Eric M. Wolfman

The Attorney-General sought forfeiture of insurance proceeds under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 following the killing of the insured by the beneficiary, who had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court held that the insurance proceeds constituted property acquired as a result of unlawful activity within the meaning of the statute because they became payable as a consequence of the killing.

However, the court concluded that ordering forfeiture would be clearly not in the interests of justice.

Given the absence of moral blameworthiness associated with a finding of not criminally responsible, the lack of deterrent value, and the respondent’s personal circumstances, forfeiture would be manifestly harsh.

The application for forfeiture was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment to enforce unpaid promissory notes and related guarantees against a corporate borrower and its principal.

The defendants relied solely on a limitation period defence under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing the claims were statute-barred.

The court held that the promissory notes, which contained fixed maturity dates, were not demand obligations and the limitation period began running at maturity, rendering those claims statute-barred.

However, the guarantees constituted free‑standing demand obligations with no fixed time for payment, and because no demand had been made prior to the action the limitation period had not begun to run.

Summary judgment was therefore granted on the guarantees but dismissed with respect to the promissory notes.

The Attorney General sought a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act in respect of life insurance proceeds payable following the killing of the insured by the beneficiary, who had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for the homicide.

The respondent opposed the order and sought payment of legal fees from the preserved funds and a declaration recognizing counsel’s solicitor’s lien based on a contingency fee agreement.

The court held that a verdict of not criminally responsible constitutes proof that the offence was committed for purposes of the Act, and that the insurance proceeds were sufficiently connected to unlawful activity to justify preservation.

Delay by the Crown in bringing the application did not meet the narrow “clearly not in the interests of justice” exception.

The preservation order was granted, while requests for payment of legal expenses and recognition of a solicitor’s lien were denied or deferred.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) for the second-degree murder of his wife, applied to receive the proceeds of her life insurance policy.

The application judge dismissed the claim, applying the public policy rule that a person cannot profit from their own criminal act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the public policy rule does not apply to an NCR accused, as they are not morally responsible for their actions.

The Court also found that the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 does not supplant the common law rule, though it leaves open the possibility for the Attorney General to seek forfeiture.

The appeal was allowed and the proceeds were ordered payable to the appellant.

The appellant father appealed an Ontario Superior Court order requiring the return of his 14-year-old son to Canada from Oklahoma.

The child had been living in Oklahoma with the father, and U.S. courts had previously refused the respondent mother's Hague Convention petition for the child's return, citing the child's mature objection to returning to Canada under Article 13(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Ontario courts should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Oklahoma courts based on principles of comity and deference to the U.S. courts' reasonable interpretation of the Hague Convention.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing two guarantees they provided for the indebtedness of their corporation.

The Court of Appeal found no error by the motion judge, concluding there was no triable issue regarding an enforceable agreement between the respondents and the corporation, nor any indication that such a contract was a term of the guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.