Marie Kattapuram Abraham

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

The defendants requested a review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, who had commenced multiple similar actions, sued various government entities and a legal clinic over his involuntary committal to a hospital in 2010.

The court found the statement of claim lacked material facts, contained grandiose and legally baseless claims, and was barred by the six-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that his constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable delay was violated.

The charge was failing to comply with a recognizance.

The total delay was approximately fifteen months from arrest to trial date.

The court found that while the pure institutional delay was ten months, the additional eight-week period from December 7, 2011 to February 2, 2012 was neutral delay attributable to both parties' mistaken belief that a judicial pre-trial was mandated by court protocol when it was not.

The court found no express waiver of section 11(b) rights and minimal prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants applied to re-open an appeal previously decided by the Court of Appeal, arguing that the court was misled by false evidence regarding the status of a police informant.

The Crown conceded that newly disclosed evidence contradicted the evidence relied upon in the original appeal, which had determined the individual was a police informer rather than a police agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that while there is inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment based on fraud or newly discovered evidence, the proper forum to seek such relief is the court of first instance (the Superior Court), not the appellate court.