Mary Anne Alexander

The applicant, charged with dangerous operation causing death, sought to exclude his utterances, a statement, and observations of alcohol odour, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the applicant was psychologically detained from the moment police took his documents and questioned him, and that his section 10 rights were breached.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the evidence's admission.

Consequently, the court ordered the exclusion of the impugned evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and administering a stupefying substance to his 11-year-old step-daughter.

During a pre-charge conference, the issue arose whether the accused could be found to have 'administered' the substances (alcohol, marijuana, and pills) if the child voluntarily consumed them.

The court ruled that the jury would not be instructed to consider consensual consumption, finding that an 11-year-old cannot give fully informed consent to consuming such substances, particularly when provided by a parent figure with the alleged intent to facilitate a sexual assault.

August Greiner pleaded guilty to two counts of assault with a weapon and one count of dangerous operation of a conveyance, involving attacks on police officers and damage to property.

The incidents were linked to the accused's significant, largely untreated mental health issues, exacerbated by recent personal losses.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence, emphasizing the accused's mental health and ongoing treatment.

The court imposed a 270-day conditional sentence, followed by 24 months probation, finding that denunciation and deterrence could be achieved through a conditional sentence, and that public protection was best served by the accused's continued mental health treatment, which was central to the offence.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Christopher Scaglione for assault causing bodily harm and breach of a release order.

The court rejected the defence's arguments of provocation and consensual fight, finding the assault to be unprovoked, premeditated, and disproportionate, with the accused continuing to assault the victim after he was unconscious.

Aggravating factors included the accused's extensive criminal record for violent offences and administration of justice offences.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea and a gap in his criminal record.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of 30 months.

This is a sentencing decision for Emmanuel Faria, who pleaded guilty to assault simpliciter.

The victim, SB, who was under 16 at the time of the offence, suffered significant and traumatic impact.

Mr. Faria, a first-time offender, young, and without a criminal record, undertook extensive counselling and psychiatric assessment, showing insight and remorse.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with 24-36 months probation and a DNA order, emphasizing the victim's profound impact.

The defence sought a conditional discharge, arguing that a conviction would adversely affect Mr. Faria's future employment and subvert community interests.

The court granted a conditional discharge with 24 months of non-reporting probation, including a term of no contact with the victim, and declined the DNA order, finding it to be in the best interests of the accused and not contrary to the public interest, consistent with principles for conditional discharges.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including break and enter, aggravated assault, and robbery with a firearm, following a home invasion where the homeowner was shot.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data, DNA found on a marijuana roach at the scene, and eyewitness identification.

The court found the eyewitness identification to be general and weakened by the witness's inability to identify the accused in a photo lineup.

Furthermore, the court accepted a plausible alternative theory for the presence of the accused's DNA at the scene.

Concluding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence did not prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, the court found the accused not guilty.

The defendant, Marcello Fracassi, was convicted of impaired driving causing death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation and general deterrence, and reviewed the evolving sentencing ranges for such offences.

Aggravating factors included the defendant's choice to drink and drive, the fatal and injurious consequences, his high blood alcohol concentration, and prior driving infractions.

Mitigating factors included his first-time offender status, genuine remorse, strong community support, and efforts to address an undiagnosed alcohol addiction.

The court imposed a sentence of six years in the penitentiary, with credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 5 years and 6 months, along with a seven-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving, and failing to remain at the scene after striking two municipal workers with his truck.

The accused raised a defence of non-mental disorder automatism, arguing he was in a parasomniac state (sleep-driving) at the time of the collision.

The court rejected the automatism defence, finding the accused fell asleep at the wheel due to extreme fatigue and alcohol impairment, rather than a sleep disorder.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

However, he was acquitted of dangerous driving because it was not reasonably foreseeable that he would fall asleep during the short drive, and acquitted of failing to remain because he was asleep during the collision and unaware it had occurred.

This ruling addresses the qualification of Dr. Brian Murray, a neurologist, to offer expert opinion evidence on sleep disorders, specifically parasomnia and sleep driving, in a criminal trial where the defendant, Marcello Fracassi, asserts an automatism defence.

The defence challenged Dr. Murray's qualification on grounds including his specialty (neurologist vs. forensic psychiatrist), lack of personal examination of the defendant, limited litigation experience, and perceived bias.

The court applied the Mohan/White Burgess framework, finding Dr. Murray met the threshold requirements for logical relevance, necessity, and absence of exclusionary rules.

The court rejected the argument that only forensic psychiatrists could testify on automatism in sleep disorder cases, noting Dr. Murray's extensive education and experience.

The court also found that the lack of a personal interview and prior courtroom experience went to weight, not admissibility.

While acknowledging some "peculiar" passages in Dr. Murray's report, the court found no clear evidence of bias to warrant exclusion.

Consequently, Dr. Murray was qualified as an expert in neurology and sleep disorders.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner contrary to s. 249 of the Criminal Code.

Two Ontario Provincial Police officers observed the defendant's vehicle traveling southbound on Highway 400 over approximately 15 kilometres and 8 minutes.

The officers testified to observing repeated instances of speeding (up to 140 km/hr), tailgating at distances of one-half to two car lengths, and unsafe lane changes on a wet roadway at night.

The defendant testified that he was keeping pace with traffic at 110-120 km/hr and had only passed two vehicles.

The court accepted the officers' evidence and found the defendant guilty, determining that the totality of the driving conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person.