J. Tuttle

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pretrial motion challenging the admissibility of multiple statements made to police during a missing-person investigation.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because the accused was not cautioned and not informed of his right to counsel.

The court held that during the early stages of the investigation the accused was merely a person of interest in a missing-person case and not a suspect.

By the second police interview, however, the investigation had shifted to a homicide inquiry and the accused was a suspect who should have been cautioned.

The court found most statements voluntary and admissible, but excluded the portion of the second interview involving discussion of a polygraph and subsequent related statements.

In a pre‑trial motion in a murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude statements made to child protection workers while he was incarcerated.

The defence argued the workers were persons in authority and that the Crown could not prove voluntariness, alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court held the Family and Children’s Services workers were not persons in authority because they were acting solely in their child protection role and had no influence over the criminal prosecution.

As a result, the confessions rule and Charter arguments did not apply to the statements.

However, portions of the interview discussing bail, criminal record, and possible plea resolution were excluded as irrelevant and potentially prejudicial.

In a first-degree murder prosecution involving an alleged domestic homicide, the Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking admission of ante mortem statements made by the deceased to friends regarding the nature of her relationship with the accused.

The defence opposed admission on the basis of the hearsay rule and the rule excluding bad character evidence.

The court held the statements satisfied the principled exception to the hearsay rule because necessity was established by the declarant’s death and threshold reliability could be assessed through available corroboration and cross-examination of witnesses.

The court further concluded that the probative value of the statements concerning the relationship, the deceased’s state of mind, and the accused’s potential motive outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The statements were ruled admissible at trial.

In a pretrial motion in a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit expert toolmark evidence relating to damage on a bathtub wall in the accused’s residence.

The proposed expert opinion suggested the mark was consistent with damage caused by a saw or serrated knife and was relied upon by the Crown to support a theory of attempted dismemberment in the bathtub.

The court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan, as refined in R. v. Abbey and White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co. The court found no evidentiary foundation supporting the Crown’s dismemberment theory and concluded the expert evidence had little or no probative value while posing significant prejudicial risk.

The evidence was therefore excluded.

The Crown sought a pre‑trial ruling on the admissibility of recorded statements made by the accused to an undercover police officer during a covert investigation into the death of the accused’s partner.

The defence argued the statements had minimal probative value, were inconsistent with forensic evidence, and constituted highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

Applying the probative‑prejudicial balancing framework for similar fact and bad character evidence, and considering reliability concerns discussed in undercover confession jurisprudence, the court excluded statements in which the accused discussed methods of killing and disposing of a body.

Those statements were found to have little relevance and significant prejudicial effect.

However, statements reflecting hostility and animus toward the deceased were admitted as probative evidence of motive.

The accused brought a pretrial motion seeking permission to pose a race‑based challenge for cause question to prospective jurors using a multiple‑choice format designed to detect conscious and unconscious racial bias.

The Crown did not oppose a race‑based challenge for cause but objected to the proposed form of questioning.

The court reviewed jurisprudence including the Parks question and later cases considering expanded questioning formats.

The judge concluded that while a race‑based challenge for cause was appropriate, there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the established Parks formulation in favour of a multiple‑choice question.

The court held that the standard Parks question, modified to refer to judging the evidence “fairly,” adequately addressed concerns about potential juror bias without unnecessarily complicating the jury selection process.