Rochelle Direnfeld

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the "faint hope" clause (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code).

The screening judge applied the less stringent "reasonable prospect of success" test from the 1997 amendments, as the murder occurred in 2003.

Despite some positive institutional conduct, the applicant's abysmal overall conduct, lack of genuine remorse and accountability, and persistent moderate risk for violent recidivism led the court to conclude he failed to meet the test.

The application was dismissed, but a further application was permitted after six years.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old victim.

The main ground of appeal concerned the admissibility of a partial recording of a telephone call between the appellant and the victim's mother, in which the appellant apologized and appeared to be crying.

The appellant also challenged the admission of incomplete text messages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, finding that the victim's mother's testimony provided sufficient context for the recorded statement and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding the incomplete text messages.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment plus 13 months pre-sentence custody for multiple driving-related offences including impaired driving, dangerous driving, flight from police, driving while disqualified, and failing to provide a breath sample.

The central issue was whether the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum of five years when pre-sentence custody was included in the calculation.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was illegal as it exceeded the maximum by one month and 19 days.

The court established that pre-sentence custody must be considered when calculating sentences against statutory maximums, following the principle established in minimum and conditional sentence cases.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 34 months and 11 days from the date of sentencing.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 13, 2016.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the Board failed to apply the Winko test in concluding the appellant remains a significant threat to public safety and failed to order an absolute discharge; (2) the Board erred in failing to order a conditional discharge; and (3) conditions should be amended to allow community living in Brockville rather than North Bay due to North Bay's inability to receive the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds but allowed the appeal on the third ground, permitting the appellant to live in approved community accommodation in Brockville.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 11, 2016, raising an issue regarding the supervisory powers of the Board between hearings.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be moot as the Board's disposition had been implemented and the appellant sought no remedy on appeal.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences committed both as an adult and as a young offender.

The trial judge conducted a single trial for both the adult and youth indictments and admitted evidence across the indictments as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act precludes the joint trial of adult and youth indictments.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in his similar fact evidence ruling by failing to account for the 30-year gap and the appellant's age difference, and erred in admitting a videotaped statement without affording the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness on her demeanour.

The appellant, a physiotherapy assistant, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by considering the complainant's demure dress in court and her apparent religious beliefs as factors bolstering her credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by treating the complainant's manner of dress and religious beliefs as relevant to her credibility, these factors were given minimal weight and did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction entered by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no strong arguments that the lower court fell into legal error and declining to repeat the analysis performed by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that he should have received an absolute discharge as he was no longer a significant threat to public safety, or alternatively, that the Board failed in its inquisitorial role regarding the timing of his 24-hour supervised community living placement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant required ongoing supervision to ensure medication compliance and prevent relapse.

The Court also noted that the Board had appropriately questioned the hospital on the timing of the placement, and fresh evidence indicated a bed would soon be available.

The accused, a project manager on a balcony restoration project, was charged with four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after a swing stage collapsed, causing five workers to fall 100 feet.

The court found that the accused had the authority to direct the workers and breached his duty under s. 217.1 of the Criminal Code by permitting six workers to board the swing stage when he knew there were only two lifelines available.

The court held that this failure constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable supervisor, showing wanton and reckless disregard for the workers' lives and safety.

The accused's negligence was found to be a significant contributing cause of the deaths and injuries, and he was found guilty on all counts.

In a criminal negligence trial arising from a fatal swing stage collapse, the court considered whether the Crown could tender selected pre-trial statements by the accused without introducing a later video-recorded interview.

Applying the entire statement rule, the court held that fairness required the second statement and the third statement to be treated together because the Crown sought to use the second statement as an admission of negligence, while the third contained the accused's fuller explanation of his supervisory duties.

The first statement, however, was limited to the accused's identification of himself as a supervisor and did not require the later interview to be admitted for fairness.

The Crown could therefore adduce the first statement alone, but not the second without the third.

The young person was charged with manslaughter following a shooting.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found the Crown's case to be largely circumstantial and the proposed bail plan, involving strict house arrest and a $100,000 pledge by two sureties, to be adequate to address any risks.

The young person was released on bail.

The accused, a project supervisor for a construction company, was charged with criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm following the collapse of a swing stage on December 24, 2009, at a Toronto construction site.

Five workers fell 13 stories to their deaths, one suffered debilitating injuries, and one survived because he was tied to a lifeline.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial based primarily on his failure to ensure that workers were properly tied to lifelines while working on the suspended platform, despite clear regulatory requirements and training standards.

The appellant, a 17-year-old youth, was involved in a gang shootout on a crowded street that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander.

He was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as an adult.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding his identification as a shooter and causation of the victim's death, and challenged the Crown's decision to require a jury trial under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable based on the evidence, the mutual decision to engage in a gunfight established causation, and the Crown's decision to require a jury trial did not amount to an abuse of process.

The young person appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was not clearly disproportionate to the offence and that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's determination that the sentence served the purposes and goals of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.