortgage scheme and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and $250,000 in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by conducting his own handwriting analysis, failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following unlawful arrest and search, and imposing an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Grant framework to admit the evidence, reasonably assessed the handwriting, and correctly held that conditional sentences are inappropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a judge-alone criminal trial on the basis of misapprehension of evidence.

The respondent conceded material misapprehensions on two counts but disputed any error on the remaining count.

The court held that a further misapprehension affected the credibility assessment on the first count and, taken cumulatively with the conceded errors on the other counts, rendered the verdicts unreliable.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on all three counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

The Crown's principal position at trial was that the appellant was wilfully blind to the child pornography his house guest had placed on his computer.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's original charge and re-charge to the jury on wilful blindness were too broad and confusing, failing to properly articulate the level of suspicion required to engage the doctrine.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission of 20 months and imposed a sentence of 5 years plus time served.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge erred by not allowing further submissions before departing from the joint submission and by failing to give it significant weight.

The Court of Appeal agreed the judge erred procedurally, but found the 5-year sentence fit, as the proposed 20-month sentence would have brought the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault causing bodily harm, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her infant son.

She argued that inculpatory statements made during a police interview should have been excluded because she was psychologically detained and not advised of her right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained, as she had been told she was free to leave, had previously been given her Charter rights, and went to the station voluntarily.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his certiorari application seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for second degree murder.

He argued the evidence could support committal only for manslaughter and that the inferences drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge amounted to speculation.

The Court of Appeal held that, at the preliminary inquiry stage, the inference most favourable to the Crown must be drawn and that difficult inferences may still be reasonable.

It found the inferences supporting committal under ss. 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were reasonably available given the appellant's conduct, the conduct of his accomplices, and the planning and execution of the robbery.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-car accident.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 839 of the Criminal Code, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge failed to properly review the evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were largely factual, raised no question of law, and did not involve issues of significance to the general administration of criminal justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his nieces and great-niece.

The trial judge had stated that allegations of sexual misconduct made against a family member are inherently more credible than those against a non-family member due to the explosive nature of such complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that this analytical framework was improper and constituted a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and uttering a threat, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, reached an unreasonable verdict, and failed to properly scrutinize the frailties of the sole eyewitness's identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence did not cause a miscarriage of justice and the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred by failing to adequately analyze the specific frailties of the eyewitness identification, particularly given the lack of corroborating evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her transfer to the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

She argued the order was unreasonable due to delays in the transfer and that it was not the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the transfer had recently occurred, rendering the delay arguments moot.

The Court found the Board's conclusion that the transfer was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on a young male, arguing that the cumulative effect of several trial errors rendered the trial unfair.

The issues raised included the trial judge's handling of e-mails sent to the appellant by an excluded defence witness regarding his choice to affirm rather than swear an oath, the jury instructions on delayed disclosure and prior complaints, and the absence of a Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, concluding that the trial was fair.

The appeal was dismissed.