Brendan Yiu Bong Wong

The defendant moved under Rule 49.09(a) to enforce a purported settlement and require the plaintiffs to execute a full and final release.

The plaintiffs had accepted an offer to settle the 'Action', but refused to sign the defendant's draft release because its broad wording could preclude their separate application for judicial review regarding a federal dental care program.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that on an objective basis, the parties had not reached an agreement on all essential terms given the narrow wording of the offer.

The court further held that even if a settlement existed, enforcing it would not be in the interests of justice.

The court considered whether the plaintiff, Gaurav Tewari, should be permitted to bring a motion for an interlocutory injunction under Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure against multiple defendants, given his outstanding costs orders from previous litigation.

The court found that it would be unfair to allow further motions until the costs orders were satisfied, despite the plaintiff's claims of significant assets.

The motion was not permitted to proceed at this time.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 18, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As the responding parties did not provide a cost outline, the court made no order as to costs.

The self-represented moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal from a decision of P. Sutherland J. dated July 20, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

The appellant, a speech language pathologist, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for intentional infliction of economic harm, interference with economic relations, PHIPA retaliation, and conspiracy, stemming from Sun Life's delisting of her services after an audit dispute.

The motion judge found the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, rejecting arguments for a rolling limitation period and that the discovery of the claim was contingent on a College investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing with the motion judge's analysis on the limitation period and the appropriateness of summary judgment.

The appellants appealed two awards from a sole arbitrator in a commercial arbitration regarding a failed real estate project.

The first award granted partial summary judgment dismissing claims related to loan advances as time-barred.

The second award increased the amount of security for costs.

The Superior Court held that the standard of review for commercial arbitrations remains reasonableness under Sattva, as Vavilov did not overrule it in this context.

The court found the arbitrator's decisions on both the limitation period and the security for costs were reasonable and correct, and dismissed the appeals.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer a Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court of Justice.

The plaintiffs, an osteopathic federation and its president, sued the defendant insurer for defamation after the insurer delisted their services.

The court applied the five-factor test from Farlow v. Hospital for Sick Children and found that the complexity of the issues, the need for expert evidence, the need for discovery, and the general importance of the matter favoured a transfer.

The court also noted the plaintiffs sought mandatory orders beyond the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The plaintiff in a subrogated action scheduled discoveries and proposed an independent insurance adjuster as its corporate representative.

Days before the scheduled discoveries, the defendants objected and insisted on examining the plaintiff's sole director.

The plaintiff rejected alternate proposals and unilaterally cancelled the discoveries.

Both parties brought motions for costs thrown away.

The court dismissed both the motion and cross-motions, finding that while the defendants should have raised the issue earlier, the plaintiff acted unreasonably in cancelling the discoveries.

The moving defendants sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an order that quashed their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction.

The defendants had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory.

The Divisional Court applied the four-factor test for extending time and found that the delay was significant, the proposed appeal lacked merit due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, and there was a risk of prejudice to the plaintiff.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellants sought to appeal an order quashing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction, certificates of pending litigation, and Norwich orders.

The Court of Appeal determined that the quashed order was interlocutory in nature, not final, as it did not finally determine the real matter in dispute—whether fraud was perpetrated—but rather addressed collateral issues pending trial.

The court held that interlocutory orders must be appealed with leave to the Divisional Court pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, not directly to the Court of Appeal.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted without prejudice to the appellants' right to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The applicants, former officers of the respondent corporation, brought applications for advance funding of their legal fees to defend an action alleging complex commercial fraud.

The applications were brought pursuant to the corporation's Unanimous Shareholders Agreement and section 124 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The court applied the strong prima facie case test to determine if advance funding should be denied due to bad faith.

The court dismissed the application of the former CEO, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud had been established against him in a related Mareva injunction motion.

The court granted the application of the former COO, as the evidence did not establish a strong prima facie case of fraud against him.

Amphenol Canada Corp. obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction and other orders against the defendants.

The defendants (Sundaram, Devappa, Sundev Technologies Inc.) subsequently brought a motion to set aside these orders.

Amphenol responded with a motion to quash or stay the defendants' set aside motion, arguing issue estoppel, collateral attack, and abuse of process, and also sought leave to amend its Statement of Claim to add Radiant Tools Ltd. as a defendant.

The court granted Amphenol's motion to add Radiant Tools Ltd. as a defendant.

The court found that the conditions for issue estoppel were satisfied regarding the strong prima facie case of fraud against the Sundev Defendants, as this issue was determined in a prior continuation motion.

While the court did not find the doctrine of collateral attack engaged, it concluded that the defendants' attempt to re-litigate issues constituted an abuse of process.

Consequently, Amphenol's motions were granted, and the defendants' Set Aside Motion was quashed or stayed.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no valid and enforceable settlement due to a lack of clarity in the offer, insufficient authority of the individual purporting to accept on behalf of corporate plaintiffs, and improper direct communication by the defendants' counsel with a represented party, violating professional conduct rules.

This costs endorsement addresses two applications for costs following a motion concerning a Mareva injunction, Certificate of Pending Litigation, and Norwich Orders.

The Plaintiff, Amphenol Canada Corp., sought costs against Chandra Devappa, Nandakumar Sundaram, and Sundev Technologies Inc. after Devappa unsuccessfully contested the continuation of the Mareva injunction.

MTech Ltd. sought substantial indemnity costs from Amphenol after successfully having the Mareva injunction set aside against it.

The court awarded Amphenol partial indemnity costs of $14,000 against Devappa, finding her contestation unreasonable given a prior settlement offer.

No costs were awarded against Sundaram and Sundev as they did not oppose the continuation motion.

The court awarded MTech partial indemnity costs of $16,000 from Amphenol, rejecting substantial indemnity as Amphenol's conduct in advancing the fraud claim against MTech was not deemed "reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous."

The plaintiff brought a motion to continue an ex parte Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging a fraudulent scheme where a former employee used the plaintiff's resources to manufacture parts for third parties and kept the profits.

The court found a strong prima facie case and a serious risk of asset dissipation against the employee's spouse, continuing the injunction against her, the employee, and their company.

However, the court found insufficient evidence of knowing participation or risk of dissipation against a third-party contractor, MTech, and dismissed the motion to continue the injunction against it.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding their right of access to waterfront property through membership in Cedar Ridge Waterfront Park Corporation (CRRC).

The motion judge found a common intention that lot purchasers would have water access through CRRC membership.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the right of access was contractual in nature, not an easement or easement by estoppel.

The court found that the documentation and circumstances were inconsistent with the creation of an easement, including the requirement to assign membership to subsequent purchasers and the absence of typical easement indicia such as metes and bounds descriptions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to vary a Mareva injunction granted in favour of Trade Capital against The Cash House.

The motion judge allowed Maple Trust to seize funds in a specific account under a writ of seizure and sale.

The appellant argued that a temporary stay should have been granted to allow it to trace stolen funds into the account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if a serious issue regarding tracing could be demonstrated, the balance of convenience favoured Maple Trust, which had acted in good faith in obtaining its judgment and pursuing execution.

The appellant's Mareva injunction gave it no proprietary interest in the funds, and there was no basis for the third party to suffer prejudice.

The plaintiff landlord claimed the defendant tenant was overholding after the expiry of a commercial lease because a subtenant left a functional computer server containing client data on the premises.

The landlord sought overholding rent.

The court dismissed the action, finding that leaving a single piece of equipment did not constitute use and occupation of the premises, especially since the tenant had no access to the building and no business was being conducted there.

The franchisor, Mr. Lube, brought an application to enforce a sublease provision requiring the franchisee to pay an additional 2% rent based on gross sales.

The franchisee brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that it was not required to pay the amount, arguing it was a disguised franchise fee prohibited by a prior agreement and was not properly disclosed under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The court found that the 2% rent was clearly disclosed in the franchise disclosure document and the executed sublease.

The court rejected the franchisee's argument of non est factum, noting the franchisee's principal failed to read the documents.

The court also held that the percentage rent was not a franchise fee.

The franchisor's application was granted and the franchisee's application was dismissed.

The defendant car auction company brought a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to dismiss a negligence claim arising from injuries caused when a stolen vehicle collided with the plaintiffs’ vehicle ten days after the theft.

The moving party argued that it was not reasonably foreseeable that a thief would negligently cause harm to third parties days after a theft, relying on appellate authority concerning foreseeability in car theft cases.

The court held that, accepting the pleaded facts as true, it was not plain and obvious that the claim was certain to fail because the pleadings alleged circumstances that could support foreseeability, including the possibility that the thief was dangerously driving while evading police.

The court also found the motion premature given the absence of evidentiary context typically available after discovery or trial.

However, several subparagraphs of the amended statement of claim were struck as speculative and lacking material facts.