12 total
Specific performance granted for real estate sale where vendor mistakenly misunderstood clear HST inclusion clause.
The applicant sought specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.
The respondent vendor refused to close the transaction after realizing that the contract stipulated HST was 'included in' the purchase price, meaning she would net less than anticipated.
The respondent argued there was a lack of consensus ad idem and unilateral mistake.
The court rejected these arguments, finding the contract language unambiguous and the mistake to be the respondent's own error in judgment.
The court granted specific performance, holding that the property was unique in the context of a hot real estate market and damages would be inadequate.
Application for post-104 week income replacement benefits dismissed as applicant did not qualify within first 104 weeks.
The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and returned to work shortly after, continuing to work full-time for over two years.
She subsequently applied for income replacement benefits (IRBs) for a period commencing more than 104 weeks post-accident.
The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that because the applicant did not suffer a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her employment within the first 104 weeks, she was ineligible for post-104 week IRBs.
Furthermore, she failed to prove she was completely unable to engage in any employment for which she was reasonably suited.
The plaintiffs were awarded $15,000 in partial indemnity costs following a summary judgment motion where the defendant achieved only minor success.
This endorsement addresses costs following a summary judgment motion where the defendant achieved partial success on minor claims but failed on the two main claims.
Both parties sought costs.
The court awarded the plaintiffs $15,000 in partial indemnity costs, reduced to reflect the defendant's minor successes.
The court found that it was not unreasonable for the defendant to have brought the summary judgment motion.
The court granted partial summary judgment to a developer on privacy and contract claims but directed a trial for misrepresentation and corporate veil issues.
The defendant, Robert Mills, moved for partial summary judgment and leave to amend his statement of defence to plead the Limitations Act, 2002.
The plaintiffs claimed for breach of contract and tort related to the purchase of residences and a common recreational complex.
The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on claims for breach of privacy, breach of contract regarding monthly fees for club access, and deficiencies in construction.
However, the court dismissed the defendant's request for summary judgment on claims related to the delay in building the clubhouse and misrepresentation about golf course proximity/view, finding these issues required a trial due to intertwined facts and the need to potentially pierce the corporate veil.
Leave to amend the statement of defence to plead limitation periods for breach of contract and golf course representations was also denied.
Default judgment set aside despite delay because the defendant demonstrated an arguable defence on the merits.
The defendant moved to set aside a $6 million default judgment entered against her.
The plaintiffs had sued the defendant and others for misconduct related to the purchase of life insurance policies.
The court found that while the defendant did not bring the motion promptly and lacked a good explanation for her default, she had an arguable defence on the merits regarding her personal liability as a corporate officer.
Balancing the factors, the court set aside the default judgment on terms, requiring the defendant to pay costs thrown away and the costs of the motion, and allowing the writ of execution to remain on title.
Will challenge dismissed; court found testator's decision to disinherit daughter was her own volition.
The plaintiff brought an action to invalidate her late mother's 2007 will, which left the entire estate to the defendant, her brother.
The plaintiff alleged the will was the product of undue influence.
The court reviewed the history of the mother's changing wills and powers of attorney, the strained relationship between the plaintiff and the mother, and the mother's diminished capacity.
The court found that while there were suspicious circumstances, the mother had her own reasons to disinherit the plaintiff and retained a strong will.
The court concluded the 2007 will was the product of the mother's own volition and dismissed the action.
Substantial indemnity costs of $21,000 awarded to the applicant due to protracted litigation caused by respondents.
Following a motion decided in favour of the applicant, the court received written submissions on costs.
The applicant sought costs of $28,157.62 on a solicitor and client basis, while the respondents argued for partial indemnity costs fixed at $10,000.
Applying Rule 57.01 and the principles from Boucher, the court found that the protracted litigation necessitated by the respondents' actions warranted costs on a substantial indemnity basis.
The court fixed the costs payable by the respondents to the applicant at $21,000 all-inclusive.
The court allowed a judgment creditor to use the oppression remedy to enforce a judgment against related corporations and their directors due to intermingling of affairs.
The applicant, PRW Excavating Contractors Ltd., sought to enforce a 2007 judgment against additional respondents (individuals and related corporations) by utilizing the oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act and by piercing the corporate veil.
The court found that the intermingling of corporate affairs by the individual respondents, coupled with a lack of critical disclosure, constituted oppressive conduct, making all respondents jointly and severally liable for the judgment under the oppression remedy.
The court also dismissed the respondents' argument that the claim was statute-barred, finding it was an enforcement of a judgment, not a new cause of action, and fell within the 15-year ultimate limitation period.
However, the court dismissed the claim to pierce the corporate veil, citing the high threshold for proving illegal or fraudulent conduct.
Successful production motion awarded $12,500 costs on partial indemnity basis.
The successful moving party on a prior motion for production of documents sought approximately $22,000 in costs.
The responding party argued that each side should bear its own costs because the motion raised a novel point of law and challenged the reasonableness of the moving party’s time and cross‑examination costs.
The court rejected the argument that the motion involved a novel legal issue and found the responding party’s resistance to production unreasonable.
However, the court held that the parties should bear their own costs for cross‑examinations on affidavits.
Costs were awarded to the successful moving party on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $12,500, all inclusive.
Court reduces costs award due to withdrawn settlement offers and litigation tactics.
Following a trial in which the plaintiff obtained judgment for unpaid amounts arising from a business relationship, the court addressed the issue of costs.
The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs to the date of settlement offers and substantial indemnity costs thereafter under Rule 49.
The court found the offers did not qualify for enhanced costs because they had been withdrawn and were not properly filed.
Considering the conduct of the parties and complications arising from an acknowledged but unpleaded debt owed by the plaintiff to the defendant, the court reduced the costs sought and awarded partial indemnity costs only.
Appeal of bankruptcy order dismissed as appellant owed over $1,000 and could not pay debts.
The appellant appealed a bankruptcy order.
The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the respondents were owed more than $1,000 due to a prior costs order and that the appellant was unable to pay his debts as they came due within six months of the application.
The appeal was dismissed.
Prescriptive easement varied to reflect the actual width of the continuously used roadway.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents were entitled to a prescriptive easement over a 66-foot wide road on the appellants' land.
The Court of Appeal found that while the respondents were entitled to an easement, the prescriptive right must be confined to the land continuously used, which did not exceed 25 feet in width.
The appeal was allowed, varying the judgment to limit the easement to the boundaries of the existing roadway, to be determined by a new survey prepared at the respondents' expense.