Bernadette Dietrich

The moving parties, acting as foreign representatives and trustees in bankruptcy, brought a motion for contempt against the responding party for failing to attend an examination as ordered.

The responding party brought a motion for the presiding judge to recuse herself, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the moving parties' submissions regarding the bankrupt's character.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no objective basis for bias.

The court then granted the contempt motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the responding party intentionally failed to comply with a clear and unequivocal order to attend the examination.

The responding party was given 10 days to purge his contempt.

The moving party sought a stay of an order requiring him to produce documents and attend an examination in a foreign main bankruptcy proceeding, pending his father's application in Hong Kong to annul the underlying bankruptcy order.

The court determined the order was interlocutory and applied the RJR-Macdonald test.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm to the moving party, and that the balance of convenience favoured the trustees.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy brought a summary judgment motion to set aside two transactions made by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy: the transfer of his half-interest in a residence to his spouse, and the transfer of preferred shares to a family-owned company.

The court found both transactions were transfers at undervalue and made with the intent to defeat creditors, constituting fraudulent conveyances and preferences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The defendants' cross-motion arguing the claims were statute-barred was dismissed, as the limitation period commenced upon the Trustee's appointment.

The moving party purchaser entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a pre-construction condominium and paid a $500,000 deposit, $400,000 of which went directly to the developer.

The developer defaulted on its first mortgage, and a receiver was appointed.

The receiver sought to disclaim the purchaser's agreement.

The purchaser brought a motion to compel the receiver to complete the sale, arguing he had an equitable interest in the property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the purchaser's interest was contractually subordinate to the first mortgagee and that the equities did not justify overriding the mortgagee's legal priority.

This motion involved a dispute between a sister (applicant) and brother (respondent) over their mother's personal care and property.

The applicant challenged the validity of two Powers of Attorney (for Personal Care and Property) signed by their 89-year-old mother, June Lockhart, in 2018, which appointed the respondent brother as sole attorney.

The court found both 2018 Powers of Attorney void ab initio due to the mother's lack of capacity and the respondent's failure to prove capacity, as well as his actions in preventing a full capacity assessment and withholding the documents.

The court authorized both the applicant and respondent to make personal care and treatment decisions for their mother jointly under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, dismissing the respondent's motion to validate the POA and exclude the applicant.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The United Mexican States applied to set aside a partial arbitral award on jurisdiction in a NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state dispute.

The applicant argued the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction because certain claimants failed to provide a timely notice of intent under Article 1119 and failed to provide proper consent under Article 1121.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the tribunal was correct in concluding that the procedural defects related to admissibility rather than jurisdiction, and that the applicant's consent to arbitrate was not conditioned on strict compliance with Article 1119.

The court also found no jurisdictional error in the tribunal's treatment of submissions from the USA and Canada.

This case concerns an atypical receivership where the court-appointed receiver sought approval for its activities, including a cash collateral arrangement with Tarion Warranty Corporation and the payment of unsecured creditors' proven claims.

The debtor and a related party objected, arguing that the unsecured claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that Tarion was not an unsecured creditor or not entitled to full indemnification for legal fees.

The court approved the receiver's reports, finding that the Limitations Act, 2002 bars the remedy of commencing a proceeding but does not extinguish the underlying debt.

It held that a court-authorized claims process in a receivership is a separate remedy not barred by the Act.

The court also approved the cash collateral arrangement and Tarion's claim for indemnified legal fees, confirming its status as an unsecured creditor.

This motion concerned the approval of a Memorandum of Agreement between the receiver of the Norshield entities, appointed by the Ontario Superior Court, and the class representative of a Québec class action.

The agreement sought to facilitate the production of information from the receiver to the class representative for use in the Québec class action.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), a defendant in the Québec class action, opposed the motion, arguing that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction to approve what amounted to a non-party discovery in a Québec proceeding.

The court found that RBC had standing to oppose the motion and dismissed the class representative's request, ruling that the Superior Court of Québec, as the class action judge, was the appropriate forum to determine the relevance and necessity of the information sought.

The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company, as guardian of property for Asha Kumra, sought advice and direction from the court regarding whether Minutes of Settlement, entered into by Asha's sons Sanjiv and Rajiv Kumra, were binding on the guardian and precluded it from pursuing claims related to property transfers made by Asha prior to a one-year limitation period specified in the Minutes.

The court found that the Minutes were not binding on Scotiatrust or Asha Kumra, as neither was a party to the agreement, nor was Asha legally represented during its negotiation.

Consequently, Scotiatrust retains the discretion to pursue claims in Asha Kumra's best interests, irrespective of the limitation period in the Minutes.

The applicant sought to enforce a settlement agreement regarding the distribution of a deceased's estate, specifically concerning a life lease occupancy agreement.

The respondent argued that no formal acceptance occurred, his lawyer acted without full instructions, and an essential term (appraisal) was missing.

The court found that a binding settlement was reached by counsel with apparent authority and that an appraisal was not an essential term.

The court enforced the settlement, finding no real risk of clear injustice, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The appellant, a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, appealed two decisions by Masters sitting as Registrars in Bankruptcy.

The appellant sought an order under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) to pursue a claim that a property registered in the respondent mother's name was beneficially owned by the bankrupt former spouse.

He also sought an order under s. 163(2) of the BIA to examine witnesses regarding the property and the bankrupt's alleged undisclosed income.

Both Masters dismissed the motions, primarily relying on a prior consent family law order (the "Vallee Order") which explicitly stated the property would not form part of the bankrupt's estate for any purpose.

The court dismissed both appeals, affirming that the Masters did not err in principle or law.

It was held that the appellant failed to establish threshold merit for the s. 38 motion given the Vallee Order, and it would be inequitable to allow him to indirectly pursue what he had expressly agreed not to.

For the s. 163(2) motion, the court found the appellant did not demonstrate "something amiss" with the estate administration, concluding the proposed examinations were a fishing expedition.

The applicant, a former officer and shareholder of the respondent corporation, brought an oppression application after his termination.

In the context of that proceeding, he moved to remove the law firm representing the respondents as counsel of record, alleging a disqualifying conflict of interest based on prior joint representation and the likelihood that the firm's lawyers would be called as witnesses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the firm's retainer clearly stated it represented only the corporation, not its officers or shareholders.

Furthermore, the court held that it was premature and speculative to remove counsel on the basis that its lawyers might be called as witnesses, as the applicant had not yet determined whether he would call them or convert his application into an action.

The moving party sought a declaration that the bankrupt's debt to it, arising from a US judgment for trademark infringement enforced in Ontario, not be released upon his discharge from bankruptcy.

The court found that the bankrupt had obtained property by false pretences by selling counterfeit goods on Amazon.

Applying section 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court held that the debt survives the bankruptcy discharge, rejecting the bankrupt's public policy arguments regarding the quantum of statutory damages.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement regarding her late parents' estates.

The parties disputed the valuation date for real estate joint ventures and corporate shares used to fund a $4.9 million preference payment to the applicant.

The applicant argued for 2010 valuations, which would grant her the subsequent appreciation in value, while the respondent argued for current valuations.

The court held that, based on an objective interpretation of the settlement and the general rule for estate distributions, the assets must be valued at a date proximate to their distribution.

Giuseppe Paolo Magnotta died intestate, survived by his wife, Melissa Magnotta (Applicant), and his mother, Rossana Magnotta (Respondent).

Melissa applied for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee without a Will.

Rossana objected, initially citing Melissa's alleged threat to exhume the deceased's remains and misrepresentation of estate liabilities, and sought a neutral third-party trustee.

The court found Rossana's objections unreasonable, as Melissa was the sole beneficiary and her "threat" to exhume was not acted upon.

Rossana's claim of a financial interest as a creditor for funeral expenses was also deemed insufficient to grant standing under Rule 75.03, as creditors have other remedies.

The court granted Melissa's application, dispensed with the administration bond, and awarded Melissa partial indemnity costs against Rossana.

The applicant daughter sought to remove her brother as their incapable mother's Attorney for Personal Care.

The mother had lived with the applicant for 11 years, during which the applicant provided comprehensive daily care and acted as the de facto decision-maker.

The brother, despite being the appointed attorney, failed to act in good faith, refused to reimburse care expenses, and failed to consent to necessary medical treatments.

The court allowed the application, removing the brother and declaring the applicant as the Attorney for Personal Care, finding that the siblings' animosity prevented them from working cooperatively in their mother's best interests.

The plaintiff, Atlas Copco Canada Inc., brought a motion for contempt of a Mareva injunction against Dirk Johannes Plate and Maria Van Noorden Plate for selling properties despite court orders.

The defendants brought a cross-motion seeking a stay of action against Mr. Plate and dismissal of the action against Mrs. Plate.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's contempt motion, finding no intentional breach by the defendants due to the plaintiff's own non-compliance with the orders and lack of pursuit of real property claims.

Mr. Plate's cross-motion for a stay was dismissed, as the plaintiff was entitled to set off appeal costs against Mr. Plate's restitution debt.

Mrs. Plate's cross-motion to dismiss the action against her was granted on the grounds of merger of claims and, alternatively, inordinate and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff causing prejudice.

Raymon DeRanney died intestate.

Fritzie Deleon and her daughter Caseylynn Deleon brought an application for dependant's relief from his estate.

Fritzie's claim was abandoned.

The court found that Caseylynn, though not a biological child, was a "dependant" under the Succession Law Reform Act because the deceased had demonstrated a settled intention to treat her as a child of his family, primarily through providing shelter and significant financial support for over 15 years.

The court awarded Caseylynn $40,955 for her post-secondary education, rejecting her claim for an equal share of the estate with the deceased's biological daughter, Sonya, due to insufficient evidence of equal treatment intention and Caseylynn's own financial disclosure deficiencies.

The court also addressed costs for the abandoned claim.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's fraud action for inordinate and inexcusable delay spanning over nine years.

The plaintiff attributed delays to corporate restructurings, database corruption, and translation requirements.

The court found the delay inordinate and inexcusable, noting the plaintiff's responsibility to advance the action and the lack of compelling reasons for the multi-year inaction.

The court also found a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible due to fading memories of critical viva voce evidence, especially given the fraud allegations.

The motion was granted, and the action dismissed with costs to the defendants.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement that purportedly resolved the plaintiffs' oppression claims arising from a corporate restructuring.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the agreement was unconscionable and induced by misrepresentations regarding the inclusion of a critical patent licence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual matrix was complex, credibility issues were prominent, and it was premature to grant summary judgment or partial summary judgment before examinations for discovery had been completed.