Bradley Teplitsky

In a fraud action, the defendant volunteered to have the proceeds of the sale of her home held in trust pending trial, resulting in a consent order.

The defendant subsequently brought a motion to use a portion of the frozen funds to pay for her living and legal expenses.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to vary the consent order.

The court held that the consent order was equivalent to a Mareva injunction and that it had the jurisdiction to permit the defendant to use the frozen assets for reasonable expenses.

The motion was granted, allowing the defendant to use up to $175,000 from the proceeds.

The appellants brought a motion seeking to appoint the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian for one appellant, to require a mental examination, to remove counsel, to extend time to perfect the appeal, and to seal evidence concerning mental health.

The motion judge addressed the sealing and confidentiality issues under the two-part test from Sierra Club v. Canada (Minister of Finance).

The court ordered redaction of solicitor-client communications and certain historical medical information as reasonable alternatives to confidentiality orders.

However, the court declined to grant a confidentiality order for current observations of the appellant's mental state, finding insufficient evidence of necessity under the Sierra Club test.

References to a non-party's health information were also redacted as unnecessary and irrelevant.

Following the dismissal of a will challenge via summary judgment, the successful respondents sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court found that the applicants' allegations of undue influence were not evidence-based and their vitriolic approach unnecessarily prolonged the litigation.

The court awarded costs of $275,000 to the estate and $125,000 to the respondent personally, payable by the applicants, with one applicant's liability capped at 20%.

The moving parties (respondents in the main action) brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the responding parties' claims challenging the validity of the deceased's 2005 will and inter vivos transfers.

The responding parties alleged that the deceased was subjected to undue influence and fraud by her son, the primary beneficiary.

The court reviewed the extensive circumstantial evidence and found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting that the deceased was an independent and strong-willed individual who made deliberate choices about her estate.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claims to set aside the 2005 will and the inter vivos transfers.