Troy Harrison

The applicant, operator of the Highway 407 toll road, sought an order of mandamus compelling the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to refuse to validate or issue vehicle permits for individuals who failed to pay tolls.

The Registrar had refused to act, arguing that he had a duty to ensure the applicant complied with the statutory scheme and that individuals were not wrongly denied plate renewals.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Highway 407 Act imposes a mandatory duty on the Registrar to deny permits upon receiving notice of non-payment.

The court held that the Registrar has no discretion or oversight role to look behind the notices or compliance certificates, and declined to exercise its residual discretion to refuse mandamus.

The applicant brought a motion regarding refusals and undertakings arising from examinations in a judicial review application concerning the respondent's authority to enforce notice of licence cancellation.

The court reviewed transcripts and correspondence, ruling on obvious relevancy issues and leaving the remainder to the Divisional Court panel to determine, noting the competing views on the scope of the record.

The plaintiffs, the estate and family of a man fatally shot by police, brought actions for misfeasance in a public office and negligence against the involved officers, the Chief of Police, the Police Services Board, and the Province.

The claims arose from the officers' alleged failure to cooperate with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the Chief, and the negligence action against the Chief, could proceed, as it was not plain and obvious they would fail.

However, the negligence actions against the Board and the Province were struck out because they did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs to ensure officers cooperated with the SIU.

Following a successful judicial review application, the applicants sought costs of $113,017.43 on a partial indemnity scale.

The court reviewed the bill of costs and applied the principle that a costs award must reflect a fair and reasonable amount for the unsuccessful party to pay, rather than an exact measure of actual costs.

The court disallowed costs for proceedings before the administrative tribunal, reduced the hourly rates claimed for counsel, and found the hours claimed for preparation and submissions excessive.

Costs were fixed at $25,681.93 inclusive of disbursements.

The applicants, competitors in the wastewater treatment system market, sought judicial review of a decision by the Building Materials Evaluation Commission (BMEC) to amend their previously granted authorizations.

The BMEC initiated the review on its own motion due to interpretation difficulties and potential health and safety concerns.

The Divisional Court held that while the BMEC lacked express statutory authority to amend the authorizations outside of specific conditions, it possessed implied legislative authority to reconsider its decisions where public health and safety warranted, and was therefore not functus officio.

However, the Court quashed the BMEC's decision, finding that the BMEC breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicants with adequate notice and disclosure of the information underlying the proposed amendments, thereby depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to respond.

The applicants, inmates awaiting trial at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre, brought an application for judicial review challenging the implementation of a new telephone system that imposed an automatic twenty-minute time limit on outgoing calls.

They argued this restriction violated their freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter and section 5 of the Ministry of Correctional Services Act.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no statutory or Charter breach, and held that any such breach would be saved by section 1 of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the application for pre-trial inmates, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.