5 total
Insurer has duty to defend where G2 driver reasonably believed his blood alcohol was zero.
The insurer appealed an application judge's decision declaring it had a duty to defend the insureds (a mother and her son) in two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident.
The son, a G2 driver, had a blood alcohol concentration greater than zero at the time of the accident, prima facie contravening s. 6(1) of O. Reg. 340/94.
The insurer denied coverage based on a statutory condition prohibiting operation by an unauthorized driver.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that s. 6(1) is a strict liability offence, that the son had a reasonable belief his blood alcohol was zero after sleeping for several hours, and that the mother did not know or ought to have known her son was unauthorized to drive when she permitted him to use her vehicle.
Punitive damages are available in negligence actions for impaired driving but must be proportionate.
The plaintiff was seriously injured when struck by a motor vehicle driven by an impaired driver who had been drinking at a university pub.
The jury found the driver 70% liable and the pub 30% liable, awarding general, aggravated, and punitive damages, but dismissing the family members' claims.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability apportionment and general damages, but struck the separate aggravated damages award.
The Court affirmed that punitive damages are available in negligence actions for impaired driving but reduced the quantum from $100,000 to $20,000.
The Court also allowed the family members' appeal, awarding them damages under the Family Law Act.
Convictions for heroin trafficking stayed for six appellants due to 44.5-month unreasonable delay.
The seven appellants were convicted of trafficking in heroin following an undercover police operation.
They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the 44.5-month delay between their charges and trial violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.
The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to six of the appellants, finding the delay was largely systemic and caused prejudice, and ordered a stay of proceedings for those six.
The appeal of the seventh appellant, who was arrested much later, was dismissed on all grounds, including arguments regarding the destruction of police notes, jury instructions, and sentence fitness.
Medical marijuana ban violated s. 7 and required a constitutional exemption.
The Crown appealed a trial judgment staying marijuana cultivation and possession charges against an accused who used marijuana to control severe epilepsy.
The court held that criminally prohibiting possession and cultivation of marijuana for necessary medical use deprived the respondent of liberty and security of the person, and that the deprivation did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice because the statutory scheme provided only illusory or unfettered access to lawful medical use.
The court found the ministerial exemption power in s. 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act constitutionally insufficient to save the blanket prohibition.
The trial stay was upheld, but the reading-in remedy was set aside and the possession prohibition in s. 4 was declared invalid, with the declaration suspended for one year and a personal exemption granted during the suspension.
Imperial Oil's random drug and alcohol testing policy ruled discriminatory and unlawful under the Human Rights Code.
The complainant, Martin Entrop, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission challenged Imperial Oil's Alcohol and Drug Policy, alleging it discriminated on the basis of handicap.
The Board of Inquiry found that drug abuse and dependence constitute a handicap under the Human Rights Code.
The Board held that the policy's requirements for mandatory disclosure of past substance abuse, reassignment, and onerous reinstatement conditions were overly broad and unlawful.
Furthermore, the Board ruled that pre-employment and random drug testing, as well as random alcohol testing, were unlawful because the employer failed to prove that positive tests correlate with actual impairment on the job, thus failing to establish a bona fide occupational requirement under section 17 of the Code.