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Appeared as counsel in 1 case (2005–2005)
152 total
RRIF beneficiaries are not liable for estate taxes where the will only specified RRSP taxes.
The applicants sought interpretation of their late mother's will to determine if they were liable for income tax on a RRIF for which they were designated beneficiaries.
The will contained a clause requiring them to pay tax on an RRSP, but the deceased had subsequently converted the RRSP to a RRIF and made a new beneficiary designation outside the will without any tax condition.
The court applied the armchair rule and found that the will's reference to an RRSP did not apply to the RRIF.
The court ordered the estate trustee to pay the applicants their $150,000 legacy without deduction for RRIF taxes, plus 5 percent interest under the rule of convenience.
Motion to amend pleadings and add parties granted; plaintiff established arguable case on delayed discoverability.
The plaintiff brought a motion to amend his Statement of Claim in an estate dispute, seeking to add new claims and parties.
The defendants and proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the new claims were statute-barred by the two-year limitation period and that the amendments would cause non-compensable prejudice.
The court granted the motion, finding that the amendments against the existing defendants did not constitute new causes of action, but rather sought alternative relief based on facts already pleaded.
Regarding the new parties, the court found the plaintiff had established an arguable case that the claims were not discoverable until after the limitation period had presumptively expired.
The court also found no non-compensable prejudice, as the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay.
Respondent declared common law spouse and entitled to pension benefits despite lack of formal designation.
The applicants, siblings of the deceased, brought an application to determine entitlement to the deceased's pension funds.
The deceased died intestate and the pension funds were payable to his surviving spouse, or to his estate if he had no spouse.
The respondent claimed to be the deceased's common law spouse, having lived with him for 28 years.
The applicants argued she was merely his housekeeper.
Applying the Molodowich factors, the court found overwhelming evidence that the deceased and the respondent lived in a conjugal relationship.
The court also held that the Pension Benefits Act does not require a formal beneficiary designation for a common law spouse to be entitled to survivor benefits.
The respondent was declared the common law spouse and beneficiary of the pension funds.
Presumption of resulting trust does not apply to beneficiary designations under the Succession Law Reform Act.
The deceased designated one of her two sons as the sole beneficiary of two segregated fund policies.
Following her intestate death, the other son claimed entitlement to half the proceeds, arguing the designated beneficiary promised to share them and held them on a resulting trust for the estate.
The court found insufficient corroborated evidence of a binding promise to share the proceeds.
Applying Mak (Estate) v. Mak, the court held that the presumption of resulting trust does not apply to beneficiary designations under the Succession Law Reform Act.
The proceeds were ordered paid out of court to the designated beneficiary.
Guardianship application dismissed as the respondent retained capacity to execute a new power of attorney.
The applicants, acting as alternative Attorneys for Property, applied for an order declaring the 86-year-old respondent incapable of managing her property and appointing a guardian of property.
The respondent opposed the appointment, arguing she retained capacity to manage her property with assistance and could execute a new power of attorney.
Relying on expert capacity assessments, the court found that while the respondent had mild cognitive impairment and required assistance, she retained the capacity to instruct counsel and to make or revoke a power of attorney.
The court dismissed the application, concluding that the respondent's ability to execute a new power of attorney constituted a less restrictive alternative to guardianship.
The court enforced a binding settlement agreement and ordered the respondents to execute the release documents, awarding substantial indemnity costs due to their egregious non-compliance.
The applicant, as trustee of her late husband's estate, sought enforcement of a settlement agreement reached in 2020 with the respondents regarding the purchase of her interest in family business assets and real property.
The respondents had paid the settlement amount but refused to execute the Minutes of Settlement and Release and Indemnity, claiming the release provisions would compromise their separate action against their former counsel.
The court found a binding settlement existed and that enforcement was appropriate, granting judgment in accordance with the settlement terms and ordering execution of the documents within seven days.
The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.
Limitation period for dependant's support extended only against remaining undistributed estate assets; interim support granted.
The applicant sought interim relief in her application for dependant's support against the estate of her alleged common-law spouse.
The respondents, the deceased's adult children and estate trustees, argued the application was statute-barred as it was brought after the six-month limitation period under the Succession Law Reform Act.
The court extended the limitation period pursuant to s. 61(2) of the SLRA, but only as against the $4,400 remaining undistributed in the estate.
The court found the applicant established a prima facie case for support and awarded the remaining $4,400 as interim support.
The applicant's requests for a preservation order over a condominium and interim funding for legal fees were dismissed.
The court approved the trustee's accounts, appointed a corporate successor, and awarded full indemnity costs against a beneficiary for reprehensible conduct.
The court granted the applicant trustee’s request to pass accounts, dispense with a formal passing for a subsequent period, approve compensation, remove herself as trustee, and appoint CIBC Trust as successor.
The court found the trustee’s compensation reasonable, the objections of the respondent Michael Wilson unsubstantiated, and awarded increased costs against Michael due to his conduct.
The decision addresses the administration of a testamentary trust, the entitlement to compensation, and the allocation of costs in estate litigation.
Respondent awarded $8,000 in costs after successfully resisting most motion relief.
This costs endorsement followed a motion for directions under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 concerning powers of attorney, disclosure, protective relief, and a capacity assessment.
The court held that the respondent was overall successful because she successfully opposed nearly all of the relief sought, although the court had ordered appointment of s. 3 counsel and a capacity assessment.
Applying the Rule 57 costs factors, the court found the respondent's claimed partial indemnity costs were within the applicant's reasonable expectation and fixed costs at $8,000 inclusive.
The costs were ordered payable by the applicant within 30 days.
The court dismissed the alleged common-law spouse's claim for dependant's support but awarded the adult child a $39,000 lump sum.
The decision addresses claims for dependant’s support under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act by Elena Nikitina (alleged common-law spouse) and Rosa Maria Huynh (adult child) against the estate of Cong Hoanh Huynh.
The court found that Ms. Nikitina was not a common-law spouse and thus not entitled to support, but that Rosa was a dependant and entitled to a lump-sum support payment.
The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the legal and factual requirements for establishing cohabitation and dependency, and the quantum and duration of support for adult children.
Capacity assessment and s. 3 counsel ordered in contested elder-care dispute.
On a motion within a Substitute Decisions Act guardianship dispute between siblings, the court addressed interim directions concerning an elderly mother's capacity, legal representation, disclosure, and protective relief.
The court held that s. 3 counsel should be arranged and that a capacity assessment should be ordered under s. 79 because the evidentiary record, including geriatric psychiatric evidence, provided reasonable grounds to believe the person was incapable.
The court declined immediate production of medical and solicitor files, examinations of the lawyers, disclosure of the person's location, apprehension and relocation orders, and tracing or preservation relief, finding those measures premature and unduly invasive absent a capacity declaration.
The court instead ordered unfettered access for s. 3 counsel, limited production of records sought by the assessor, and facilitated telephone communication.
Capacity assessment ordered; failed shared-care arrangement replaced with primary caregiver model.
In a family guardianship dispute concerning an elderly parent with dementia, the applicants sought a court-ordered capacity assessment, broad production of medical, financial, and solicitors’ records, and historic asset information, while the respondent son sought to vary an interim shared-care order.
Applying the factors governing s. 79 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, the court found reasonable grounds to believe the parent may be incapable of managing property and personal care and ordered a current capacity assessment limited to those issues.
The court refused broad documentary production as disproportionate and invasive of privacy, but permitted limited disclosure of medical and financial records if requested by the designated assessor, through s. 3 counsel only.
The court also declined to require a further historic statement of assets and liabilities, finding the existing informal accounting sufficient.
The cross-motion was granted to terminate the failed shared-care regime and designate the respondent son as primary caregiver pending determination of the guardianship application.
Tax Relief granted
The applicant, Rosemary Maki, sought leave under section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, to compel the respondent, Lucien Cammaert, to pass his accounts regarding his management of their father's (Willy Cammaert) property.
The father, 89 and in long-term care, was deemed to lack capacity.
The applicant alleged extensive involvement and mismanagement by the respondent since 2016, leading to a significant erosion of the father's assets.
The respondent claimed the father managed his own finances until a stroke in February 2024 and that transfers were gifts.
The court granted leave, finding the applicant had a genuine interest and that the respondent was involved in the property's management since January 2016, regardless of the father's capacity at the time, and had not fully accounted for his dealings.
The applicant was awarded costs.
An exchange of emails within a prescribed 60-day period constituted an enforceable agreement to exercise a testamentary option to purchase property.
The applicant sought the court's advice and direction on whether an enforceable agreement was formed for her to purchase a property from the deceased's estate, as per an option granted in the will.
The will stipulated a 60-day period to enter into an enforceable agreement.
The respondent estate trustee argued that no enforceable agreement was made within this period because a formal written offer was received after 70 days.
The court found that the exchange of email correspondence between the applicant and the respondent within the 60-day period constituted an enforceable agreement, as the will did not require a formal written document.
The court dismissed the respondent's arguments regarding lack of certainty of terms and the assertion that it was merely an agreement to agree, concluding that a meeting of the minds on all essential terms had occurred.
An Ontario will revoked a prior Italian will, creating a partial intestacy regarding foreign property.
The Estate Trustee of Nazzareno Coccia's estate sought the court's advice and direction regarding the interpretation of the deceased's Ontario Will and its effect on a prior Italian Will, particularly concerning real property in Italy.
The court determined that the Ontario Will, containing a revocation clause, effectively revoked the Italian Will.
Furthermore, the court found that the Ontario Will created a partial intestacy regarding the Italian real property, as the term "money" in the will could not be broadly construed to include land.
Consequently, the Italian real property passed to the deceased's nieces (next of kin) under Italian intestate succession law, as directed by conflict of law principles (lex situs).
The court granted a dependant's support claimant interim possession of estate property on strict financial terms but struck his will challenge for lack of standing.
The applicant, claiming to be a common-law spouse, sought to prove the deceased's will in solemn form and obtain dependant's support.
The respondent, the Estate Trustee and sole beneficiary, brought a motion for vacant possession of the condominium where the applicant resided and to strike the applicant's will challenge for lack of standing.
The court granted the applicant interim possession of the condominium on terms (requiring him to pay all maintenance, insurance, and property taxes) until his dependant's support application is resolved.
However, the court dismissed the applicant's challenge to the will, finding he lacked the necessary financial interest or standing, as his potential dependant's support claim would not be affected by the will's validity.
The court ordered interim directions for an incapable person's personal care and limited document production amid a dispute over the validity of recently executed powers of attorney.
This motion addresses the interim management of an incapable person's (Lionel Bascus) property and personal care, pending a full application challenging the validity of recently executed powers of attorney (POAs) and a property transfer.
The applicant, Mr. Bascus's daughter, sought directions for his care and production of records, alleging the respondent, Mr. Bascus's sister, was not acting in his best interests.
The court found the respondent was not adhering to statutory principles for substitute decision-makers, particularly regarding consultation and advocating for appropriate long-term care.
The court ordered directions for personal care, mandating consultation between the parties and access to medical information for the applicant.
It also ordered limited production of medical and solicitor records relevant to the POAs and property transfers, but denied access to financial and estate planning records.
The respondent's request to unfreeze bank accounts was denied as it was not brought by motion.
The court ordered an attorney for property to pass accounts and invalidated a TFSA beneficiary designation due to suspicious circumstances.
The applicant, Giuseppe Campo, as Estate Trustee and in his personal capacity, brought an application alleging that the respondent, Melinda Longo, breached her fiduciary duties as Maria Campo's attorney for property and unjustly enriched herself.
The applicant sought orders compelling the respondent to pass her accounts, declaring certain joint bank accounts and a TFSA as estate assets, and invalidating the TFSA beneficiary designation due to Maria's incapacity and the respondent's undue influence.
The respondent conceded the joint accounts were estate assets but disputed the TFSA and the requirement to pass accounts.
The court granted all orders sought by the applicant, finding suspicious circumstances regarding the TFSA designation and compelling the respondent to account for her actions as attorney for property.
A lawyer was ordered to personally pay partial indemnity costs after unreasonably defending a motion to remove him despite a clear conflict of interest.
The applicant, Kristy Rae Wheeler, sought costs following her successful motion to remove Allen Wilford and A. Wilford Professional Corporation as counsel for James Bruce MacAulay due to a conflict of interest, and to appoint s. 3 counsel for Mr. MacAulay.
The court found that Mr. Wilford's decision to defend the motion, despite a clear conflict, caused unnecessary costs.
The court awarded Ms. Wheeler partial indemnity costs, with a portion payable personally by Mr. Wilford and the remainder by Mr. MacAulay, as the motion also benefited Mr. MacAulay.
The court invalidated new powers of attorney executed by an elderly man with dementia due to lack of capacity and suspicious circumstances.
This application concerned the validity of powers of attorney (POAs) made by an 82-year-old respondent, Larry Alvin Marshall, and whether a guardian of his property and person should be appointed.
The applicants, Shawn Hollinger (Attorney for Personal Care) and MD Private Trust Company (Attorney for Property), sought to invalidate new POAs made in January 2023 that named Mr. Marshall's estranged sons, Thomas and Bryan Marshall, as attorneys.
The court found that Mr. Marshall lacked the requisite capacity to make the 2023 POAs due to significant cognitive impairment and vulnerability to undue influence.
Suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the 2023 POAs shifted the burden of proof to the grantees, which was not met.
Consequently, the 2023 POAs were declared invalid, and the 2022 POAs were affirmed as Mr. Marshall's last valid powers of attorney.