Troy Harrison

The applicants sought judicial review of a Financial Services Tribunal decision that refused to renew their mortgage broker licences and imposed $70,000 in administrative penalties.

The Divisional Court declined to review the licensing decision, finding that the applicants had an adequate alternative remedy through a statutory right of appeal, which they had failed to perfect.

Applying a reasonableness standard, the court upheld the administrative penalties, concluding that the Tribunal's findings regarding the applicants' failure to cooperate and the economic benefit derived from delaying the proceedings were amply supported by the evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario's (FSRA) decision to investigate them, issue a summons, and issue a Notice of Proposal regarding alleged contraventions of the Mortgage Brokerages, Lenders and Administrators Act.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application for being premature, as there were ongoing proceedings before the Financial Services Tribunal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the administrative process must run its course and that the statutory scheme provided an adequate alternative remedy through a de novo hearing before the tribunal.

The Respondent brought two motions to consolidate proceedings before the Financial Services Tribunal.

The first motion sought to combine separate proceedings initiated by the applicants in response to a second Notice of Proposal (NOP2).

The second motion sought to combine the consolidated NOP2 proceeding with an earlier proceeding relating to a first Notice of Proposal (NOP1).

The Tribunal granted the first motion, finding significant commonality of facts and law among the NOP2 applicants.

The Tribunal dismissed the second motion, finding little commonality between NOP1 and NOP2, and noting that combining them would cause prejudice and undue delay to the NOP1 proceeding.

The applicants, a licensed mortgage brokerage and its principal broker, sought to vary a motion judge's decision quashing their application for judicial review of a Notice of Proposal issued by the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA).

They also sought judicial review of FSRA's decisions to publish the Notice of Proposal on its website pursuant to its Transparency Guidance and to refuse to publish the applicants' Request for Hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to vary, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the application was premature.

The Court also dismissed the remaining judicial review application, holding that FSRA's publication decisions did not affect the applicants' legal rights and were not amenable to judicial review.

In any event, the Court found the decisions to be reasonable and consistent with FSRA's statutory objects.

The respondents moved to quash an application for judicial review brought by the applicants, a mortgage broker and its principal.

The applicants sought to quash a notice of proposal issued by the regulator and challenged the regulator's decisions regarding the publication of the notice and its refusal to publish the applicants' response.

The Divisional Court quashed the portion of the application challenging the notice of proposal as premature, finding that the pending hearing before the Financial Services Tribunal provided an adequate alternative remedy.

However, the court declined to quash the claims relating to the regulator's publication decisions, finding it was not plain and obvious that those decisions were unreviewable or did not impair the applicants' legal rights.

The claim for mandamus regarding competitors was also quashed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal revoking her mortgage agent licence.

The Tribunal found she had engaged in a repeated pattern of dishonesty, including failing to disclose a previous real estate registration revocation and a criminal conviction for obstructing justice, and misleading investigators.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Tribunal should have applied a higher standard of proof and erred in its penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the civil standard of proof applies regardless of the seriousness of the allegations, and found no palpable or overriding error in the Tribunal's decision to revoke the licence.

The applicant, a former licensed mortgage broker, requested a hearing before the Financial Services Tribunal to dispute a Notice of Proposal to impose $82,500 in administrative penalties.

Over the course of nearly a year and six pre-hearing conferences, the applicant repeatedly failed to comply with Tribunal orders, retain counsel, or provide medical evidence to support his requests for delay.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the proceeding for delay.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intention to Dismiss, giving the applicant 30 days to comply.

The applicant failed to respond, and the Tribunal dismissed the request for hearing, ordering the imposition of the administrative penalties.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' Charter motion to exclude evidence gathered under a summons, the respondent sought costs.

The parties subsequently agreed to a costs order of $500 against the applicants.

The Financial Services Tribunal issued a consent order directing the applicants to pay $500 in costs to the respondent.

The Crown appealed an order granting the respondent state-funded counsel of choice (a Fisher order) for his first-degree murder trial.

The application judge had conditionally stayed the charge until the state negotiated compensation with the respondent's chosen counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to produce sufficient evidence to meet the narrow exceptions established in Peterman for state-funded counsel of choice.

The order was set aside, though the Crown had agreed to fund the chosen counsel regardless of the appeal's outcome.

This appeal addressed whether trial judges may fix rates of remuneration for amici curiae and order provincial payment in criminal proceedings where amici were appointed to preserve orderly process.

The majority held that while superior and statutory courts may appoint amici in exceptional circumstances, inherent or implied jurisdiction does not extend to fixing compensation rates absent constitutional or statutory authority.

The Court emphasized separation of powers and held public-funding allocation decisions belong to the legislative and executive branches.

Dissenting judges would have recognized fee-setting as necessarily incidental to the appointment power to protect judicial process integrity.

The appeal was allowed.

The Attorney-General sought forfeiture of insurance proceeds under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 following the killing of the insured by the beneficiary, who had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court held that the insurance proceeds constituted property acquired as a result of unlawful activity within the meaning of the statute because they became payable as a consequence of the killing.

However, the court concluded that ordering forfeiture would be clearly not in the interests of justice.

Given the absence of moral blameworthiness associated with a finding of not criminally responsible, the lack of deterrent value, and the respondent’s personal circumstances, forfeiture would be manifestly harsh.

The application for forfeiture was therefore dismissed.

The Attorney General sought a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act in respect of life insurance proceeds payable following the killing of the insured by the beneficiary, who had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for the homicide.

The respondent opposed the order and sought payment of legal fees from the preserved funds and a declaration recognizing counsel’s solicitor’s lien based on a contingency fee agreement.

The court held that a verdict of not criminally responsible constitutes proof that the offence was committed for purposes of the Act, and that the insurance proceeds were sufficiently connected to unlawful activity to justify preservation.

Delay by the Crown in bringing the application did not meet the narrow “clearly not in the interests of justice” exception.

The preservation order was granted, while requests for payment of legal expenses and recognition of a solicitor’s lien were denied or deferred.

The Attorney General applied for forfeiture of $5,545 seized during a drug investigation under the Civil Remedies Act.

The respondent brought a motion to strike portions of the supporting affidavit that referred to his criminal record and past drug-related activity, arguing it was inadmissible propensity evidence.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The respondent appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that similar fact evidence of bad character is admissible in civil forfeiture proceedings where its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, as it is relevant to whether the seized money is proceeds of unlawful activity.

The Attorney General appealed orders setting rates of compensation for amicus curiae appointed in three criminal proceedings.

The Crown argued that courts have no jurisdiction to fix the rate of compensation for amicus curiae, as only Parliament can allocate public funds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that both superior and statutory courts have the jurisdiction to fix the rate of compensation for amicus curiae as a necessary incident of their jurisdiction to appoint amicus.

The court found that such orders do not infringe constitutional principles and are authorized by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and the Financial Administration Act.

The trial judges did not err in setting rates that exceeded legal aid rates, as amicus serves the court and the administration of justice, and the rates were based on appropriate factors.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision regarding a Legal Aid Plan policy that restricted an accused's choice of counsel to major centres.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the issue was moot between the parties and not evasive of review.

The court noted that the motion judge's decision was based on the unique circumstances of the case and did not open the floodgates for accused persons to choose counsel outside their trial centres.

The accused, a seasonal worker and undischarged bankrupt, refused to accept a conditional legal aid certificate requiring him to make monthly payments of $300, believing he could not afford them.

The motion judge granted a Rowbotham order, finding the conditional offer tantamount to a denial of legal aid.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, holding that the accused's refusal to accept the terms of the certificate did not equate to a denial of legal aid, which is a prerequisite for a Rowbotham order.

The appellant appealed an order appointing a receiver over its social housing projects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion.

The respondent was the only entity with a direct financial interest, and the appellant was insolvent.

The court agreed that a receiver was appropriate to protect the social housing stock, even pending the determination of the appellant's separate motion regarding disputed subsidies.

The self-represented appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his claim for malicious prosecution against an assistant crown attorney.

The motion judge had found no genuine issue for trial regarding the absence of reasonable and probable grounds or malice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's decision and noting the appellant failed to address any purported errors.

The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing successfully applied for the appointment of a receiver over the moving party, a non-profit social housing corporation, due to alleged financial defaults.

The moving party appealed the appointment and brought a motion for a stay pending appeal.

The Ministry argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the receivership order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction because the receivership was sought by application, making it a final order.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Court granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding the corporation's insolvency and the procedural appropriateness of the receivership application, and that the corporation would suffer irreparable harm if the housing projects were transferred to another entity.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Attorney General and a Crown Attorney.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the pleadings were inadequate, as the appellant failed to plead the material facts necessary to support allegations of the absence of reasonable and probable grounds or malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.