Michelle O’Bonsawin

M.B. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed his incapacity to manage property.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in law by misconstruing the purpose of cross-examination of an expert witness and by failing to properly evaluate the evidence against the presumption of capacity.

The court found that the Board considered all evidence holistically, including the extensive cross-examination, and did not err in its assessment.

The Board's finding of incapacity was upheld, based on M.B.'s history of poor financial decisions and persistent delusional beliefs that prevented him from understanding relevant financial information or appreciating the foreseeable consequences of his decisions.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication and mood stabilizers.

The Board found the appellant met the first part of the capacity test (understanding information) but failed the second (appreciating foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack thereof) due to his denial of illness and active psychosis.

The Superior Court applied a reasonableness standard of review for questions of fact or mixed fact and law.

The court found the Board's decision was reasonable, supported by strong medical evidence from Dr. Smith and Dr. Watts, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on his appeal from decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board regarding his capacity and the appointment of a substitute decision-maker.

The proposed evidence related to his prior capable wishes regarding treatment with Clozapine.

The court applied the Palmer test and dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence could have been adduced at the original hearings with due diligence and that its reliability was questionable given the appellant's periods of incapacity.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding a Community Treatment Order (CTO) under the Health Care Consent Act and Mental Health Act.

He argued that the statutory criteria for the CTO were not satisfied and that the Board’s decision was unreasonable, particularly given medication side effects.

The court held that the standard of review for the Board’s decision was reasonableness, except where statutory criteria raised questions of jurisdiction.

After reviewing the evidence, including the physician’s testimony and psychiatric history, the court found that the statutory criteria were met and that the Board’s decision was reasonable.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The respondent psychiatrist brought a motion under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act seeking an interim treatment order while an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision remained outstanding.

The appellant had appealed a finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment but had taken no steps to advance the appeal, resulting in a statutory suspension of treatment.

Evidence from the treating psychiatrist demonstrated that the appellant’s untreated psychotic disorder had significantly deteriorated, leading to aggression toward another patient and heightened risk to himself and others.

The court held that the statutory criteria for interim treatment were satisfied, including that treatment would substantially improve the appellant’s condition and that the benefits outweighed the risks.

An interim treatment order authorizing treatment without consent was granted pending the final disposition of the appeal.