Ian J. Cantor

Following the dismissal of its application to prevent the re-leasing of disputed lands, the applicant condominium corporation argued it should be relieved of costs because the matter was in the public interest and involved consumer protection.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that condominium corporations are subject to the standard costs regime.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents, declining to award substantial indemnity costs based on an unaccepted monetary offer to settle because the application sought non-monetary relief.

Costs were fixed at $58,655.44 for two respondents and $35,008.44 for the third.

The applicant, York Condominium Corporation No. 76 (YCC76), sought to invalidate a lease amendment concerning "Disputed Lands" within the Crescent Town development.

YCC76 claimed a leasehold interest in the lands and alleged that the amendment, which released the lands in exchange for $500,000, was improperly approved by the board of Crescent Town Club Inc. (CTC) and constituted oppression.

The court dismissed YCC76's application, finding that YCC76 had no leasehold interest in the Disputed Lands, the board's approval was valid under the Ontario Not For Profit Corporations Act, 2010, and the lease did not require unanimous consent from YCC76.

Furthermore, the court determined it lacked broad jurisdiction to grant an oppression remedy under the ONCA, and even if it did, YCC76 failed to prove oppression or actual prejudice.

The applicant tenant sought a declaration that it retained a right to renew a commercial lease and had properly exercised that option.

The court held that the renewal option had already been spent, the tenant had not provided notice in strict compliance with the lease, and the tenant had been in default for most of the term.

The court further refused relief against forfeiture because the defaults resulted from the tenant's own deliberate acts rather than circumstances beyond its control.

The application was dismissed with agreed costs to the successful landlord.

A commercial landlord sought declarations that a tenant failed to validly exercise an option to extend a lease and was therefore an overholding tenant.

The tenant brought a competing application seeking a declaration that it had validly exercised the option or alternatively that the option remained exercisable.

The court reviewed the law governing the exercise of lease renewal or extension options and the requirement for clear and unequivocal acceptance communicated to the landlord.

Interpreting the lease and rider provisions together, the court found that written notice delivered by courier within the rider’s timeline satisfied the contractual requirements and unambiguously exercised the extension option.

The landlord’s arguments concerning timing, delivery method, authority of the signatory, and use of the term “renewal” instead of “extension” were rejected.

Following a successful application, the applicant sought a costs award on a partial indemnity basis.

The claimed costs totalled $13,765.83, including legal fees and disbursements.

The respondents did not oppose the request and acknowledged the reasonableness of the submissions.

After reviewing the Bill of Costs, the court found the amounts reasonable and awarded the full amount sought.

A creditor sought relief under s. 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act after obtaining default judgment against a debtor corporation that ceased operations and whose business activities were effectively continued through a newly incorporated company.

The court found that the debtor corporation’s director and spouse transferred business operations, assets, employees, and goodwill to the new entity immediately after garnishment proceedings in order to avoid satisfying the judgment.

Applying the oppression remedy framework articulated in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, the court held that a creditor has a reasonable expectation that a debtor corporation will not take steps to hinder satisfaction of a judgment.

The conduct of transferring the business to a new corporation controlled by the same individuals was found to be oppressive and unfairly prejudicial.

The individuals and the new corporation were held jointly and severally liable for the outstanding judgment.