Jameson William Clow

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

The respondent was convicted of driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to s. 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal judge allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown must prove the cellphone was capable of receiving or transmitting.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the requirement for a device to be capable of receiving or transmitting applies only to prescribed devices, not to cellphones.

The applicant sought to prohibit the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) from conducting a hearing into whether the applicant should pay costs to the respondents following an unsuccessful appeal.

The applicant argued that the lack of a transcript and the OMB member's refusal to consider a lawyer's notes demonstrated bias and precluded a fair hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review as premature, holding that courts generally will not entertain piecemeal attacks on administrative proceedings before a final decision is made.

The appellant appealed from a judgment declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the application judge erred by denying his request for an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the application judge's discretionary decision, noting the appellant's motivation for the adjournment was delay and he had outstanding costs awards against him.

The appellant appealed a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court directly to the Court of Appeal.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that the proper route for such an appeal is to the full panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.