Brendan Yiu Bong Wong

The defendants moved to dismiss an action for unpaid electrical services on the basis that the named plaintiff lacked legal capacity because the corporation identified in the claim did not legally exist.

The court considered whether the misidentification constituted a misnomer under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the test for misnomer, the court held that the defendants clearly understood who the contracting party was and that the action concerned invoices issued under the trade name used by the corporation.

The court permitted amendment of the plaintiff’s name to the correct corporate entity notwithstanding the expired limitation period and found any prejudice could be addressed by costs.

The court also ordered the action transferred from Brampton to Toronto and set a litigation timetable.

The appellant leased a water heater from the respondent.

The respondent proposed an amendment to the rental agreement requiring customers to deal directly with the respondent to terminate the agreement, rather than using an agent.

The appellant sought a declaration that the amendment was invalid under the Consumer Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendment did not comply with the Regulation because the right to terminate was not unconditional.

However, the Court upheld the application judge's decision to invoke s. 93(2) of the Act, binding the appellant to the amendment, as the application was brought for a collateral purpose to benefit a competitor and no consumer was prejudiced.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking out his statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and dismissing his motion for leave to amend.

The appellant argued he should be allowed to amend his claim to assert negligence against the respondent bank as a guarantor or surety of the corporation's obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no lis between the appellant and the bank because his obligations were to third parties, not the bank.

Furthermore, the court agreed that the appellant's potential claim was derivative of the corporation's claim and could only be asserted by the corporation.

The appellant sued a trustee in bankruptcy and others.

A Registrar dismissed his motion for leave to continue the action under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and the appellant did not appeal.

Instead, he issued a new Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim based on the same facts.

The motion judge struck the new claim on the grounds of res judicata and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the new claim was an attempt to relitigate a determined matter and that the proper avenue was to appeal the Registrar's order.

The appellant appealed an order striking paragraphs in its statement of claim that alleged three statements (website, faxed, and oral) were defamatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the impugned remarks, taken in context, were not capable of bearing the defamatory meanings alleged by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence.

In a complex CCAA restructuring of Stelco Inc., four appeals were brought regarding the distribution of assets among creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that Senior Debt Holders could enforce subordination and turnover provisions against Noteholders via trust principles, and that post-filing interest was payable.

However, the Court reversed the motion judge on two key issues: it found that a massive IT outsourcing contract was not in the 'ordinary course of business', thereby elevating its assignee to Senior Debt status, and it ruled that the distributed securities must be valued at the 'Plan value' ($5.50 per share) rather than the post-emergence market value.