Kathy Gruspier

The Crown sought a pre‑trial ruling on the admissibility of recorded statements made by the accused to an undercover police officer during a covert investigation into the death of the accused’s partner.

The defence argued the statements had minimal probative value, were inconsistent with forensic evidence, and constituted highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

Applying the probative‑prejudicial balancing framework for similar fact and bad character evidence, and considering reliability concerns discussed in undercover confession jurisprudence, the court excluded statements in which the accused discussed methods of killing and disposing of a body.

Those statements were found to have little relevance and significant prejudicial effect.

However, statements reflecting hostility and animus toward the deceased were admitted as probative evidence of motive.

In a pretrial motion in a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit expert toolmark evidence relating to damage on a bathtub wall in the accused’s residence.

The proposed expert opinion suggested the mark was consistent with damage caused by a saw or serrated knife and was relied upon by the Crown to support a theory of attempted dismemberment in the bathtub.

The court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan, as refined in R. v. Abbey and White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co. The court found no evidentiary foundation supporting the Crown’s dismemberment theory and concluded the expert evidence had little or no probative value while posing significant prejudicial risk.

The evidence was therefore excluded.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge violated his right to be present at his trial under s. 650 of the Criminal Code by holding an in camera meeting with the federal Crown and an investigating officer to determine an informer privilege claim over RCMP records.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the 'other suspect' defence, Vetrovec warnings for unsavoury witnesses, and the fact-finding process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the in camera meeting was part of a separate proceeding under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, not the trial itself, and that the appellant had expressly consented to the procedure.

The Court also found no reversible error in the jury instructions.