Michael A. Jaeger

Following a jury verdict in a defamation and intrusion upon seclusion action, the plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a Sanderson order requiring the unsuccessful defendant to pay the costs previously awarded to two successful co-defendants who had been dismissed on summary judgment.

The court considered the governing test from Moore (Litigation Guardian of) v. Wienecke and found the threshold requirement was not met because the plaintiffs had no evidentiary basis to join the successful defendants when the action was commenced.

The court further held that even if the threshold were met, a Sanderson order would not be appropriate given the risk that the unsuccessful defendant lacked the means to satisfy the costs award.

However, relying on prior findings that the unsuccessful defendant had ensnared the successful defendants in the litigation, the court granted a Bullock order permitting the plaintiffs to recover from that defendant the costs previously awarded to the successful defendants.

Costs of the motion were awarded against the plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed an order granting in part the respondents' motion for summary judgment, which struck out several paragraphs of his Statement of Defence.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in striking his defence of truth, which the motion judge found to be a collateral attack on previous factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's requests for other relief, including a declaration of bias and a transfer of the matter to Florida.

The applicant sought to add her former supervisor, Barbara Schacher, as an individual respondent to her human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and family status.

The respondent opposed the request, arguing the allegations related to standard management functions and post-termination conduct outside the employment context.

Applying the three-part test from Smyth, the Tribunal granted the request, finding that the allegations against the proposed respondent were central to the application and could support a finding of a Code violation.

The Ontario College of Teachers brought a motion seeking leave to withdraw allegations of professional misconduct against the Member.

College Counsel determined there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations and no reasonable prospect of obtaining a finding of professional misconduct.

In exchange, the Member provided an undertaking to resign, never seek reinstatement, and never teach again in Ontario.

The Discipline Committee granted the motion, finding that the withdrawal of the allegations in exchange for the undertaking and a notation on the Public Register was appropriate and protected the public interest.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in a defamation action concerning statements posted on websites operated by the defendant.

They alleged the publications contained defamatory statements relating to family events surrounding the death of a child and sought damages and injunctive relief.

The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues requiring trial, including publication of the statements, whether the statements were defamatory, and the extent of damages.

However, the court struck portions of the defendant’s statement of defence that disclosed no reasonable defence, including certain claims of responsible communication, fair comment, and volenti non fit injuria.

The court also made a declaration establishing the facts of a prior violent incident involving the parties’ family as not subject to dispute in the action.

Following a multi‑action civil trial arising from failed investment schemes, the plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after obtaining findings of fraud and fraudulent conveyance against the principal defendant.

The defendants had consented to judgment for the principal investment amounts but contested interest and liability for fraud.

The court had found that the principal defendant committed fraud and that he and his spouse fraudulently conveyed their home to defeat creditors.

Considering the sanctionable conduct of the defendants and the principles governing elevated costs, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs.

The court ordered costs of $92,267.75 and apportioned partial responsibility to one defendant for the fraudulent conveyance portion of the litigation.

Multiple plaintiffs brought civil actions arising from investments made with the principal defendant and related corporations that promised guaranteed monthly returns from foreign exchange trading.

The court found that the defendant misappropriated investor funds, used them for personal expenses and charitable donations, and provided false account statements while concealing losses.

The evidence established a fraudulent scheme in which investor funds were pooled and diverted without authorization, resulting in significant losses.

The court further found that the transfer of the defendant’s home to his spouse occurred with the intent to defeat creditors and therefore contravened the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs including contractual interest, the conveyance of the property was declared void, and the claims against the spouse were dismissed for lack of evidence of involvement.

Following the dismissal of a motion for partial summary judgment, the court determined the issue of costs after written submissions.

The moving party had argued that the opposing party lacked an evidentiary basis for its damages claim.

The court found the motion had been reasonably brought but concluded that the factual nature of the dispute and the wording of the agreements rendered the motion premature.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $12,500 inclusive, payable in the cause as determined by the trial judge.

The moving party sought partial summary judgment for payment of $144,000 under a promissory note issued pursuant to a share purchase agreement and related non‑competition, non‑solicitation, and non‑disclosure agreements.

The responding party argued that the note was subject to the broader contractual framework and that the moving party had breached the restrictive covenants.

Evidence suggested the moving party may have assisted a competing company and facilitated the movement of employees and customers during the restricted period.

The court held that these allegations created genuine triable issues and that the evidentiary record did not permit the full appreciation required for summary judgment under Rule 20.04 and the test articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his request to preserve a bathroom to take further pictures for his defence.

The motion judge had also dismissed his request for production of existing pictures, finding them irrelevant to the action, which the appellant did not appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the order, as pictures of the room were deemed not relevant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order appointing a receiver over its social housing projects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion.

The respondent was the only entity with a direct financial interest, and the appellant was insolvent.

The court agreed that a receiver was appropriate to protect the social housing stock, even pending the determination of the appellant's separate motion regarding disputed subsidies.

The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing successfully applied for the appointment of a receiver over the moving party, a non-profit social housing corporation, due to alleged financial defaults.

The moving party appealed the appointment and brought a motion for a stay pending appeal.

The Ministry argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the receivership order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction because the receivership was sought by application, making it a final order.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Court granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding the corporation's insolvency and the procedural appropriateness of the receivership application, and that the corporation would suffer irreparable harm if the housing projects were transferred to another entity.

The appellants, who are farmers, appealed a summary judgment enforcing security against them.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to serve the required notice under s. 21 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act before taking proceedings to enforce the security.

The Court held that a farmer does not need to demonstrate insolvency to be entitled to this notice, and the failure to serve it rendered the proceedings null and void under s. 22.

The Court also set aside a contempt order against the appellants.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their claims against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by weighing evidence and concluded there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether one respondent was a director of the corporation, and regarding a limitation period issue.

However, the court upheld the dismissal against another respondent, as there was no evidence he agreed to be appointed as a director.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant police services board appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that its officers unlawfully entered the respondent's home and unlawfully arrested him.

The officers entered the respondent's apartment without a warrant or consent to arrest him for failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal held that the officers were not protected from civil liability for trespass and false arrest by section 25 of the Criminal Code or the common law, as they lacked legal authorization to enter the dwelling following the Supreme Court's decision in Feeney.

The appeal was dismissed.