James Gibson

The appellant, an unsecured creditor, appealed a motion judge's order authorizing a pooled distribution of assets under a receivership, which included both individual and corporate debtors.

The appellant objected to sharing corporate assets with creditors of only the individual debtors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in piercing the corporate veil to pool assets, as the corporate assets were derived from fraudulent transfers by the individual debtors to defeat creditors.

The court also found no procedural unfairness in determining the issue on a motion for directions and upheld the disallowance of certain interest charges claimed by the appellant.

The Plaintiff sought judgment on a claim of fraud against the Defendant.

The Defendant, noted in default, repeatedly failed to comply with a Mareva injunction requiring disclosure of assets and the whereabouts of the Plaintiff's funds, providing only a misleading "debt disclosure." The court found the Defendant's conduct reprehensible and granted judgment to the Plaintiff for $345,000 in compensatory damages, $100,000 in punitive damages, and $55,000 in substantial indemnity costs.

The court declined to issue an order barring the Defendant from future attempts to set aside the default judgment, noting the high hurdle he would face.

The plaintiff, Naymark Law Professional Corporation, brought a motion for leave to obtain a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a property and for substituted service by email on two defendants.

The CPL was sought in relation to a fraudulent conveyance claim against the defendants, who had transferred a jointly owned property for no consideration shortly after an assessment report confirmed a significant debt owed to the plaintiff for legal fees.

The court applied the modified test for CPLs in fraudulent conveyance claims, finding a high probability of judgment recovery, a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer intent, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the CPL.

The court also granted substituted service by email, noting the defendants' past evasion of service and the reasonable likelihood that email would bring the matter to their attention.

The appellant, a U.S. law firm, appealed an order declaring mortgages it held over six Ontario properties, granted by its clients (the Hutchens) to secure legal fees, void ab initio as fraudulent conveyances under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that the judgment creditors had standing, were "creditors or others" under the Act, and that the mortgages were not granted in good faith, thus not falling under the statutory exceptions.

The court also rejected arguments of res judicata or abuse of process.

The plaintiff, a candidate for the leadership of the Conservative Party of Canada, was disqualified by the Dispute Resolution Appeals Committee (DRAC) following a complaint about his campaign materials.

He brought a summary judgment motion seeking to restore his candidacy, arguing breach of contract, procedural unfairness, and bad faith.

The court found that while the process was fair and there was no bad faith, the DRAC lacked the authority under the party's rules to disqualify a candidate.

The court set aside the disqualification and restored the Chief Returning Officer's original ruling, which imposed a penalty but not disqualification, without prejudice to the Leadership Election Organizing Committee's right to consider the matter.

The plaintiff, Ryan Dean, a self-represented litigant, sought $25 million in damages against numerous defendants, including the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council (ICCRC) and several registered immigration consultants (Complainant Defendants), following his removal from the ICCRC board of directors.

The Complainant Defendants moved to strike Dean's claim for unlawful means conspiracy, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court found that Dean failed to plead any unlawful conduct by the Complainant Defendants, as filing complaints with a regulator is a lawful act and not unlawful per se.

The claim also lacked essential elements of conspiracy, such as a clear agreement and purpose.

The court dismissed Dean's claim against the Complainant Defendants and denied leave to amend, as any new cause of action would be time-barred.

The applicant, Dimitrious Karahalios, a disqualified leadership candidate for the Conservative Party of Canada, brought an application seeking reinstatement and release of campaign funds.

The respondents, including the Conservative Party and its Fund, brought a preliminary motion to strike the application, arguing it was barred by the Leadership Rules and disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and that individual committee members were not proper parties.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the application for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Leadership Rules contractually precluded the applicant's claims.

The individual respondents (members of the Dispute Resolution Appeals Committee and Chief Returning Officer) were removed as parties by agreement.

The court converted the application into an action and scheduled a summary judgment motion to efficiently determine the merits of the dispute, given the complex and novel legal issues regarding the judicial review of unincorporated associations.

The plaintiff, a former Olympic alpine skier, brought a motion for summary judgment against her former tax lawyer and his firm for professional negligence.

The defendants had advised the plaintiff to participate in an aggressive offshore tax plan to wind up her amateur athletic trust, which the Canada Revenue Agency later deemed a sham.

The Superior Court of Justice granted summary judgment on liability, finding that the defendants breached their duty of care by failing to warn the plaintiff of the significant legal risks associated with the plan.

The court held that expert evidence was not required to establish the standard of care because the duty to warn was clear, and directed that the issue of damages proceed to trial.

This decision addresses eight motions in a billion-dollar secondary market securities class action.

The court granted motions by SNC-Lavalin and its Outside Directors to strike paragraphs from the Plaintiffs' Amended Reply and dismissed the Plaintiffs' motion to deliver a Fresh as Amended Reply, finding that the Plaintiffs were attempting to plead a new, uncapped liability claim without leave and reintroduce previously rejected allegations of bribery in Libya.

The court also granted motions by the Outside Directors and Michael Novak to strike paragraphs from Riadh Ben Aïssa's Statement of Defence, which similarly attempted to introduce allegations of bribery in Libya and knowledge against co-defendants beyond the scope of the granted leave.

Additionally, the court granted protective orders for the examinations for discovery of Messrs.

Ben Aïssa, Duhaime, and Roy, who faced criminal charges, to protect their Charter rights and the integrity of criminal proceedings, but denied requests to stay or postpone discoveries.

The appellant purchased a commercial property that was contaminated by hydrocarbons that had migrated from an adjacent former gas station property.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the contamination more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding that the appellant had knowledge of the claim by March 9, 2012, or alternatively by March 30, 2012.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by equating the appellant's suspicion of contamination with actual knowledge of contamination, and by failing to consider the relevant circumstances of the multi-property transaction and the waiver of conditions.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for the appointment of an investigator under the Business Corporations Act.

They argued the motion judge erred by failing to determine if a prima facie case of oppressive conduct was established and by requiring them to prove oppression on the merits.

The court found the motion judge applied the correct test and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general or public importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for inordinate delay and abuse of process, nearly 24 years after its commencement.

The plaintiffs attributed the delay to their various former counsel.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, with primary responsibility resting with the plaintiffs.

The presumed prejudice to the defendants due to the passage of time, faded memories, and loss of a witness was not rebutted, making a fair trial impossible.

The court also exercised its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the action, finding the severe and aggravated delay, including breaches of court-ordered deadlines and a 7-year period of inactivity, amounted to an abuse of process.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The applicant, a customer of a bankrupt securities firm, sought to establish a claim against the bankrupt estate's general fund for post-bankruptcy increases in the value of liquidated foreign futures contracts.

The court held that while Part XII of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act does not preclude a customer from making a claim against the general fund as an ordinary creditor, the applicant only had a provable claim for contracts that vested in the trustee on the date of bankruptcy, not for those liquidated prior to bankruptcy due to subagent insolvency.

The court also dismissed the applicant's request for an equitable priority over other general creditors.

In a bankruptcy proceeding on the Commercial List, counsel alerted the court that its earlier endorsement had not addressed a specific tab in the Brief of Privileged Documents.

The court considered whether the materials contained in that tab were privileged.

Because the tab excerpted material from a settlement conference brief previously held to be privileged, the court confirmed that the tab itself was also privileged.

The endorsement was corrected by way of corrigendum to reflect that determination.

A motion arose in bankruptcy litigation concerning whether portions of a trustee’s report disclosed privileged communications from a prior joint retainer between the trustee and a creditor.

The creditor argued the materials were protected by solicitor‑client privilege, settlement privilege, and common interest privilege and sought to prevent their disclosure.

The court held that, in a dispute between former joint clients over removal of counsel, solicitor‑client privilege does not apply between the clients themselves, allowing the full record to be considered on that motion.

However, for the trustee’s broader motion for advice and directions involving third parties, several documents remained privileged because privilege jointly held by co‑clients cannot be unilaterally waived.

The court therefore ordered certain materials sealed for the removal motion but redacted from the public record for other proceedings.