Brian John Raymond Hall

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order, arguing the judge misapprehended evidence regarding the interpretation of a quitclaim deed and its tax consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interpretation of the deed was a matter of law and intention, not evidence, and that the motion judge correctly considered the tax consequences without misapprehending the evidence.

The moving party father brought a motion for the production of his children's health and counselling records from four service providers, including records relating to one child's gender-affirming care.

The children, who were capable of consenting under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, refused consent.

The court dismissed the father's request under section 20(5) of the Children's Law Reform Act, finding broad disclosure was not in the children's best interests given the high-conflict separation and allegations of family violence.

Under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules, the court ordered production of the reunification therapist's records and limited information about the children's enrollment in counselling.

However, the court found the individual counselling and gender-affirming care records were privileged under the Wigmore test and dismissed the motion for their production.

The appellant father appealed an enforcement order and a restraining order made in a family law matter concerning parental alienation.

The enforcement order granted the respondent mother temporary parenting rights to facilitate the children's enrollment in an intensive therapeutic program ("Family Bridges") to address parental alienation.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the enforcement order, affirming the motion judge's jurisdiction under Family Law Rules r. 1(8) to make such orders as necessary for compliance, and finding that the orders were in the children's best interests and supported by evidence of the father's alienating conduct.

The restraining order was varied on consent to mitigate its impact on the father's livelihood.

The dissenting judge argued that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to vary a final order under r. 1(8) without following the specific procedural requirements for changing parenting orders under the Family Law Rules, Children's Law Reform Act, or Divorce Act, and that there was insufficient evidence to support such a drastic therapeutic intervention.

This case addresses a motion and cross-motion in a high-conflict family dispute concerning parental alienation and non-compliance with prior parenting orders.

The Respondent Mother sought temporary custody and an order for the children to attend a "Family Bridges" reunification workshop, alleging the Applicant Father's systematic alienation and sabotage of therapeutic efforts.

The Applicant Father denied the allegations and sought a focused assessment.

The court found the Applicant Father consistently breached previous orders by involving the children in adult disputes and undermining reunification therapy.

The court granted the Respondent Mother's requested relief, including temporary sole custody, enrollment in the Family Bridges program, a restraining order against the Applicant Father, and ordered him to cover the workshop and aftercare costs.

The Applicant Father's cross-motion was dismissed.

The respondent, M.C., moved to vary a consent order to establish a specific access schedule with his child, K., and sought joint custody.

The applicant, J.D., and her parents, P.D. and B.D., opposed, arguing for supervised access or termination, citing K.'s mental health issues and M.C.'s anger.

The court found no material change in circumstances to justify varying the original consent order based on K.'s health, as these issues largely predated the order.

The court rejected P.D. and B.D.'s interpretation of "reasonable access as agreed by the parties" as an "agreement to agree" which would render the consent order unenforceable.

Consequently, the court set aside the entire consent order, temporarily continued joint custody with J.D. and her parents, and established a specific, unsupervised parenting time schedule for M.C. An OCL assessment was ordered, and all parties were mandated to take parent training courses.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking an order for the return of the child from Cobourg to Oshawa and to prevent future changes to the child's residence without consent or court order.

The applicant mother had moved with the child to Cobourg due to family expansion, health issues during pregnancy, and affordability of housing.

The court found a material change in circumstances and, applying the best interests of the child test, determined there were compelling reasons to allow the interim move to Cobourg.

The respondent's motion was dismissed.

The applicant mother was completely successful on her motion for guideline child support and section 7 expenses.

She sought costs on a full recovery basis pursuant to Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules, having obtained a result better than her offers to settle.

The court found the applicant's efforts to negotiate settlement and the time expended were reasonable and necessitated by the respondent father's rigid and unreasonable conduct.

The respondent was ordered to pay costs of $9,213.83.

The applicant sought custody and the return of a child removed from Ontario to the United States by the respondent.

The court found that the child’s habitual residence was Ontario and that Ontario had jurisdiction under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction despite a competing preliminary order issued by a Utah court.

However, the respondent had not attorned to the court’s jurisdiction and service of the application had not complied with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents.

As a result, the court declined to grant judgment through an uncontested trial.

The matter was adjourned to permit proper service under the Hague Convention.

In a child protection proceeding, the child’s father and step‑mother brought a motion seeking an order placing the child in their care and custody.

The court treated the motion as a temporary care and custody hearing under s. 51 of the Child and Family Services Act because no prior temporary care and custody hearing had been held.

Although the evidence established reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm, the court found that the risk could be adequately addressed through a supervision order while the child remained with the mother and step‑father.

The court emphasized continuity of care, the stage of the proceedings, and the society’s position that supervision was appropriate.

The motion seeking placement with the father and step‑mother was dismissed.

This is a costs decision following a temporary motion heard on April 9, 2015, with the decision released on May 11, 2015.

The respondent sought expanded access to two children, including overnight access and ancillary parenting orders.

The applicant opposed the transfer and sought to change the child's counsellor.

The court granted the respondent alternate weekend access and Wednesday access, denied the applicant's request to change counsellors, and made ancillary orders regarding extra-curricular activities and telephone access.

The respondent was successful on the motion and had served an offer to settle that was not accepted.

The court awarded full costs to the respondent.

The respondent father brought a motion for expanded access to his two children, including overnight access.

The applicant mother opposed the motion and sought to maintain the existing day-access schedule.

The mother also brought a cross-motion to change the children's counsellor.

The court found that after over one year since separation, the children were ready for expanded overnight access.

The court granted the father's motion for increased access on alternate weekends and mid-week overnight access, and dismissed the mother's motion to change counsellors.

The decision emphasizes that children benefit from maximum contact with both parents consistent with their best interests, and that the party seeking to restrict access must justify such restrictions.