Tracy Patricia Lyle

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking to bar the plaintiffs' action for a fatal motor vehicle accident under section 267.6 of the Insurance Act, arguing the deceased driver was uninsured.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence against the Ministry of Transportation and its contractor for highway design and non-repair.

The court, applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and guided by Hernandez v. 1206625 Ontario Inc., determined that section 267.6 does not apply to bar claims against tortfeasors whose liability arises from negligent highway design or non-repair, as such liability does not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs, allowing the action to proceed.

The defendant Graham McKeddie moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him, which was based on social host liability.

The plaintiff, a minor injured as a passenger in a car driven by Graham's son, supported the dismissal.

The defendant Echelon General Insurance Company, a party under uninsured/underinsured provisions, cross-claimed against Graham alleging social host liability.

The court applied the framework from Childs v. Desormeaux and the summary judgment principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin.

Despite conflicting evidence regarding the host's interaction with the guests, the court found insufficient evidence to establish a paternalistic relationship or any other basis for a positive duty of care on the host's part as a social host.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the claim against the moving defendant.

A fatal motor vehicle collision occurred after a driver borrowed the vehicle owner’s car earlier in the day and later drove it while intoxicated, causing the death of a young driver.

The plaintiffs and the vehicle owner’s insurer disputed whether the owner or the insurer was responsible for paying an agreed amount of damages.

The court considered whether the driver had possession of the vehicle with the owner’s consent under s.192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Applying appellate authority emphasizing that consent to possession—not consent to operation—governs vicarious liability, the court found the driver remained in possession of the vehicle with the owner’s consent throughout the day.

The owner was therefore vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence and the claim against the insurer was dismissed.