Marie Kattapuram Abraham

The applicant sought a review of sanctions imposed by the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) after the Capital Markets Tribunal previously set aside one finding of misappropriation.

The applicant sought to introduce new affidavit evidence regarding his ability to pay and the remaining misappropriation finding.

The Tribunal declined to admit the new evidence, finding it was not new or compelling and amounted to an inappropriate collateral challenge.

The Tribunal reduced the fine for misappropriation from $50,000 to $40,000 to reflect the set-aside finding, but upheld the remaining sanctions, including a permanent ban and $25,000 in costs, noting the severity of the remaining misconduct.

The applicant, a former registered representative, applied for a hearing and review of CIRO decisions finding he misappropriated client funds, effected unauthorized trades, and failed to cooperate with an investigation.

The applicant, who was self-represented, argued he was denied procedural fairness due to his health and that the findings were incorrect.

The Capital Markets Tribunal dismissed most of the application, finding the CIRO panel did not err in denying an adjournment or proceeding with a two-member panel.

However, the Tribunal set aside the finding that the applicant misappropriated funds from two specific clients, concluding the CIRO panel overlooked material documentary evidence (a promissory note and a complaint letter) supporting the applicant's claim that the funds were a personal loan.

The matter regarding those two clients was remitted to CIRO Staff to decide whether to rehear the allegation.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of two decisions of the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) pending the disposition of his application for a hearing and review.

The applicant also requested that his oral testimony at the stay motion hearing be kept confidential.

The Tribunal applied the three-part test for a stay and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish that he would suffer irreparable harm if the stay was not granted.

The Tribunal dismissed the stay motion.

Regarding the confidentiality request, the Tribunal applied the open court principle and found that only limited portions of the transcript containing sensitive health and personal information should be redacted to prevent an affront to the applicant's personal dignity.

The applicant sought a confidentiality order to redact certain documents in the Record of Original Proceeding for his application to review IIROC decisions.

The Tribunal granted the agreed-upon redactions concerning the applicant's intimate personal medical information.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the applicant's contested requests to redact his doctor's professional contact information and a letter of reprimand from his former employer, finding that neither met the standard required to depart from the principle of open proceedings.

The applicant, a former licensed mortgage broker, requested a hearing before the Financial Services Tribunal to dispute a Notice of Proposal to impose $82,500 in administrative penalties.

Over the course of nearly a year and six pre-hearing conferences, the applicant repeatedly failed to comply with Tribunal orders, retain counsel, or provide medical evidence to support his requests for delay.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the proceeding for delay.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intention to Dismiss, giving the applicant 30 days to comply.

The applicant failed to respond, and the Tribunal dismissed the request for hearing, ordering the imposition of the administrative penalties.

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination under the Human Rights Code.

A summary hearing was scheduled, but the applicant failed to attend or provide an explanation for his absence.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed as abandoned.

The Tribunal noted the applicant's history of filing and abandoning multiple applications and dismissed the current application as abandoned, warning that future similar conduct could result in the applicant being declared a vexatious litigant.

The defendants requested a review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, who had commenced multiple similar actions, sued various government entities and a legal clinic over his involuntary committal to a hospital in 2010.

The court found the statement of claim lacked material facts, contained grandiose and legally baseless claims, and was barred by the six-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that his constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable delay was violated.

The charge was failing to comply with a recognizance.

The total delay was approximately fifteen months from arrest to trial date.

The court found that while the pure institutional delay was ten months, the additional eight-week period from December 7, 2011 to February 2, 2012 was neutral delay attributable to both parties' mistaken belief that a judicial pre-trial was mandated by court protocol when it was not.

The court found no express waiver of section 11(b) rights and minimal prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants applied to re-open an appeal previously decided by the Court of Appeal, arguing that the court was misled by false evidence regarding the status of a police informant.

The Crown conceded that newly disclosed evidence contradicted the evidence relied upon in the original appeal, which had determined the individual was a police informer rather than a police agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that while there is inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment based on fraud or newly discovered evidence, the proper forum to seek such relief is the court of first instance (the Superior Court), not the appellate court.