Aaron Rousseau

The applicant, Barry Taylor, brought an application claiming he was constructively dismissed when his employer, Salytics Inc., placed him on a temporary lay-off.

He argued that the temporary lay-off provision in his employment contract was void because other termination clauses in the agreement violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that a temporary lay-off provision is not a termination provision and is not invalidated by other unlawful termination clauses.

Consequently, the lay-off was contractually authorized and did not constitute constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff consulting firm brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant pharmaceutical company for unpaid invoices totaling $506,198.70 related to expert litigation services provided in a UK proceeding.

The defendant argued the fees exceeded litigation budgets and were unreasonable, and that the plaintiff was estopped from relying on a five-day notice of objection provision in the retainer agreement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial as the budgets were not part of the contract, no timely written objections were made, and there was no evidence of promissory estoppel.

The plaintiff was awarded the full amount claimed, with pre-judgment interest capped at 5% per year under the Interest Act.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendants' statement of defence due to the defendants' failure to pay outstanding costs orders totaling $52,500.

The defendants sought an adjournment, which was denied as they failed to provide evidence or a reasonable explanation for their delay.

The court found that the defendants had engaged in a pattern of behaviour designed to abuse the court's process, delay the proceedings, and cause the plaintiffs to incur wasted costs.

Applying the principles from Atlas Copco, the court struck the statement of defence and awarded the plaintiffs substantial indemnity costs of $18,500.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover monies advanced to the defendants through a series of loans and a purported joint venture.

The defendants argued that the agreements were part of a joint venture, raised the defence of non est factum, and claimed one loan charged a criminal interest rate.

The court granted summary judgment for the loans made prior to November 12, 2017, finding no genuine issue for trial, rejecting the non est factum defence, and concluding the interest rate did not violate the Criminal Code.

However, the court found that the business dealings after November 12, 2017, which involved a joint venture, presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

The plaintiff, a union member, commenced an action against his union for damages for breach of contract and an order to expunge a six-month disciplinary suspension.

The plaintiff alleged procedural unfairness and bias in the union's disciplinary proceedings, including breaches of the union's constitution.

The defendant union moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing that the court should not interfere with a voluntary tribunal's decision unless it exceeded jurisdiction, failed to conduct proceedings fairly, or acted in bad faith.

The court found that while there were minor breaches of the union's constitution, these did not amount to a deprivation of procedural fairness.

The court also found no evidence of actual bias or a real likelihood of bias on the part of the adjudicators.

Consequently, the union's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed with costs.

The defendants (moving parties) sought an interlocutory injunction against the plaintiffs (responding parties) arising from the termination of a distribution agreement.

The court found that the agreement had been terminated with reasonable notice in August 2015.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, holding that the moving parties failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as they delayed over two years in seeking relief and failed to provide a meaningful undertaking as to damages.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the responding parties.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The appellants' statement of defence had been struck after they failed to attend a motion hearing, and they were subsequently noted in default.

The motion judge dismissed their motion to set aside the default, finding that the circumstances leading to the default had not been adequately explained and that setting aside the judgment would prejudice the respondent and impair the integrity of the justice system.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants' pattern of delay and failure to attend court proceedings justified the refusal to set aside the default judgment.

The applicant, a former probationary professor, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her discrimination and reprisal application against the university.

The Tribunal had found her application was filed outside the one-year limitation period, calculating the time from the date she was denied tenure rather than her final day of employment or the denial of her grievance.

The Tribunal also dismissed her reprisal claim and denied her request to amend the application.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable, finding that the denial of tenure was the triggering event and that there was no evidence of an intention to retaliate by the university.

The applicant sought to amend her human rights application to add an allegation that she was terminated on May 18, 2011.

The respondents opposed the amendment, arguing it was untimely, lacked a reasonable prospect of success, and would cause prejudice by significantly broadening the scope of the application.

The Tribunal denied the request to amend, finding that allowing it would prejudice the respondents and that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of demonstrating she was terminated on that date, as her employment ended as a consequence of an earlier decision to deny tenure.

Following the dismissal of a motion brought by the defendant and a lien claimant to declare the plaintiff's construction lien expired, the court determined the costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of over $80,000, citing an unaccepted offer to settle and the importance of the motion.

The court found the offer did not comply with Rule 49 and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Applying the principle of proportionality and considering the factors in Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs at $22,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendants Laari Construction Ltd. and SMS Rents brought a motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff Carpenters Union's construction lien had expired due to non-compliance with Section 34(5) of the Construction Lien Act.

The defendants argued that the lien was improperly registered because it did not contain the names and addresses of the individual Carpenters Union members who performed the work.

The Carpenters Union contended that naming the trustee as agent for affected members was sufficient, especially given the practical difficulties in identifying individual workers and their specific entitlements at the time of registration.

The court found that the Carpenters Union had sufficiently identified the lien claimants by naming the trustee as agent for the affected members and complied with Section 34(5) of the Act.

Consequently, the motion brought by Laari and SMS Rents was dismissed.

A long‑term employee brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action after nearly 39 years of service.

The court determined the employee’s position at termination remained a middle‑management role despite internal restructuring.

Applying the Bardal factors, including the employee’s age, lengthy service, and managerial character of employment, the court fixed the reasonable notice period at 24 months.

The employer failed to establish that the employee had not made reasonable mitigation efforts.

However, the court held the employee was not entitled to further incentive payments under the employer’s short‑term incentive plan because the plan required active employment at the payout date.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff’s claim and granting judgment on a counterclaim subject to later assessment of damages, the defendants sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the defendants’ claimed hours and rates in light of the Civil Procedure Rules Committee grid, the indemnity principle, and the factors under Rule 57.01 and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found the time expended and rates claimed to be reasonable and determined that the litigation conduct of the plaintiff reflected tactical litigation intended to harm a competitor.

While recognizing the discretion to award costs against corporate principals, the court declined to pierce the corporate veil due to insufficient evidentiary foundation.

Costs of $58,878.22 inclusive of HST and disbursements were awarded to the defendants.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff employer's claims for breach of a non-solicitation agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, duty of fidelity, negligence, and 'time theft', and to grant the defendant employee's counterclaim for constructive dismissal.

The court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims, finding the non-solicitation clause void and expired, the employee not to be a fiduciary, and the remaining claims without merit.

The court granted summary judgment on liability for the employee's constructive dismissal counterclaim, finding the employer created a toxic work environment and repudiated the employment contract, and directed a trial solely on the quantum of damages.

A self‑represented employee brought a motion seeking determinations relating to issue estoppel arising from an Employment Insurance decision, the applicability of the Occupational Health and Safety Act reprisal provisions, and production of asbestos-related records.

The moving party argued that a Service Canada determination that he had not engaged in misconduct precluded the employer from asserting just cause for dismissal.

The court held that the requirements for issue estoppel were not met because the EI determination addressed a different legal question and the employer was not a party to the administrative process.

The court also confirmed that complaints of reprisal under s. 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board and declined to compel production of asbestos records outside the normal discovery process.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking judgment in accordance with a previously accepted settlement offer and damages for alleged breach of the Minutes of Settlement arising from a wrongful dismissal action.

The dispute centred on the interpretation of settlement provisions relating to eligibility for participation in the employer’s relocation program and reimbursement of relocation-related expenses.

The plaintiff argued that the settlement required immediate enrollment and reimbursement, while the defendant maintained the agreement only provided immediate eligibility and imposed no strict timeline for relocation services.

The court held that the settlement terms had not been breached and that the timing of the defendant’s actions was reasonable in the circumstances.

As no breach was established and the plaintiff failed to prove causation of additional losses, the motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for common law severance damages for wrongful dismissal.

He argued that a clause in his employment contract was void because it attempted to contract out of the Employment Standards Act regarding the inclusion of bonuses in termination pay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the clause, read in context, preserved the appellant's statutory entitlements.

The appeal and the respondent's cross-appeal on costs were both dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability (drug addiction and depression) by his former employer.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed because it was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

The applicant argued the delay was incurred in good faith due to his disabilities.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide medical evidence demonstrating he was so disabled that he could not file an application, noting he had published newspaper articles, podcasts, and a book during the delay period.

The application was dismissed for delay.

The employee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that a termination clause in his employment agreement was void for contracting out of minimum standards under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The dispute centered on a provision stating that bonuses would not be included in termination pay calculations except as otherwise agreed or required by statute.

The employee argued the clause unlawfully waived ESA rights contrary to s. 5(1).

The court held the provision, read harmoniously with the clause limiting termination entitlements to ESA minimums, did not contract out of the statute and simply confirmed bonuses would be included where required by law or later agreement.

The motion was dismissed and the action was summarily dismissed.

The appellant acquired 124 of 147 percentage interests in an apartment building held by tenants in common.

Unable to acquire the remaining interests, the appellant applied under the Partition Act for an order for the sale of the entire building.

The application judge dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the appellant had a prima facie right to a sale, its conduct was oppressive.

The appellant sought to force a sale to acquire the entire building for its own profit, undermining the reasonable expectations of the minority co-owners who lived in the building and would suffer significant hardship.

The appeal was dismissed.