Charles Simco

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion by the defendants to transfer an action from Milton to Toronto, which the plaintiffs had opposed.

The court applied principles from Schreiber v. Mulroney and Boucher v. Public Accountants Counsel for the Province of Ontario, considering Rule 57 factors and proportionality.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendants partial indemnity costs of $2,980.00.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion brought by the defendants to transfer an action from Milton to Toronto.

The court, applying Rule 57 factors and principles from *Schreiber v. Mulroney* and *Boucher v. Public Accountants Counsel for the Province of Ontario*, ordered the plaintiffs to pay partial indemnity costs to the defendants.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from Milton (Central West Region) to the Toronto Region, pursuant to Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court granted the transfer, finding no rational connection to Milton and determining that Toronto was a substantially better venue, given that the project, contractual agreement, and all events giving rise to the claim were located in Toronto, as were the parties and their counsel.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from Milton (Central West Region) to the Toronto Region, arguing that Toronto was the more appropriate venue.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court granted the transfer, finding no rational connection to Milton and that Toronto was a substantially better venue, based on a holistic application of Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) factors, including the location of the project, the events giving rise to the claim, and the parties' residences.

The plaintiff in a subrogated action scheduled discoveries and proposed an independent insurance adjuster as its corporate representative.

Days before the scheduled discoveries, the defendants objected and insisted on examining the plaintiff's sole director.

The plaintiff rejected alternate proposals and unilaterally cancelled the discoveries.

Both parties brought motions for costs thrown away.

The court dismissed both the motion and cross-motions, finding that while the defendants should have raised the issue earlier, the plaintiff acted unreasonably in cancelling the discoveries.

Manorgate, a residential home builder, retained Kirkor, an architectural consulting firm, to provide design services for a construction project.

After the City of Toronto requested a higher density development, the parties entered into a second agreement for a larger project.

Manorgate alleged that Kirkor made a negligent misrepresentation regarding the cost per square foot of the larger project, which turned out to be significantly higher than represented, rendering the project financially unviable.

Kirkor moved for summary judgment, relying on an Entire Agreement Clause in the second agreement that precluded reliance on pre-contractual representations.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that the second agreement was a separate contract and that the Entire Agreement Clause excluded the alleged misrepresentation.

Manorgate appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in giving effect to the Entire Agreement Clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law and affirming that the Entire Agreement Clause was broad enough to exclude the alleged misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant architectural firm for negligent misrepresentation regarding the construction costs of a stacked townhouse project.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 'entire agreement' exclusion clause in their contract precluded the plaintiffs from suing based on pre-contractual representations.

The court found that the exclusion clause applied to the alleged misrepresentations and that it was not unconscionable to enforce it.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a rehearing or variation of a previous endorsement by Murray J. concerning a settlement agreement, arguing that no final decision was made or that there was a misapprehension of evidence and denial of natural justice.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to carry Murray J.'s endorsement into operation and enforce the settlement agreement.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that Murray J.'s endorsement constituted a final "decision" under s. 123 of the Courts of Justice Act, precluding a rehearing.

The court also found that the defendant's lengthy and unexplained delay, coupled with a lack of new evidence, prevented relief under Rule 59.06.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to enforce Murray J.'s endorsement was granted.