Tracy Patricia Lyle

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, including income replacement benefits (IRBs) and a treatment plan for social work therapy.

The insurer suspended IRBs on the basis that the applicant failed to comply with section 57(2) of the Schedule by not participating in recommended psychological treatment.

The Tribunal found that the applicant did not comply with her obligation to receive psychological treatment, upholding the suspension of IRBs.

The Tribunal also denied the treatment plan for social work therapy, finding the costs excessive and the treatment not reasonable and necessary given the applicant's history of non-compliance and the recommendation for a psychologist rather than a social worker.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action after being summarily terminated without cause following 18.5 years of service as Vice President.

The defendant failed to attend the trial, and its pleadings were struck.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to a 24-month common law notice period.

Additionally, the court awarded $50,000 in aggravated damages and $50,000 in punitive damages due to the defendant's bad faith, which included making defamatory statements, accusing the plaintiff of criminality, and pursuing a baseless counterclaim.

The plaintiff in a subrogated action scheduled discoveries and proposed an independent insurance adjuster as its corporate representative.

Days before the scheduled discoveries, the defendants objected and insisted on examining the plaintiff's sole director.

The plaintiff rejected alternate proposals and unilaterally cancelled the discoveries.

Both parties brought motions for costs thrown away.

The court dismissed both the motion and cross-motions, finding that while the defendants should have raised the issue earlier, the plaintiff acted unreasonably in cancelling the discoveries.

The appellant appealed the school board's decision to expel her 15-year-old son from all schools of the board after he posted a vulgar and threatening 'diss-rap' video on YouTube naming students and a teacher.

The Child and Family Services Review Board quashed the expulsion, finding that the school board failed to adequately consider mitigating factors, including the pupil's recent diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder, his limited ability to control his behaviour or foresee consequences, the history of racial bullying he faced, and the lack of progressive discipline or psychological assessment prior to the incident.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking to bar the plaintiffs' action for a fatal motor vehicle accident under section 267.6 of the Insurance Act, arguing the deceased driver was uninsured.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence against the Ministry of Transportation and its contractor for highway design and non-repair.

The court, applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and guided by Hernandez v. 1206625 Ontario Inc., determined that section 267.6 does not apply to bar claims against tortfeasors whose liability arises from negligent highway design or non-repair, as such liability does not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs, allowing the action to proceed.

The defendant Graham McKeddie moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him, which was based on social host liability.

The plaintiff, a minor injured as a passenger in a car driven by Graham's son, supported the dismissal.

The defendant Echelon General Insurance Company, a party under uninsured/underinsured provisions, cross-claimed against Graham alleging social host liability.

The court applied the framework from Childs v. Desormeaux and the summary judgment principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin.

Despite conflicting evidence regarding the host's interaction with the guests, the court found insufficient evidence to establish a paternalistic relationship or any other basis for a positive duty of care on the host's part as a social host.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the claim against the moving defendant.

Following settlement of a serious personal injury action at the defendant's policy limits, the parties asked the court to fix costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs sought substantially higher costs based in part on a percentage-of-recovery approach, while the defendant argued for a lower figure based on estimated hours and disputed disbursements.

The court held the settlement agreement required a Rule 57 partial indemnity assessment rather than a percentage-of-settlement methodology.

Applying those factors, the court fixed fees at $70,000 and accepted the defendant's position on disbursements in the absence of reply submissions, assessing total costs at $87,075 plus HST.

A fatal motor vehicle collision occurred after a driver borrowed the vehicle owner’s car earlier in the day and later drove it while intoxicated, causing the death of a young driver.

The plaintiffs and the vehicle owner’s insurer disputed whether the owner or the insurer was responsible for paying an agreed amount of damages.

The court considered whether the driver had possession of the vehicle with the owner’s consent under s.192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Applying appellate authority emphasizing that consent to possession—not consent to operation—governs vicarious liability, the court found the driver remained in possession of the vehicle with the owner’s consent throughout the day.

The owner was therefore vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence and the claim against the insurer was dismissed.

The appellant blocked a channel between his property and the respondents', causing water to back up.

The trial judge found the channel was a natural watercourse, not merely surface water, and ordered the appellant to remove the barrier and pay damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in classifying the partially artificial channel as a natural watercourse and in finding it maintained its character downstream.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the channel was a well-defined natural watercourse where it was blocked.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents were entitled to a prescriptive easement over a 66-foot wide road on the appellants' land.

The Court of Appeal found that while the respondents were entitled to an easement, the prescriptive right must be confined to the land continuously used, which did not exceed 25 feet in width.

The appeal was allowed, varying the judgment to limit the easement to the boundaries of the existing roadway, to be determined by a new survey prepared at the respondents' expense.

The appeal concerned the interpretation of a short-form employment agreement governing commission entitlement on contracts secured with Bell.

The appellant argued the respondent was not entitled to commissions after leaving employment before the end of 1996.

The court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that salary compensated ongoing servicing work, while commissions were earned once the Bell contracts were secured, even though the amount could only be calculated at contract end.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.