Michael A. Jaeger

The moving party brought a motion to quash four appeals from orders dealing with the care, residence, and decision-making of the parties' 102-year-old father.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the orders were interlocutory because they did not finally determine any substantive issues between the parties, as evidenced by a subsequent order suspending enforcement and allowing the father to reside with his son pending a contempt motion.

The appeals therefore lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The motion to quash was allowed, with substantial indemnity costs awarded to the moving party.

The applicant client moved under Rule 54.09(2) to oppose confirmation of a Solicitors Act assessment of criminal defence accounts rendered under an unwritten alleged block-fee retainer.

The court held that review of an assessment officer's decision is limited to questions of principle, palpable and overriding error, or an amount so grossly improper as to warrant intervention.

Applying the quantum meruit framework and the Cohen factors, the court found no reviewable error in the assessment officer's treatment of research time, travel time, complexity, responsibility, skill, result achieved, or client expectations.

The report and certificate of assessment were confirmed, leaving the client liable for the remaining assessed balance.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion to add three individual respondents as defendants in her wrongful dismissal action, alleging they were common employers.

The motion judge found the claim against them statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period, as the appellant knew or ought to have known the material facts supporting her claim at the time of termination.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's application of discoverability and common employer principles, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed Fire Marshal Review Decisions confirming inspection orders that required the installation of a second exit and fire separations in four semi-detached student housing buildings.

The appellant argued the buildings operated as single cooperative households, exempting them from the enhanced retrofit requirements for lodging houses under Part 9 of the Ontario Fire Code.

The Commission found that the owner exercised significant control over the properties, tenants had individual leases for separate bedrooms with locks, and there was a lack of cohesiveness among the tenants.

The Commission concluded the buildings were lodging houses and confirmed the orders, extending the compliance date.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that found them jointly and severally liable for $120,000 plus prejudgment interest to the respondent.

The appeal primarily focused on the personal liability of one appellant under a personal guarantee related to a joint venture agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the case was suitable for summary judgment despite being a simplified procedure action, and upholding the validity and enforceability of the personal guarantee, which imposed personal liability.

The plaintiff, Leanne Briscoe, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, 9327959 Canada Inc. and Stephan Yaworski, seeking repayment of a $150,000 loan.

The loan was evidenced by a promissory note that stipulated repayment by December 4, 2021, or upon the sale of a property, whichever occurred earlier, plus interest.

The property was not sold by the deadline, triggering the repayment clause.

The defendants argued the note was unenforceable due to a lack of consensus ad idem, adverse market conditions, and the rights of prior lenders, claiming verbal agreements supplemented the written terms.

The court found the promissory note clear and unambiguous, and that the defendants failed to provide specific, coherent evidence to support their claims, relying instead on bald allegations.

Exercising its enhanced fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $195,000 plus pre-judgment interest.

The applicant sought costs against the appellant following the appellant's withdrawal of his appeals 17 minutes prior to the deadline for submitting hearing materials.

The Ontario Land Tribunal found that while the appellant's limited availability did not amount to unreasonable conduct, the late withdrawal of the appeals was unfair and frivolous, as the applicant had already incurred expenses preparing and filing materials.

The Tribunal awarded costs to the applicant on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $5,000.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of $120,000 based on a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and a Personal Guarantee.

The defendants argued the Guarantee lacked consideration, was invalid due to drafting errors, and that the JVA only required repayment if the project realized a profit.

They also contended that summary judgment was inappropriate for a simplified procedure action.

The court found the Guarantee valid, noting the plaintiff's reliance on it for her investment, and rejected the defendants' interpretation of the JVA based on the defendant's subsequent acknowledgments of the debt.

The court also found the corporate defendant unjustly enriched.

Summary judgment was deemed appropriate given the document-driven nature of the case and the undisputed material facts.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to file a cross-appeal and an order for security for costs against the responding parties.

The court granted the extension of time, finding the delay was not substantial, there was no prejudice, and the cross-appeal had merit.

The court also granted the security for costs, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, and the appellants had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

The court noted the responding parties' conduct, including changes in counsel and failure to comply with previous orders, contributed to the finding of vexatiousness.

This is an appeal from an order directing the payment of funds held in court (net proceeds from a home sale) to the respondent in partial satisfaction of a summary judgment against Paige Imola.

The appellant, Luigi Imola, had transferred his interest in the home to his wife, Paige Imola, years prior to avoid creditors.

He argued for a resulting trust over half the funds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's factual findings, including the appellant's intention to gift the property and his subsequent actions, rebutted any presumption of a resulting trust.

Following the plaintiff's successful motion and the dismissal of the defendants' motion, the court determined the costs payable to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought costs on a full indemnity basis due to the egregious and delaying conduct of the defendant.

The court found that the defendant's conduct unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and awarded costs of $11,900, payable personally by the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to fix costs from previous motions after the trial judge retired, to vary a previous judgment to make funds payable directly to her, and to recover collection costs and costs thrown away.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to terminate a garnishment, arguing the previous judgment was fully satisfied.

The court found the previous judgment was not fully satisfied and dismissed the defendant's motion.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that no limitation period applies to enforcing court orders for costs, and that Rule 59.06 and the court's inherent jurisdiction allowed it to fix the costs of the previous motions.

The defendant was ordered to pay $117,067.49.

The defendants brought a motion to amend their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim to add a new party and claim damages for negligent misrepresentation.

The plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis that the proposed claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the defendants failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary record to rebut the presumption of discoverability under section 5(2) of the Act.

The motion to amend the pleadings and add the party was dismissed.

The defendants (moving parties) sought an interlocutory injunction against the plaintiffs (responding parties) arising from the termination of a distribution agreement.

The court found that the agreement had been terminated with reasonable notice in August 2015.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, holding that the moving parties failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as they delayed over two years in seeking relief and failed to provide a meaningful undertaking as to damages.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the responding parties.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded $565,000 in damages against the estate of her deceased former spouse, the plaintiff sought costs.

The court found that the executor of the estate engaged in reprehensible and reckless conduct, advancing groundless defences to harass the plaintiff and dissipate estate assets.

The court ordered the executor to personally pay the plaintiff's costs on a solicitor-client scale, fixed at $141,310 plus disbursements.

This decision addresses two consolidated proceedings.

The plaintiff, Julie Craven, sought substantial damages from the Estate of Andrew Peter Osidacz for a series of violent acts, including assault, the wrongful death of their son Jared, and attempted murder.

Additionally, Ms. Craven claimed that Michael Osidacz, as the estate trustee, breached his fiduciary duties by unreasonably defending the estate, leading to the dissipation of assets.

The court assessed damages for Ms. Craven, awarding her $565,000.00, and found the estate trustee personally liable to reimburse the estate for $71,277.98 in legal costs due to his imprudent and hostile litigation strategy.

Following a successful appeal of a procedural ruling regarding a contempt motion, the parties neglected to address the costs of the proceeding before the motion judge.

The appellant requested that the Court of Appeal determine those costs, seeking $20,000.

The respondent argued the matter should be remitted to the motion judge or that no costs should be awarded.

The Court of Appeal declined to remit the issue to avoid further delay and expense, and awarded the appellant costs of the motion below fixed at $15,000 all-inclusive.

The respondent obtained a money judgment against the appellant and secured an order compelling him to attend an examination in aid of execution with specified documents.

The day before the examination, the appellant made an assignment in bankruptcy.

He attended the examination but brought a Notice of Stay of Proceedings instead of the documents.

The motion judge allowed the respondent's contempt motion to proceed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the examination was stayed by section 69.3 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act upon the bankruptcy, and therefore the failure to bring documents could not found contempt.

The plaintiffs, Julie Craven and John Craven, brought an action for libel and intrusion upon seclusion against Richard Chmura, following the publication of highly disparaging statements and videos online.

The jury found for the plaintiffs, awarding general and punitive damages.

This endorsement addresses the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction to prevent further harm.

The court applied the two-prong test from *New York Fries*, finding a real possibility that the plaintiffs would not receive compensation due to the defendant's financial inability and history of unpaid costs awards.

A permanent injunction was granted, restraining the defendant from publishing any statements or depictions about the plaintiffs and mandating the removal of existing defamatory content.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a lower court judgment on the basis that the judgment was an interlocutory order.

The lower court had ruled that contempt proceedings against the responding party were not stayed by his filing for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but adjourned the contempt motion to a later date.

The Court of Appeal held that because the lower court's ruling deprived the responding party of a substantive defence that could have resolved the proceedings, the order was final.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.