Inga Brigitta Lammechien Andriessen

The court dismissed the defendant Universal Protection Service of Canada Corporation’s motion for security for costs and a prohibition order against the plaintiff, Qun Zheng.

The court found that the motion for security for costs was not warranted at this late stage of the proceeding, given the delay in bringing the motion and the relatively small amount of unpaid costs from other proceedings.

The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to prohibit Mr. Zheng from taking further steps in the action or from appealing without leave, as such orders would be overbroad and not supported by the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendants, Universal Protection Service of Canada Corporation, Tina Baldwin, and Randy Smith, brought a motion to prohibit the self-represented plaintiffs, Elizabeth Efthymiadis and George Efthymiadis, from bringing further motions in the proceeding without leave of the court.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to strike portions of Universal's statement of defence.

The court granted Universal's motion, finding that the plaintiffs' persistent and unsuccessful motions and appeals, including the cross-motion which sought to re-litigate previously decided issues, constituted litigation misconduct and an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to Universal, and the parties were directed to establish an updated litigation timetable.

The applicant sought possession of two trucks under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The respondents failed to participate in the application, despite adjournments to seek counsel, and made misrepresentations about retaining a lawyer and vehicle insurance.

The court addressed significant evidentiary issues with the applicant's affidavits, particularly concerning indirect hearsay from counsel and the improper use of business records and electronic evidence rules under the Evidence Act.

Despite these evidentiary deficiencies, the court found sufficient admissible evidence, including the respondent's implicit admissions, to grant the applicant possession of the vehicles and costs.

The creditor moved without notice for an order of substituted service of its notice of motion, seeking a contempt order against the debtor.

The debtor had a documented history of evading service in the proceeding.

The court granted the order for substituted service, finding a consistent pattern of evasion and certainty of the debtor's address, which made it likely the notice would come to her attention.

The court emphasized the quasi-criminal nature of contempt motions, requiring close scrutiny and considering substituted service as a last resort, but found it justified in this case.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 for the creditor.

The applicant's application was dismissed, leading to a costs endorsement.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing that her offer to settle (a dismissal) should attract Rule 49 consequences.

The applicant contended that an offer to dismiss does not engage Rule 49 because a dismissal is not a "recovery" of judgment.

The court agreed with the applicant, citing *S. & A. Strasser Ltd. v. Richmond Hill (Town)*, and found that Rule 49 did not apply.

Furthermore, the court determined that the applicant's conduct did not rise to a level warranting substantial indemnity costs under Rule 57.01(1), as per *Iannarella v. Corbett*.

Consequently, costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at $20,000.00, all-inclusive, to be paid by the applicant to the respondent.

The applicant sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a unique 1.9-acre property.

The APS was conditional on the seller obtaining Credit Valley Conservation Authority (CVC) permission for "cut and fill" and building permits.

The applicant alleged the respondent failed to act in good faith and take reasonable steps to obtain consent.

The respondent argued she took reasonable steps, incurring significant costs, and terminated the APS when further expenses were deemed unwarranted.

The court found the respondent acted in good faith and dismissed the application, also noting that specific performance would not have been granted due to the applicant's failure to prove the property's uniqueness and the property's subsequent transfer to a third party not involved in the application.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its unjust enrichment claim against the respondents on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant knew or ought to have known of all material facts giving rise to the claim by January 2012, when the respondent admitted under cross-examination that Silverwood had supplied flooring for the M5V Project.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's testimony that profits were less than the management fee removed the possibility of damage from the appellant's mind, and that the appellant only discovered the actual damage when the respondent later admitted in 2015 that the project had made at least $200,000 in profit.

The action commenced in September 2015 was therefore within the limitation period.

Following a successful application, the applicant sought a costs award on a partial indemnity basis.

The claimed costs totalled $13,765.83, including legal fees and disbursements.

The respondents did not oppose the request and acknowledged the reasonableness of the submissions.

After reviewing the Bill of Costs, the court found the amounts reasonable and awarded the full amount sought.

A creditor sought relief under s. 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act after obtaining default judgment against a debtor corporation that ceased operations and whose business activities were effectively continued through a newly incorporated company.

The court found that the debtor corporation’s director and spouse transferred business operations, assets, employees, and goodwill to the new entity immediately after garnishment proceedings in order to avoid satisfying the judgment.

Applying the oppression remedy framework articulated in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, the court held that a creditor has a reasonable expectation that a debtor corporation will not take steps to hinder satisfaction of a judgment.

The conduct of transferring the business to a new corporation controlled by the same individuals was found to be oppressive and unfairly prejudicial.

The individuals and the new corporation were held jointly and severally liable for the outstanding judgment.