Matthew Urback

Following a decision dividing the equity in a property between the applicant son and respondent mother, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought $15,000 based on the respondent's repeated failures to comply with deadlines, which necessitated eleven court appearances.

The respondent argued for no costs given the divided result on the merits and her deteriorating health.

The court awarded the applicant $10,000 in costs, finding that the respondent's conduct unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding.

The applicant son sought a determination of his financial interest in a property co-owned as joint tenants with his respondent mother, claiming an 80 to 85 percent interest based on resulting or constructive trust.

The mother, acting through a litigation guardian, sought an equal division.

The court found that both parties made substantial contributions but had incomplete records.

Applying the principles of unjust enrichment and constructive trust, the court apportioned the equity 65 percent to the applicant and 35 percent to the respondent, severed the joint tenancy, and ordered the property sold if the parties could not agree on a buyout.

A non-party former solicitor brought a motion for payment of his legal fees pursuant to a contingency fee agreement (CFA) signed by his client in December 2020, or alternatively on the basis of docketed hours.

The court found the CFA void for failing to comply with numerous mandatory requirements under Ontario Regulation 195/04 under the Solicitors Act, and held that ss. 23–24 of the Solicitors Act did not permit the court to validate a non-compliant CFA.

The court awarded fees only for work performed prior to a capacity assessment completed March 16, 2021, after which the solicitor had knowledge of the client's incapacity to manage property; post-assessment docketed fees were allowed only at a 15% discount.

No disbursements were allowed as no supporting evidence was provided.

The applicant, the 85-year-old mother of the deceased filmmaker Charles Herbert Officer, sought extensive financial and corporate disclosure from various respondents to support her application for dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The respondents, including the estate trustee, the deceased's former partner, and business associates, had already provided significant financial disclosure, including tax returns, bank statements, and a business valuation.

Justice Faieta dismissed the applicant's motion for further disclosure, finding the requests overbroad, unnecessary, and lacking proportionality, with minor exceptions consented to by the Estate Trustee.

The application was also dismissed on consent against several professional respondents.

The moving party, who became the sole owner of a condominium by right of survivorship following her former partner's death, brought a motion for vacant possession and occupation rent against the deceased's 85-year-old mother.

The mother argued she had a verbal agreement with the deceased to live in the condo rent-free for life.

The court found the mother's hearsay evidence regarding the deceased's promise to be unreliable and unenforceable for lack of consideration.

The court granted the motion, ordering the mother to deliver vacant possession and pay occupation rent of $2,200 per month from the date the moving party ceased financially supporting her occupation.

The applicant sought the court's advice and direction on whether an enforceable agreement was formed for her to purchase a property from the deceased's estate, as per an option granted in the will.

The will stipulated a 60-day period to enter into an enforceable agreement.

The respondent estate trustee argued that no enforceable agreement was made within this period because a formal written offer was received after 70 days.

The court found that the exchange of email correspondence between the applicant and the respondent within the 60-day period constituted an enforceable agreement, as the will did not require a formal written document.

The court dismissed the respondent's arguments regarding lack of certainty of terms and the assertion that it was merely an agreement to agree, concluding that a meeting of the minds on all essential terms had occurred.

The applicant, claiming to be a common-law spouse, sought to prove the deceased's will in solemn form and obtain dependant's support.

The respondent, the Estate Trustee and sole beneficiary, brought a motion for vacant possession of the condominium where the applicant resided and to strike the applicant's will challenge for lack of standing.

The court granted the applicant interim possession of the condominium on terms (requiring him to pay all maintenance, insurance, and property taxes) until his dependant's support application is resolved.

However, the court dismissed the applicant's challenge to the will, finding he lacked the necessary financial interest or standing, as his potential dependant's support claim would not be affected by the will's validity.

This appeal arose from a dispute among siblings concerning the care and property of their nonagenarian mother.

The appellant challenged the application judge's decision, which declared the mother incapable, validated existing powers of attorney, and ordered the appellant to account for funds held on a resulting trust.

The appellant alleged procedural unfairness, including failure to consider his materials, denial of an adjournment, and improper dismissal of his counter-application, and sought leave to appeal the costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error or procedural unfairness, and denied leave to appeal costs, affirming the application judge's discretion.

The Defendant moved to stay or strike the Plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action.

The Plaintiff, a marine engineer, was dismissed from his employment on a ship and sued in the Federal Court.

The Defendant argued the Court lacked jurisdiction, the action was statute-barred, and a forum selection clause applied.

The Court found it had jurisdiction under the Federal Courts Act, the action was within the Marine Liability Act limitation period, and the forum selection clause was ambiguous and did not preclude the action in Federal Court.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, Shazad Adam, sought to be appointed as guardian of the person for his father, Shyam Mohamed Adam, who sustained a head injury and whose capacity to manage personal care was in dispute.

Shazad also sought to remove Shyam's spouse, Bibi Hasena Hanuman, and daughter, Selena Shazela Hasena, as attorneys for personal care under a 2019 Power of Attorney.

The court granted leave for the application, declared Shyam incapable of personal care, found Bibi neglectful and in breach of a court order, and removed Bibi and Selena as attorneys.

Shazad was appointed as guardian of the person for one year, subject to a revised guardianship plan.

Costs were awarded to the Public Guardian and Trustee and Shyam's s.3 counsel from Shyam's property, and partial indemnity costs were awarded to Shazad against Bibi.

The applicant sought to invalidate powers of attorney (POAs) executed by Janina Jackiewicz in 2021, which appointed the respondent, Yolanta Zawadzinski, as attorney.

The applicant also sought to confirm the validity of earlier 2019 POAs, which appointed the applicant.

The court found suspicious circumstances surrounding the 2021 POAs, including Ms. Jackiewicz's diminished capacity and the respondent's undue influence, supported by a capacity assessment report.

The court declared the 2021 POAs invalid and the 2019 POAs valid and operative.

The respondent was ordered to provide an accounting of Ms. Jackiewicz's property managed since October 2021.

This case involves a dispute among three siblings, Bill, Mary, and John, concerning the management of their 92-year-old mother, Alpida Vrantsidis', property and personal care.

Bill and Mary sought declarations regarding the validity and enforceability of the 1995 Powers of Attorney (POAs) and an order for John to account for $61,000 he received from their mother.

John, self-represented, brought a cross-application seeking to invalidate the POAs or remove Bill and Mary as attorneys.

The court dismissed John's request for an adjournment, declared the 1995 POAs valid and operative, confirmed Alpida Vrantsidis' incapacity to manage her property and personal care, and ordered John to account for the $61,000 under a resulting trust.

John's application to remove Bill and Mary or invalidate the POAs was dismissed due to lack of merit and evidence of misconduct.

The third party, a court-appointed receiver, brought a motion to stay a third party claim commenced against it by the defendants.

The defendants sought contribution and indemnity, as well as unpaid professional fees.

The court granted the motion and stayed the third party claim, finding that the defendants failed to obtain leave of the court as required by the receivership order.

The court also found that the fee claim was barred by the limitation of liability provision in the receivership order and constituted an abuse of process because it was identical to a previous action that had been dismissed for delay.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a dismissed application where the Applicants sought a declaration that the Respondents held their share of a property in trust.

The Respondents, as the successful party, sought costs of $27,000, while the Applicants proposed $10,000.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found the Respondents were entitled to costs.

While the Respondents' offer to settle did not trigger Rule 49, the Applicants' conduct, including inconsistent pleadings and a narrow view of facts, justified a higher award of costs.

Considering the complexity and importance of the issues, and finding the Respondents' counsel's partial indemnity rate reasonable, the court fixed costs at $22,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the Applicants.

The Applicants sought a declaration that the Respondents held their 50% interest in a property in trust for the Applicants, alleging no significant financial contribution from the Respondents.

The Respondents countered that they contributed most of the down payment and that rental income covered the bulk of carrying costs, while the Applicants lived rent-free.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Respondents made significant contributions to the down payment and that the Applicants' carrying costs were largely offset by rental income and their rent-free occupancy.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to determine the division of profits from a joint venture selling automotive parts.

The court addressed two main issues: the accounting for unsold/consigned goods and a claim for discounted shocks.

The court found that unsold goods should not be deducted from net profit, but uncollected accounts receivable should.

The court also found in favor of the plaintiff regarding the discounted shocks due to lack of explanation from the defendant.

A final amount owing in USD was converted to CAD using an average exchange rate.

The Landlord sought a declaration that a lease agreement with the Tenant (Fido Solutions Inc. and Rogers Communications Inc.) for a cellular tower site was properly terminated due to a bona fide intention to develop the property, rendering the facility's operation no longer feasible.

The Tenant disputed the termination and sought relief from forfeiture.

The court interpreted "feasible" to imply reasonableness and practicability, not impossibility, and found the Landlord's development plans, coupled with the City's conditions for parkland dedication, made the facility's continued operation unfeasible.

The court also determined that while the Landlord's acceptance of rent created an annual overholding tenancy, it was properly terminated by a second notice.

Relief from forfeiture was denied as the termination was an exercise of a contractual right, not a breach.

The Landlord's application was granted, ordering termination of the lease, removal of the facility, payment of rent, and deletion of the notice of lease from title.

Manorgate, a residential home builder, retained Kirkor, an architectural consulting firm, to provide design services for a construction project.

After the City of Toronto requested a higher density development, the parties entered into a second agreement for a larger project.

Manorgate alleged that Kirkor made a negligent misrepresentation regarding the cost per square foot of the larger project, which turned out to be significantly higher than represented, rendering the project financially unviable.

Kirkor moved for summary judgment, relying on an Entire Agreement Clause in the second agreement that precluded reliance on pre-contractual representations.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that the second agreement was a separate contract and that the Entire Agreement Clause excluded the alleged misrepresentation.

Manorgate appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in giving effect to the Entire Agreement Clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law and affirming that the Entire Agreement Clause was broad enough to exclude the alleged misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant architectural firm for negligent misrepresentation regarding the construction costs of a stacked townhouse project.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 'entire agreement' exclusion clause in their contract precluded the plaintiffs from suing based on pre-contractual representations.

The court found that the exclusion clause applied to the alleged misrepresentations and that it was not unconscionable to enforce it.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The appellant appealed an order staying an action against a court-appointed receiver and refusing leave to sue the receiver.

The appellant argued that the receiver had already consented to the action and that the motion judge erred in finding the test for leave was not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior consent did not encompass the new claim for conversion arising from a subsequent agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's discretionary refusal to grant leave, as there was no evidence that the appellant suffered damages.