James C. Fleming

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and assault, as well as his sentence of life imprisonment with 17 years parole ineligibility.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence from Dr. John Bradford concluding that he suffered from severe treatment-resistant schizophrenia at the time of the offence and met the threshold for a not criminally responsible (NCR) defence under Criminal Code section 16.

The Court of Appeal rejected the fresh evidence, finding that while the diagnosis might be credible, Dr. Bradford's conclusion regarding moral wrongfulness was grounded in medical rather than legal definitions.

The court noted that the appellant's conduct before, during, and after the killing, as well as his own statements, were inconsistent with an NCR defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the 17-year parole ineligibility period was not found to be unfairly imposed or too harsh.

Appeal from conviction for two counts of first degree murder.

The appellant killed two friends and attempted suicide, raising a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) defence.

The trial judge convicted after finding the appellant had the capacity to know that society would regard his actions as morally wrong, despite suffering from a mental disorder.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) misinterpretation of "knowing that it was wrong" under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code; (2) misapprehension of evidence regarding psychotic state; (3) request to recognize diminished responsibility as a partial defence; and (4) request to recognize suicide pact as a partial defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

Four appellants appealed their convictions for fraud over $5,000 and conspiracy to commit fraud, as well as a count of knowingly contributing to an activity of a criminal organization.

The convictions arose from a large-scale telemarketing advance fee scheme operating from multiple "boiler rooms" in the Toronto area, where telemarketers defrauded American residents by falsely promising loans from fictitious lenders and demanding advance payments.

The Crown's case relied on fingerprint evidence, surveillance evidence, and the appellants' presence at the locations.

The appellants challenged various aspects of the trial, including jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's conduct or instructions, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonable on the evidence.

The defendant, Marcello Fracassi, was convicted of impaired driving causing death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation and general deterrence, and reviewed the evolving sentencing ranges for such offences.

Aggravating factors included the defendant's choice to drink and drive, the fatal and injurious consequences, his high blood alcohol concentration, and prior driving infractions.

Mitigating factors included his first-time offender status, genuine remorse, strong community support, and efforts to address an undiagnosed alcohol addiction.

The court imposed a sentence of six years in the penitentiary, with credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 5 years and 6 months, along with a seven-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving, and failing to remain at the scene after striking two municipal workers with his truck.

The accused raised a defence of non-mental disorder automatism, arguing he was in a parasomniac state (sleep-driving) at the time of the collision.

The court rejected the automatism defence, finding the accused fell asleep at the wheel due to extreme fatigue and alcohol impairment, rather than a sleep disorder.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

However, he was acquitted of dangerous driving because it was not reasonably foreseeable that he would fall asleep during the short drive, and acquitted of failing to remain because he was asleep during the collision and unaware it had occurred.

This ruling addresses the qualification of Dr. Brian Murray, a neurologist, to offer expert opinion evidence on sleep disorders, specifically parasomnia and sleep driving, in a criminal trial where the defendant, Marcello Fracassi, asserts an automatism defence.

The defence challenged Dr. Murray's qualification on grounds including his specialty (neurologist vs. forensic psychiatrist), lack of personal examination of the defendant, limited litigation experience, and perceived bias.

The court applied the Mohan/White Burgess framework, finding Dr. Murray met the threshold requirements for logical relevance, necessity, and absence of exclusionary rules.

The court rejected the argument that only forensic psychiatrists could testify on automatism in sleep disorder cases, noting Dr. Murray's extensive education and experience.

The court also found that the lack of a personal interview and prior courtroom experience went to weight, not admissibility.

While acknowledging some "peculiar" passages in Dr. Murray's report, the court found no clear evidence of bias to warrant exclusion.

Consequently, Dr. Murray was qualified as an expert in neurology and sleep disorders.

The defendant was charged with two sexual offences against his seven-year-old niece in November 2008.

After a trial spanning eight days over fourteen months, he was convicted in May 2011 and sentenced in August 2012.

He appealed his convictions, and the appeal was allowed in December 2014, remitting the matter for retrial.

The defendant brought Charter applications under sections 11(b) and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that the defendant's section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time was breached due to Crown actions in bringing a similar fact application at the eleventh hour and systemic delays in institutional resources.

The court granted a judicial stay of all charges.

The section 7 application was dismissed.